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FOREWORD

This study is one of a group of inquiries undertaken for the international research program of the Institute of Pacific Relations into the growth and characteristics of Asian Communist movements in recent years. Other reports in this series deal with Japan (two volumes having already been published), India, Indochina and Malaya. The present volume is in part an outgrowth of a shorter earlier study written by Mr. Thomas for the Lucknow (1950) Conference of the Institute, under the title "Recent Political and Economic Developments in Communist China", the great bulk of that paper being devoted to important documents on Communist China.

Mr. Thomas has now written a completely new and much more detailed and comprehensive survey of the structure and functioning of the new regime in China. Extensive use has been made of basic official documents but it has not been financially feasible to include a large documentary appendix as had originally been hoped. Readers can find most of these documents, however, by consulting Mr. Thomas' earlier report, which is still obtainable from the IPR Publications Office, or the recently issued collection of excerpts from important documents compiled by Professor E. Arthur Steiner of the University of California at Los Angeles, or the Documentary History of Chinese Communism by Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz and John K. Fairbank (Harvard University Press), or the voluminous collection of translated materials issued by the American Consulate-General at Hongkong and made available to a number of libraries in the United States.

The present study is inevitably introductory and can make no claim to being definitive. The Communist experiment in China is still too much in its early phases and too little open to critical outside observation to permit anything like an exhaustive analysis. For a great variety of reasons, including the war in Korea and the overall policies of the international Communist movement, it is often difficult for the outside writer to know how far major developments in China are determined by internal conditions or by purely Chinese attitudes and habits of administration. Furthermore, it must be noted that major changes can sometimes come very suddenly in a totalitarian regime. For instance the recent dismissal of Po Yi-po as Minister of Finance may well reflect the difficulties which have been encountered in the internal financing of the Five Year Plan and in reaching the assigned production targets for the first year of the Plan. The new Soviet aid agreement may also portend significant new changes in program and methods of Chinese economic development.

Illustrative of another type of problem which may lead to large changes in programs and achievements of the Chinese governmental agencies is the following report which appeared in the Far Eastern Economic Review (Hongkong) for June 11, 1953:

"The Peking Finance Ministry recently concluded its latest checkup of bureaucratism in the Ministry and it is now devoting its attentions to the implementation of the decrees and directives issued during the past three years. During the recent checkup, numerous mistakes were exposed. For instance, a

certain unit asked the Ministry to appropriate 350,000 million yuan for urgent use, and the Ministry made the appropriations as asked without making an investigation. Actually, however, the budgetary provision for this item was only 70,000 million, so 280,000 million was appropriated over and above the Budget figure! Units clash with each other and often leave decisions unsettled. The remark is frequently heard that the Ministry is not efficient despite its numerous departments, and apparently the more meetings there are the fewer the decisions. Some people remarked 'We cannot hold the meeting (because of lack of a quorum) and cannot break up the meeting (because preparations are not well done and problems cannot be solved.)'

"The Ministry called another conference and the acting Finance Minister Jung Tze-ho gave the officials a dressing-down. The departments always looked brisk and busy but were generally attending only to minor problems, leaving the major ones severely alone. Even in routine work there had been many mistakes. Correspondence destined for Wuhan went to Mukden, to the North-east instead of the South-Central administration. Tons were written as catties and 'hundred million' was entered as 'ten million' in official correspondence. More and more work was arranged but fewer and fewer checkups were made. Budgetary items and forms drawn up were so complex and numerous that cadres at subordinate levels were unable to fill them up and the forms were pigeonholed. Financial departments only concerned themselves with budgetary examination but rarely with budgetary implementation. Sometimes they held the purse strings too tight in the case of essential expenditures. In the matter of tax collection, demands for the fulfillment of tasks, inadequate check-up work and inadequate implementation of policy, have resulted in such law-breaking acts in various districts as commandism, beatings, arrests and forced suicides. 'This state of affairs cannot be tolerated and must be strictly corrected in the future,' said the Minister."

Despite the unavoidable limitations attaching to any study largely based on Chinese Communist official pronouncements and on a controlled press, it is believed that the study will serve a useful purpose in outlining the general machinery of government in China and the basic policies behind it. In this connection it is worthwhile to note the following remarks made by the compilers of the valuable Current Background series issued by the American Consulate-General in Hongkong:

"The emphasis on doctrinal questions which is apparent in all Marxist-Leninist literature is equally notable in Chinese Communist writings. Tiresome though these prolix discussions are to the non-Communist mind untrained in dialectics, and especially in dialectical materialism, it is nevertheless most important to attempt to understand the theory of the Chinese society and of the Chinese revolution as it is now developing in Communist China. Regardless of future developments, there can be little question but that the internal impact of Maoism and of the ideas contained in the Common

Program (as well as the basic Leninist-Stalinist literature) upon the minds of millions of people in China will be at least as important in the long run as the external pulverization of traditional personal and psychological relationships which have gone on apace in the implementation of the political revolution on the mainland of China. The intellectual-ideological impact of Communism upon the youth of the country is especially to be noted, for there is no question but that the Chinese Communists have, in a planned and painstaking manner, set about the task of winning over the minds of the youth of China."

Mr. Thomas, who has been a Research Associate of the Institute of Pacific Relations for several years, studied in Peking in 1947 and 1948 and is a graduate of the East Asian Institute at Columbia University. In the preparation of his study he has had the benefit of valuable advice and criticism from Mr. Robert C. North of the Hoover Institute at Stanford University (whose own book Moscow and the Chinese Communists has recently appeared) and Professor Theodore H. E. Chen of the University of Southern California. It should be noted, however, that though the report is issued by the Institute of Pacific Relations, the author alone is responsible for statements of fact or opinion expressed in it.

William L. Holland
Secretary General

New York
October 28, 1953.

NOTE ON THE SECOND EDITION

In this revised edition a new chapter covering major developments from about the middle of 1953 to November 1954 has been added together with some additional documents including the text of the new constitution and the texts of recent Sino-Soviet agreements.

December 16, 1954.

INTRODUCTION

Any study of the political and administrative structure of China today must necessarily be limited in scope and tentative in nature. There is presently no opportunity for personal, on-the-spot observation and appraisal of current developments within China, nor is there any stream, or even trickle of independent, up-to-date reports available from that country. The American press, for example, has no direct contact with China; foreign newspaper correspondents stationed in Hong Kong themselves must rely mainly on official Chinese Communist reports, supplemented by such information as can be secured from refugees and other arrivals from the mainland. Aside from a very few valuable first-hand reports therefore, a study of this nature must be based principally on official Communist documents, pronouncements and reports, or on critical outside analyses which are themselves largely based on such material. The utility of the information contained in such sources, when carefully evaluated, should by no means be minimized; but its limitations and shortcomings are obvious. 1/ In addition, the problem inevitably arises in discussions of structural and administrative details, of how closely actual practice conforms to paper plans and outlines.

There is the further difficulty of deciding what to include in a relatively brief analysis of Chinese Communist government and administration. In view of the all-embracing nature of the Communist state, "government" now includes every aspect of life; political, economic, social and cultural; and extra-governmental organizations and relationships are in many cases much more important than the formal institutions of government themselves. The structure and functioning of the Communist party and of such mass organizations as the trade unions and the peasants' associations, as well as the administrative organization of state-owned factories, are at least as much a part of the present Chinese government structure as are, for example, provincial government councils. The nationwide "thought reform" movement is as much a function of government as the collection of taxes or the conduct of foreign affairs. While an effort has been made to discuss many such key quasi-governmental components and activities of the

1/ The following comments of the Press Monitoring Unit of the American Consulate General, Hong Kong, whose Survey of the China Mainland Press, and Current Background releases of the texts of official Chinese Communist documents have been indispensable sources of information for this study, are worth noting in this regard:

"It is a generally held view that anything published in a Communist area is necessarily propaganda and therefore of little value from the standpoint of the independent critical observer. It is, of course, true that everything published in Communist China is propaganda in the sense that its avowed purpose is to further the revolution. Yet the fact remains that, to readers with the necessary background to interpret them, the official published sources are far more important and reliable than might be expected. The official record is admittedly incomplete, but to date in Communist China it has been surprisingly extensive and characterized by unusual candor in admitting mistakes and shortcomings and in documenting the violent methods which have accompanied the consolidation of the revolution. In the absence of independent observations on the spot, a careful study of this documentary is of basic importance in comprehending the manifold

Chinese state, a thoroughly adequate account would necessitate an encyclopedic survey of contemporary Chinese life.

The largely chronological approach used in writing this book should be kept constantly in mind, particularly in reading the earlier sections which deal with the relatively milder initial phases of the Communists' program. Many important changes in emphasis and policy have occurred since the formation of the "Chinese People's Republic" in October 1949, and are duly noted in later sections. The Nationalist military collapse and the consequent Communist assumption of the responsibility of nationwide power apparently took place much sooner than the Communists had either expected or were completely prepared for. They were faced with the necessity of quickly establishing their rule over vast areas of the country with which they had had very little prior contact, and of taking on many governmental duties for which their previous experience, invaluable though it was for them in many respects, had not adequately fitted them. Political and economic arrangements had to be made and policies determined "on the move", and this involved a certain amount of improvisation and expediency. At the same time, the gigantic revolutionary process of change the Communists have instituted in China, itself makes for continuous revisions both in the machinery of government and in its policy and direction, since the government (acting essentially for the Communist party) both initiates and then accommodates itself to the ever "higher stages" of development of this revolutionary process.

The past three years ^{2/} have therefore been essentially an interim period, now drawing to a close, during which the basic framework and foundation of Communist military, political and economic consolidation has been created. The provisional aspects of many elements of the present structure of government clearly reflect this fact. For example, legal-judicial organization and procedure are still in the process of development, and formal institutions of civil government, particularly on lower levels, are still largely transitional in nature, with the military presently holding a much more important place in government than it is likely to in the years to come.

Some new trends in policy over this period may also be noted here briefly. The socialization of the Chinese economy is apparently proceeding at a faster rate than seemed probable when the Peking government was first formed; the stress, in relation to private business, is now less on reassurance than on stern warnings and punitive measures against those violating the spirit of "New Democracy", and on stricter regulation and control. The

place on the mainland of China since 1949. Reliable observers who have studied both the Chinese Communist press and the Soviet press report that the former is much more important as a basic source of information than the stereotyped press in Russia today." (From introductory remarks to "A Listing of the Current Background Series" Nos. 1-200. (undated))

^{2/} This introductory section was written at the close of 1952 and textual references in the present tense generally refer to that period. A concluding postscript (Chapter VII) is concerned with major developments in 1953 and 1954.

original willingness to accept, with little questioning, liberal intellectuals as "democratic personages", has been replaced by firm requirements for "thought reform" along Marxist lines for such people, if they are to retain their "democratic" standing. In general, a limited toleration of non-Marxist ideas is being replaced by a vigorous campaign designed to root out "bourgeois" influences in the cultural, educational and economic life of the country. As for "reactionary elements", a relatively moderate policy stressing "compulsory reform" was succeeded by a massive campaign of suppression against those among them alleged to be "counter-revolutionaries". Such developments, as well as others noted later in this book, were undoubtedly inherent in the "logic of revolution" in China, and essentially indicate further advances along a previously-charted road to Communism -- indeed, most such developments were at least foreshadowed in earlier pronouncements by the Chinese Communist leaders. At the same time, various internal and external pressures on the Peking government since its formation, notably the Korean war and the continued existence of the American-supported Nationalist government and army on Formosa, have undoubtedly also had their effect on the process of change in China and on the manner and speed with which such changes are being carried through.

The Chinese Communists are now turning their primary attention from the problems of preliminary political and economic consolidation to their plans for the basic transformation of Chinese society, plans which revolve principally around industrialization and the complete socialization of the Chinese economy, including the collectivization of agriculture. For any nearly definitive assessment of the prospects of Chinese Communism many questions, relating both to the period of consolidation now ending as well as to the one immediately ahead, remain to be answered. Some, but by no means all, such questions may be listed briefly here:

To what extent will the land reform program, now in its final phase, give the Communists long-term support among the peasantry? How will such support be affected by an eventual program of collectivization?

How serious a friction will develop between the newly-rising urban labor forces and the party and government cadres reflecting them on the one hand, and those of peasant background on the other? What effect will present efforts to proletarianize the Communist party have in this regard?

Can the Communists speedily train efficient technical-economic cadres in sufficient numbers to develop and administer a greatly-expanded modern industrial economy? Can other immense economic problems connected with industrialization be surmounted, and at what cost? Can the Soviet Union provide adequate technical assistance and material aid for such an economic expansion program?

How will the position of the private businessman in China be resolved once the final "struggle for nationalization" of all enterprises has been launched? Will the "old-type" intellectuals find it possible to continue their present full cooperation with the regime in the face of the new ideological demands being made on them?

Will the Communists succeed in firmly implanting their ideology among the Chinese people? How much resistance will it face from traditional Chinese thought and culture? Will there be important interaction between the two resulting in the eventual emergence of a distinctive "Chinese" case?

munism"? Will the Communists fully succeed in merging Chinese nationalism with the new "proletarian internationalism"? More broadly, in the light of the Chinese Communist claim to being the authentic representative of Asian nationalism, how powerful an appeal will this claim, as well as the specific techniques of Chinese Communism, have for other equally depressed and economically backward areas of Asia should the Communists succeed in rapidly bringing economic modernization and strength to China?

And finally, how will both the strength of the Peking regime and its plans for economic development be affected by present or future Chinese military commitments?

While some of the more readily discernible tendencies are discussed in later chapters, such questions will be difficult, in most cases impossible, to answer before much more time has elapsed, and a great deal more evidence has become available. They will remain important, however, and will merit intensive further investigation by students of contemporary China.

THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS' RISE TO POWER

The rise of the Chinese Communist party to its present position of supreme power is one of the most spectacular political developments of modern times. In the late 1920's, with their political and military organizations crushed after the break with the Kuomintang in 1927, Communist strength-in-being consisted only of some surviving, disorganized armed remnants which had largely taken cover in the remote countryside far from China's major political, economic and cultural centers where the Chinese Communist movement had first taken root and grown. With the newly-established and relatively vigorous Nationalist government, under Chiang Kai-shek, consolidating its position most strongly in the coastal cities and in the populous and economically more advanced lower Yangtze Valley (areas which in Marxist-Leninist thinking were looked upon as the focal points for Communist activity in China), the latter's prospects must have seemed very bleak indeed.

Yet, within two decades these Communist-controlled bands had been transformed into a powerful and highly-disciplined army under the firm direction of a maturely-led, ideologically sophisticated mass Communist party. 1/ The joint leadership of this army and party had also succeeded in developing a remarkably effective, if crude, administrative structure to govern the already huge areas of China under its control. 2/ As the final step in this astounding change in fortune, they then went on to overcome, in an all-out military struggle (the traditional road to political power in China), 3/ a nationalist army vastly more powerful than the one which had been able virtually to destroy the Communists as an organized military and political force some twenty years before.

1/ The Communist officially claimed, at the time of their party's seventh national congress in April 1945 that their regular armed forces totalled 910,000 men, with over two million more organized in the "people's militia". Party membership was then declared to be about 1,210,000. Mao Tse-tung, On Coalition Government (a political report made to the seventh national congress of the Chinese Communist party, on April 24, 1945). (English translation published in China, September 1945, p. 16. Also issued in the United States as The Fight for a New China, New York: New Century Publishers, 1945)

2/ In the same report, Mao claimed that the various "liberated areas" contained a total population of 95,500,000 and were dispersed in location from Inner Mongolia in the northwest to Hainan Island off the southern coast of China. ibid., p. 23.

3/ The Chinese Communists themselves have often reiterated that "...armed struggle is the chief form of struggle and the chief form of organization of the Chinese revolution. The existence and development of the Chinese Party are inseparable from armed struggle." Liu Shao-chi, "Liquidate the Menshevik Ideology Within the Party". (Speech delivered in celebration of the 22nd anniversary of the Chinese Communist party on July 1, 1943.) English text in Current Background No.-84 (Hong Kong: American Consulate General, June 1, 1951.

Many factors obviously played their part in this Communist "success story", some of which may not even be clearly recognizable as yet. There are naturally conflicting viewpoints as to which constituted the "decisive" factors, and these differences of opinion will only be resolved, if at all, through the longer perspective of history. In a very general sense, of course, the element of change operating in virtually every important sphere of Chinese life over the past thirty or forty years, with its widespread questioning of the partially disintegrating traditional patterns of life and its search for and receptivity to new forms of political and economic organization and to new ideas in culture and thought, itself made for what the Communists would term a "revolutionary situation." However, a few of the more specific factors very often cited as being among the most important in bringing the Chinese Communists to power may be mentioned here briefly.

One such element was the latent revolutionary potential contained in the economic dislocation, poverty and discontent of the Chinese countryside. This unrest could readily be developed and canalized by the Communists who, isolated from the cities, were desperately in need of a means for survival and growth. A second was the Sino-Japanese war, which gave the Communists their key opportunity to identify themselves with, and thus eventually to challenge the Kuomintang for leadership of Chinese nationalism. Together, and in a sense increasingly integrated with the desire for social and economic reform, nationalism has been the great dynamic force behind modern China's profound process of change and revolution, and the importance of Communist success in linking the two (particularly in winning for them an increasing number of converts among the important student and intellectual class) cannot be overemphasized.

The war also gave the Communists the opportunity to expand militarily and politically, through their effective guerrilla strategy combined with a program designed to appeal to the peasantry, into the vast north and central China countryside which had come under relatively superficial Japanese control following its forced evacuation by the Nationalist armies and government. As a result, by the end of the war with Japan the Communist forces had experienced a growth of power and influence that was little short of sensational in its proportions, and for the first time made it possible for them to challenge the Kuomintang for national leadership.

Conversely, the war marked a decisive decline in the power, vitality and morale of the Nationalist government as it retreated into the Chinese hinterland where, cut off from its original sources of strength, it was beset by military, economic and political problems and pressures which it became increasingly unable to handle constructively or effectively.

These two parallel processes continued on into the postwar period. (The Nationalists' loss of support among the urban intellectual and business classes and Communist gains among these so-called "middle groups" played a particularly important role in postwar developments and will be discussed in some detail in the next chapter.) Just what particular combination of these two trends -- each necessarily reacting on the other -- produced Communist victory is difficult to estimate. Similarly, what effect both American and Soviet postwar policy and actions in regard to China had on the development of this process remains the subject of intense controversy. The significance of such additional factors as Kuomintang military blundering during the civil war must also be taken into account. However, it can certainly be said that the rapidity with which Communist victory was achieved

in the 1946-49 civil war was a reflection not so much of the Communists' own absolute military and political power as of the advanced state of disintegration within Nationalist China at that time. 4/

The organizational skill and doctrinal flexibility shown by the Communists in exploiting these and other elements in the Chinese situation must itself be listed as one of the significant factors in their success. As a recent analysis of Chinese Communism observes, "...it is evident that Marxist-Leninism has had its success in China roughly in proportion as it has fitted into the Chinese scene, adapted itself to Chinese needs and conditions, and taken advantage of specific Chinese opportunities." 5/ Some of the special characteristics developed by Chinese Communism in the course of this process of adaptation, as well as the highlights of the program formulated by its leaders during their struggle for power are worth noting here.

In sharp contrast to the traditional Marxist concentration on urban industrial centers and on a technique of revolution which stressed the insurrectionary seizure of key urban centers by a Communist-led and organized proletariat, the Chinese Communists came to rely (at least for an important period) on comparatively inaccessible, well-defended rural bases of operations, and on regularly-constituted armed forces as a major weapon in their drive for power. Reliance on a Communist-administered base of operations gave to the Chinese Communist leaders a tangible source of power and means of support within China itself. A recent study of the formative years of Chinese Communism emphasizes that, "the power of the Chinese Communist leaders after 1931 did not derive solely from the mandate of Moscow, but was solidly based on the control of a military force, a territorial base, and a governmental apparatus." 6/

This fact, plus relative isolation from the international Communist world, made for increasing self-confidence and self-assurance in ideological matters. Survival, in the Chinese hinterland, depended on the validity of on-the-spot analyses and on the efficacy of day-to-day policy decisions, and not on rigid adherence to the letter of classic Communist theorists, particularly since these theorists had never, in any detailed fashion, dealt with the concrete circumstances under which the Chinese Communists operated. The test of theory had to be performance. Put another way, leadership of the party (given the known fact of the development of a highly successful Communist formula in China) was bound to gravitate towards those who, while insisting that they operated on a bedrock foundation of Leninist-Stalinist doctrine and of adherence to the Soviet world outlook, could exhibit some flexibility and creativity in the application of that doctrine to Chinese conditions.

This was reflected in the final emergence of Mao Tse-tung as the undisputed leader of the Chinese Communist party in 1935, and of the

4/ For documentation on the postwar situation in Nationalist China, see United States Relations With China. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949.

5/ Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz and John K. Fairbank, A Documentary History of Chinese Communism. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952. p. 13.

6/ Benjamin I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951, p. 187.

dominance in the party of the principles and strategy he had developed in organizing and defending the first rural bases in Kiangsi which the Communists, after a five-year struggle, had been forced to abandon in 1934. Under the subsequent pressures of the anti-Japanese struggle, and through the device of the important cheng feng or "ideological rectification" movement of 1942-44 7/, the party was welded firmly together behind Mao's leadership and in support of the distinctive body of Marxist doctrine officially referred to as the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung".

Put in briefest terms, the major elements in the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung" during this period were his strategic principles of revolutionary warfare which, taking into account China's vast size and lack of interior communications, stressed a mobile guerilla warfare directed by a central organization operating out of remote rural bases -- a policy of "surrounding the cities from the countryside". This largely determined Mao's major emphasis on the peasant as the prime motive force of the Chinese revolution which in turn called for military and political mobilization of the peasantry, principally through a program of agrarian reform and a rudimentary form of popular local government. "In everything we do", Mao declared in 1940, "we show that we are basing ourselves on the forces of the peasantry" 8/; and inescapably, this resulted in a Communist party and army which were not only based on the peasantry, but which were themselves almost wholly peasant in composition. Mao's "thought" was further key-noted by a strong element of nationalism, reflected in the struggle against Japan, general "anti-imperialism", and stress on the development of a popular national culture and on the construction of a powerful "new China".

Mao set up both a minimum and a maximum Communist program. The latter looked to the eventual creation of a completely socialized China, while the former envisioned the formation of a "new democratic" state marking a lengthy transitional period between the "semi-feudal and semi-colonial" China of the present and the socialist China of the future. New Democracy was to substitute for the "capitalist stage" of development and provide the economic basis for socialism and eventual communism. Economically this transitional stage, though dominated by the nationalized sector of the economy and by overall state economic control, was to keep a place for private capitalism as well as for an agricultural system based on the private ownership of land. Politically, though led by the Communist party representing the "alliance of workers and peasants", it was to take the form of a "revolutionary united front" of the Communist party, representing these two classes, with other parties representing "patriotic" business elements, the intellectuals, and other sections of the middle classes. This strategy of broad coalition, though changing in specific application in accordance with shifts in general circumstances and Communist tactics, has been a continuous feature of Chinese Communist policy under Mao since 1935; this "tactical principle and method," a party leader stated recently, consists essentially of "winning over and striving to unite (with) all possible allies, and together (with them) deal with the enemy at hand, or isolate him to the greatest possible extent, with

7/ See Boyd Compton, Mao's China. Party Reform Documents, 1942-44. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1952.

8/ Mao Tse-tung, On New Democracy. English translation, Appendix B in Communism in China (The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism. Supplement III.) Washington: House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1948. p. 83.

a view to smashing him completely." 9/ It is a policy which has been aptly described as one of gathering "the maximum number of friends in order to fight the minimum number of enemies." 10/

Also permeating "Maoism" was its stress on the 'overwhelming importance of concrete experience in formulating policy and as a means of testing and modifying theory. In a philosophical essay written in 1937, for example, Mao declared, "Marxism-Leninism has in no way put an end to the discovery of truths, but continues to blaze the path towards the recognition of truths through practice...; we are against any incorrect ideology, whether right or 'left', that departs from the realities of history." 11/ While it is clear that, semantically speaking, all such new "truths" were to be construed simply as further elaborations of "correct" Marxist theory, in practice it indicated a realism and adaptability which enabled the Chinese Communist party during these years to work out a "Chinese" solution to the problem of devising a formula through which they could effectively exploit their own environment and circumstances, and those of the nation as a whole.

To what extent this formula represented a departure from or even a denial of various Marxist principles is a matter for involved doctrinal analysis; 12/ the key point politically, however, is that the Chinese Communist leaders themselves never acknowledged any such variance and, on the contrary, always took great pains to assert their orthodoxy, describing themselves as "Marxist-Leninists" for whom the theoretical works of the Communist quadrumvirate of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, and the political and organizational principles of the latter two were a basic guide to their own theory and practice. 13/

In "sinifying" Marxism, the Chinese Communist leaders affirmed, they were merely following a truly "Bolshevik" approach in the tradition of Lenin and Stalin themselves, and they labeled attempts at rigidly applying "text-book theory" to China as examples of "false Marxism". Thus even though Mao's ideas gained dominance at the expense of those of the so-called "Moscow-returned student" leadership of the party in the early thirties, and though

9/ Peng Chen, "The Victory of Marxism-Leninism in China". Peking, New China News Agency, June 26, 1951. (Reproduced in Current Background No. 89. Hong Kong, July 5, 1951.)

10/ Chien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950. p. 367.

11/ Mao Tse-tung, On Practice. (English translation in supplement to People's China, (Peking), June 1, 1951. p. 22.)

12/ See Benjamin I. Schwartz, op. cit.

13/ See, for example, Lin Shao-chi, How To Be a Good Communist. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1951. (A series of lectures delivered in Yanan in 1939, now reissued in English translation.) In 1948 Mao also declared that "the working class and the people as a whole cannot be successfully led in their struggle without a revolutionary party, without a revolutionary party based on the ideological, organizational and theoretical principles of Marxism-Leninism as guided by the all-wise ideas of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin." The Chinese party was such a party, he added, and "is developing all lines" as the Communist party of the Soviet Union. 14/

there is some evidence to indicate that the program Mao had earlier developed in the isolated fastnesses of Kiangsi were not wholly in line with Communist views on China as developed in Moscow; ^{14/} at no time has there been evidence of any important split between Chinese Communism and the international Communist movement centered in Moscow. Indeed, the broadly-formulated principles on which the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung" is based can be found in early Communist resolutions, and in various writings of Lenin and Stalin. The Chinese Communist party has always tempered its nationalism with underlying support of the concept of "proletarian internationalism"; to the Communist leaders the Chinese revolution has been an integral part of the "proletarian Socialist world revolution." ^{15/}

Here it should perhaps be recalled that the Chinese Communist Party's initial impetus and development did in fact follow the traditional Communist pattern, in that it was based on the modern Chinese intellectual and trade union movements, and was strongly influenced by and closely associated with Soviet Communism. In its early years the party's activities were primarily focused on the cities; in 1926, for example, only five percent of its membership was peasant. ^{16/}

The later "exile" to the countryside and the subsequent development of a mass party overwhelmingly peasant in composition never prevented the Communist leaders from maintaining that the party was "the vanguard of the proletariat" and that therefore the Chinese revolution was really being led by the working class. This point is currently being pressed more than ever, but even before the shift of Communist attention to the cities in 1949, it was being vigorously asserted. Thus in the course of a definitive ideological analysis, made in 1949 at the seventh national congress of the Chinese Communist party, Liu Shao-chi adroitly argued: ^{17/}

For long years the main sections of our Party have remained in the rural districts. This is due to the fact that China is a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, with a broad mass of peasants serving as the main force of the present revolution, and that the

"Revolutionary Forces of the World Rally to Combat Imperialist Aggression" For a Lasting Peace. For a People's Democracy! Bucharest, November 1, 1948.

^{14/} See Benjamin I. Schwartz, op. cit., p. 9. This point is further discussed in connection with current ideological developments in China in Chapter IV.

^{15/} Mao Tse-tung, On New Democracy, op. cit., p. 71. The most vigorous statement of "proletarian internationalism" in Chinese Communist writings is the 1948 treatise by Liu Shao-chi, Nationalism and Internationalism, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1951. This was apparently written in part to quell any doubts which might have arisen in Chinese Communist ranks over the Russian rift with Marshal Tito.

^{16/} Mary C. Wright, "The Chinese Peasant and Communism". Pacific Affairs Vol. XXIV, No. 3, September 1951. p. 256.

^{17/} Liu Shao-chi, On the Party. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1950. p. 28.

Chinese working class, oppressed in the cities and for a long time unable to carry on revolutionary activities freely, sent its vanguard to the countryside to organize the broad mass of its allies there in order to act in coordination with these allies in liberating the cities at the opportune moment. This is the actual meaning of our Party's long-term work in the countryside. Under the existing peculiar conditions in China, only by so doing can our Party represent the Chinese working class, and carry out the tasks of the working class at the present period. Should our Party fail to do so, it could not represent the Chinese working class.

The continuously-maintained and thoroughgoing 'class-conscious', Marxist outlook of the Chinese Communist leaders thus indicated quite clearly that greater "orthodoxy" in the surroundings and circumstances under which the party operated would be reflected by changes in Communist policy along similarly more "orthodox" lines. It also indicated that, with full control of the state, and with it of the power to initiate sweeping changes in the political and economic environment of the entire country, the direction of change would be in line with the strict Leninist-Stalinist principles of the Chinese Communist party.

However, the past history and characteristics of Chinese Communism, particularly its flexibility and shrewd capacity to 'carry along' non-Communist elements and its acute awareness of internal power relationships, also suggested that, in power, the Communists could be expected to combine a skilful adaptability to given conditions and needs with the institution of an ever-widening and accelerating tempo of change designed eventually to realize ultimate Communist objectives in China. In this interacting process, the political strength generated through an effective policy of adaptability would in turn be utilized to affect these changes, with the party continuously reconsolidating and 'readapting' itself in preparation for ever-further drastic revolutionary changes. In essence, this has seemingly been the pattern of operation exhibited by the Chinese Communists since assuming power in 1949, and is likely to continue to be in the future. The effectiveness of this approach has perhaps been most evident in Communist relations with the urban "middle groups" in China, whose attraction to the Communists was so marked a feature of the Communist takeover in 1949.

CHAPTER II.

THE RETURN TO THE CITIES

As already noted, a striking aspect of the postwar collapse of the Nationalist government was the virtual evaporation of support for it among those urban groups -- the intellectual and business classes -- which had once been the source of its vitality and the mainstay of its political strength. A British sinologist who witnessed the Communist takeover of the major cultural and intellectual center of Peking has noted that "nothing more surely presaged the fall of the Kuomintang than the wholesale desertion of the educated minority." ^{1/} This process, already under way during the war with Japan, was a particularly notable feature of the 1946-49 civil war.

A. Factors in the Middle Groups Attraction to the Communists.

The desertion of the intellectuals was in great part due to the steady deterioration of their position in postwar China. The wild and uncontrolled inflation had reduced most of them to near-destitution, and the lack of government interest in either the adequate use of their skills or in their personal welfare deeply embittered them. Their hostility grew with the increasingly severe "thought control" and police surveillance of the universities. An American scholar, who was also in Peking at this time, quotes a noted liberal professor at one of the leading universities there as declaring, in the fall of 1948, that "we have become so completely convinced of the hopelessness of the existing government that we feel the sooner it is removed the better", ^{2/} while two American correspondents who were in Shanghai both before and after the Communist takeover of that most important metropolis of China report a similar state of disillusionment pervading intellectual circles in that city. ^{3/}

These developments had the effect of pushing many such people towards the Communists, who represented the only practicable, and also as yet untried, alternative to Nationalist rule. It should be remembered that liberal groups among the intellectuals had long favored some form of coalition between Nanking and the Communists. Stirred perhaps most strongly by nationalism, they had increasingly come to feel that basic economic and social reform were essential concomitants of an effective nationalism. As a prominent Chinese political scientist (who himself later was to give his active support to the Communists) expressed it: "Every Chinese with any sensitivity of mind who is not bound to vested interests realizes that there is no future for the Chinese nation, unless it is speedily renovated by the economic and social uplift of the entire people. The true and noble nationalism of today is inseparably linked with the determination to effect that general uplift." ^{4/} At the same time, the Communists, who had originally

^{1/} C.P.F. (C.P. Fitzgerald), "The Chinese Revolution". The World Today, Vol. VI, No. 6, June 1950. p. 244.

^{2/} Derk Bodde, Peking Diary. New York: Henry Schuman, 1950. p. 24.

^{3/} Lynn and Amos Landman, Profile of Red China. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1951. p. 37.

^{4/} Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China. op. cit. p. 394.

been more closely identified with an economic reform program had, as already indicated, come to inject an equally strong note of nationalism into their thinking and program. Thus, ever more attracted by the Communists' proposed economic program for China, a great many of the intellectuals also found reassurance in the Communist appeal to nationalist sentiment.

In making this appeal, the Communists were greatly aided by the growing belief within educated circles that the Nanking government had largely lost its claim to being the genuine defender of Chinese nationalism. Whether rightly or wrongly, articulate Chinese opinion in the early postwar years was obsessed by the fear of a resurgent Japan, and therefore regarded with strong suspicion what they considered to be a "soft" American occupation policy towards that country. The increasingly mild stand taken by Nanking on questions relating to the Occupation -- a stand which was interpreted in China as further evidence of Kuomintang weakness and dependence on the United States for support -- and the reliance of Chiang Kai-shek on foreign assistance to wage an unpopular civil war, played an important part in turning much nationalist sentiment against the government. In addition, the identification of the United States with the disliked Kuomintang turned much nationalist feeling into anti-American channels. 5/ As a result the Communists, who might still have been handicapped by their ideological connections with the Soviet Union, found themselves with yet another means of rallying nationalist support as the defenders of China's interests against "American imperialism."

Also, since military strength has been of paramount importance in gaining political power in modern China, such middle-of-the-road political parties as did exist, without armies, could not hope to compete with either the Kuomintang or the Communist party. They had only the choice of possible alliance with one or the other of these two alternatives. Since their experiences had already alienated them from the Kuomintang, it was almost inevitable for the liberal "middle groups" to feel that under the Communists (still a relatively unknown quantity to them) there was bound to be a change for the better; and therefore to look on the prospect of alliance with the Communist party with growing favor.

This process was facilitated by another important characteristic of the modern Chinese intellectual: an avid receptivity towards new philosophical ideas and political systems in their search for a means of overcoming China's weaknesses and of solving its multitude of pressing problems. China's traditional pattern of life had lost much of its validity and vitality, as its failure to compete successfully with the West had demonstrated, and the Chinese intellectual increasingly looked to the West in an effort to determine the basic sources of power and modernization. For them, Marxism (which had originated in western Europe), and the Russian communist experiment itself, were as valid examples of western philosophy and politico-economic

5/ "This feeling of revulsion (against the Nationalist government) has come to be directed also against the United States because of our close association with that government." Woodbridge Bingham, "American Responsibility in China", Far Eastern Survey, February 9, 1949. p. 31.

See also, Dorothy Borg, "America Loses Chinese Good Will", Far Eastern Survey, February 23, 1949. pp. 37-45.

organization as were the democratic parliamentary, free-enterprise systems of western Europe and the United States, no matter how Soviet Communism may have appeared to observers in the latter countries.

The Russians, for their part, had made special efforts to win Chinese support and, of course, had also played an important role in the earlier rise to power of the Kuomintang itself. A Chinese economist, who formerly taught in the United States, and who had himself been connected with the "middle parties" in China, has stressed this point in explaining the Chinese liberal's predisposition to cooperate with the Communists: 6/

The Chinese have had much more contact with Communism than have Americans; in the years after the first World War many nationalists, including Dr. Sun Yat-sen, were deeply stirred by Lenin's declaration against imperialism, the Soviet's stress upon racial equality and the offers of the new Moscow regime to give up all special rights in China including extraterritoriality. We all remembered the student demonstrations and strikes in 1919. We all remembered the vital part that the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Union played in bringing about the success of the Nationalist revolution. The Kuomintang itself was reorganized by the Russians. It was Sun Yat-sen who gave his blessing to the 'Three Great Policies' of friendship with the USSR, cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party and the organization of workers and peasants.

There has thus been a genuine competition of ideas among educated Chinese; and while European and American educational, cultural and missionary influences helped disseminate Western democratic concepts, there was also great interest in and some sympathy for Marxist ideas. Such sympathies may easily have been reinforced when the superficial adoption by the Nanking government of certain Western parliamentary forms and practices merely served to cloak its inefficient and repressive governmental apparatus. The later identification of the United States with the Nanking regime also had the effect of further undermining the appeal of the Western way of life. For many, American support of the undemocratic Nationalist government seemed to cast doubt on American democracy itself. Of course, it may also be presumed that many "liberal" Chinese were in reality much closer to the Communists in thinking and sympathies than they appeared to be; there can be little doubt that a strong element of caution made many pro-Communists take a moderate "middle-of-the-road" position in Nationalist China, openly declaring themselves for the Communists only after 'liberation'.

The position of the intellectual in the Chinese Communist hierarchy, with its overtones of the classic Chinese scholar-official tradition may also have had its effect. The Communist stress on a party elite engaged in constant study and mastery of an ideological system, in this case Marxism,

6/ James T. K. Wu, "The Middle Groups in Communist China" (unpublished manuscript). Mr. Wu, who lived in the United States from 1946 to 1950, on the staff of the Far Eastern Institute of the University of Washington, was a member of the National Salvation Association (an anti-Japanese political organization in prewar China which later became part of the Democratic League) before the war. He was an observer at the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference held in Peking in September 1949, at which the Communist-led 'People's Republic of China' was set up.

bore a certain resemblance to the ancient Chinese emphasis on the mastery of Confucian doctrine as the road to political preferment and the means of leading the people. As a thoughtful American student of ideological developments in China has observed: "The Marxian emphasis on the role of the Communist party in the teaching of the people is not entirely inconsistent with the Chinese tutelary tradition of the scholar-official class." 7/ It should be added, however, that this by no means implies any strong similarity in content or outlook between the Confucian and Communist systems; also, the scholar-officials of old China were drawn largely from the gentry class which the Communists are now liquidating.

Many of these same factors had their impact on industrial and commercial circles as well; and a large number of the intellectuals themselves, of course, had close family or other ties with these circles. The business groups also had special grievances against the Kuomintang as a result of their own postwar experiences, for the Nationalist government, no longer primarily representative of these groups, as it had been in its more vital and progressive prewar days, had antagonized many of them by policies and actions which greatly weakened their economic position. Perhaps the final step in this process came with the ill-fated "currency reform" of August 19, 1948, under which all privately-owned foreign currency, gold and silver holdings were ordered surrendered in exchange for a new paper "gold yuan", with the exchange rate set at four gold yuan to one American dollar. This rate, however, was maintained for only a short while, after which the value of the gold yuan declined precipitately. As a result, it has been wryly observed, "Nanking was richer by about \$200,000,000, and poorer by the final alienation of the middle class, that group which by all logic should have been its warmest ally against the Communists." 8/

Thus by the time the Communists arrived in 1949, many businessmen in such centers as Shanghai and Tientsin were ready to join in Communist denunciations of "bureaucratic capitalists", a term the Communists used to describe those leading Nationalist government officials and their families who either ran state-controlled economic facilities as personal economic empires, or who used their official positions to establish a dominating position in Chinese commercial and industrial life. At the same time, the business groups were prepared to at least test Communist declarations of protection and support for the so-called "national capitalists", defined by the Communists as including those merchants and industrialists who had been untainted by "foreign imperialism" and who had operated independently of the "bureaucratic capitalists."

Other, more general, factors also affected these middle groups, as they did the Chinese people as a whole. China had come through twelve consecutive years of bitter warfare, terribly destructive of life, property, and the entire social and economic fabric of society. The exhausted Chinese people longed above all for peace, the return of some stability and unity, and a minimum of economic well-being -- goals which only the Communists were in a position even to offer in 1949. The fact that Communist supremacy

7/ Donald G. Tewksbury, "Concluding Views on the Significance of the Far Eastern Revolution." (A mimeographed version of a report delivered by Professor Tewksbury, of Teachers' College, Columbia University, to a Far Eastern Conference held at Oberlin College on April 14, 1950.)

8/ Lynn and Amos Landman, op. cit. p. 5.

had been achieved through military means was not particularly damaging to them politically. As already noted, this has been the accepted road to political power in China, one which the Kuomintang itself had used. What was more, in Chinese tradition, the fact of military success created its own legality and qualified the winning side to rule the country. Conversely, according to this line of reasoning, the Kuomintang, by virtue of its defeat, had demonstrated its own incapacity and was therefore no longer entitled to the "mandate" to govern the nation. As Derk Bodde notes, 'This theory, repeatedly invoked in the past, still lives in Chinese minds today. It is succinctly expressed, in fact, in the very name for revolution, ko ming, which literally means 'transferring the mandate.' 2/

In varying degrees, therefore, extending from a passive and possibly dubious acceptance by many businessmen and professional groups, on the one hand, to enthusiastic support from great numbers of intellectuals and students on the other, a substantial section of the vitally important urban middle classes stood ready to participate in a Communist-organized and led "united front" in 1949 and to lend their invaluable skills and prestige to the new government.

B. The Communist Need for a 'United Front' Policy.

The nature of the broad national front the Chinese Communist party had sponsored as one of its fundamental policies had itself undergone considerable change during the 1946-49 period, in accordance with the shift in the actual balance of military and political forces during those years. In 1946 the Communists had accepted the idea of a coalition government in which the Kuomintang would have a plurality, with themselves in a strong secondary position, and the middle parties holding the balance of political power. But with the renewal of the civil war and the subsequent shift of the tide towards the Communists, this was changed to the party's sponsorship of a Communist-organized united front designed to set up a new government from which the official Kuomintang organization was to be excluded entirely. In this projected united front, the middle groups, now expanded to include many elements that had broken with the Nationalist government since 1946, were to play an extensive but subordinate role. Already, in an October 1947 manifesto, the Communist "People's Liberation Army" had declared: 10/

Unite the workers, peasants, soldiers, students, and commercial elements, all oppressed classes, all people's organizations, all democratic parties and groups, all national minorities, overseas Chinese everywhere and other patriotic elements-- unite to organize a national united front to strike down the dictatorial government of Chiang Kai-shek and establish a democratic coalition government.

Mao, in quoting this appeal in his December 1947 report to the Communist party's Central Committee, added that, 'this united front must also be under the firm leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.' 11/ This

2/ Derk Bodde, op. cit., p. 269.

10/ Quoted in Mao Tse-tung's report to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party, December 25, 1947. (North Shensi Radio, January 1, 1948.)

11/ Ibid.

was followed up in one of the Communists' May Day, 1948, slogans, in which they called for the convening of a new political consultative conference to establish this "democratic coalition government." The swift military victories of the Communist armies in the period immediately succeeding this altered the circumstances under which this conference was finally held in 1949 (and, incidentally, gave it a much broader base than it would otherwise have had), but in the months preceding its convocation in September of that year, the Communist party appeared no less anxious to cement its alliance with the various urban non-Communist parties and groups than were the latter to accept such an alliance.

For one thing, the precipitate collapse of the Kuomintang armies had catapulted the Communists into control of virtually all of China within a matter of months. Though vast areas were militarily conquered, this conquest had still to be translated into effective political and economic control. Essential to such a process was the immediate enlistment and training of many thousands of additional "cadres", or political workers, to organize and indoctrinate the hundreds of millions of people in the newly-won areas, and effectively to carry out the new government's policies among them. 12/ And these cadres had to be recruited largely from among the educated and politically aware urban groups, particularly the university students.

Of even higher priority and urgency in Communist thinking than the reorganization of the newly "liberated" countryside, was the rapid consolidation of their position in the cities. The Communists were already entrenched among the peasantry of north China and Manchuria, and they had reason to believe that the application of somewhat the same techniques they had used in those areas would gain them a strong position in the rest of rural China. 13/ Here, after all, was where their greatest experience and success lay, and, given the initial help of the urban political workers, they could proceed very largely on their own resources and through their own political and military organizations. The cities were a different matter. They represented a new challenge which called for skills and techniques there had been little opportunity for developing in previous Communist experience. To deal effectively with the problems raised in the cities required the broadest possible cooperation with those technically trained to run them. Here, it should be remembered that the middle parties were completely urban in character, and were mainly composed of educated people who could handle, on one level or another, the complex administrative and technical problems the Communists now faced, and from whom the latter could learn eventually to do the job themselves. 14/

12/ For a trained American observer's eyewitness account of this process of Communist consolidation in the rich Chengtu Plain region of Szechwan, which points up the important role of the political workers in implementing Communist policy and propaganda among the peasantry in the newly occupied areas, see G. William Skinner, "Aftermath of Communist Liberation in the Chengtu Plain", Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXIV, No. 1, March 1951. pp. 61-76.

13/ Skinner notes that though, "The Communists marched into Szechwan with no popular support among the peasantry. In all probability, their program of reform will eventually gain them peasant support in Szechwan as it did in the North." ibid. p. 69.

14/ An analysis of Communist urban policies during its first year of power,

Similarly, if the economies of the cities were to be restored rapidly, and the groundwork laid for further expansion, then the support of private commercial and industrial elements was equally essential. It was not difficult to see why, at a March 1949 plenary session of the Communist party's central committee, particular emphasis was placed on the need to "win over the intelligentsia, and win over as much as possible the petty bourgeoisie and liberal bourgeoisie and their representative personages" to cooperation with the Communist party. 15/

This policy took on even greater force since the cities themselves loomed very large in Communist thinking. The party had always tended to consider its long tenure among the peasantry as being in the nature of an exile from its labor base in the cities. This fact, plus the tremendous Communist emphasis on industrialization and economic modernization made them look to the cities as the key to their political and economic plans for the future. Thus, at the March 1949 plenary session of the Communist party's central committee, referred to above, a new orientation had emerged. It was decided to shift the center of Communist concentration to the cities, with major stress on restoring industrial production, mastering the techniques of urban administration and of business management, developing the labor movement, and fundamentally starting China on the road to industrialization. While affirming that the countryside must not now be "cast aside", an official report of the session declared, "the period has now begun of working from the cities to the countryside," and of "leadership" by the cities over the countryside. 16/ Implicit in all this was the eventual transformation of the party itself from a predominantly peasant to an urban-based, largely proletarian organization.

notes that "for the present (the intellectuals') cooperative attitude is an important factor in the effectiveness of Communist municipal administration." H. Arthur Steiner, 'Chinese Communist Urban Policy,' The American Political Science Review, Vol. XLIV, No. 1, March 1950. pp. 60-61.

15/ New China News Agency, North Shensi Radio, March 24, 1949.

16/ New China News Agency, North Shensi Radio, March, 1949. There may have been some conflict in Communist circles over this reorientation in policy. In a July 7, 1949, editorial, the Chang Kiang Jih Pao (official organ of the Central China Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party) declared: "It is true that we have many cities and will continue to take more cities in the near future. But except for Wuhan, Tayeh and Chengchow which have a weak industrial foundation, all the cities are consumers cities of a commercial character. In sharp contrast to Manchuria and North China, Central China is weak in industry while agricultural production holds first place....It is unthinkable that we can build up industry in the cities in Central China in accordance with the doctrine of New Democracy when the wide countryside is still handicapped by feudalism economy, when the war is still in progress and when the cities are so dependent economically upon the villages. It is also unthinkable that we can restore and expand industry before the productive forces in the villages have been liberated and before agricultural production has been fully restored." General Lin Piao, then head of the Central China Bureau of the CCP, also stated at this time that "After taking over the cities and villages, the party must shift its center of gravity for a certain period of time back to the villages c

Paradoxically, the Communist party's organizational strength among the urban workers was apparently very weak at this time. Though the Communists had been the most important influence in the earlier development of the Chinese labor movement, during the revolutionary upsurge of the mid-1920's, the subsequent enforced shift of their operations to the countryside and the elimination, by the Kuomintang, of a pro-Communist elements in the urban labor movement, severely weakened their position in the trade unions. Li Li-san, now Communist Minister of Labor, indirectly confirmed this in stating: "One special characteristic of the Chinese revolution lies in the fact that the cities were not occupied through uprisings of urban workers, but were seized by the PLA (People's Liberation Army) after the extermination of the enemy's forces." 17/ While the Communists vigorously set about remedying this situation once they were in the cities, this was an additional factor in their need for a broadly-based urban united front in 1949.

It must not be supposed that there were no obstacles preventing smooth functioning of such a policy even in this initial stage. For example, in the months following the Communist occupation of Shanghai in May, 1949, thousands of labor disputes broke out in that city. The workers, who were now being told by the Communists that they were the leading class in the country, were evidently determined to put this to the test by pushing for an immediate improvement in their economic status. In very many cases, however, this took the form of excessive and irresponsible demands and actions. The Communist authorities, still not firmly in control of the labor organizations, were apparently unwilling to antagonize the workers by openly opposing such demands, but at the same time they were also aware that the economy (particularly in this period of economic depression in Shanghai) could not bear up under the continued strain of these demands, and that the situation tended to undermine their policy of cooperation with private capital.

Their solution, seemingly, was to adopt a "hands off" policy in the early months, as a result of which labor did improve its position somewhat and Communist influence in its ranks grew correspondingly. The Communists then began to stress more firmly than before that further improvement in conditions could only be realized through increased production, and they acted to stabilize labor-capital relations on the basis of so-called "mutual benefits" to both. Thus, the Communist Minister of Labor noted at the end of 1949 that in the months following their "liberation", "the demands of the workers were sometimes too high, which had a detrimental effect upon production. Therefore, right from the beginning, we have explained to the workers in private enterprises the importance of the policy of restoring production

the cities must not be neglected. As soon as the feudalistic villages have been transformed into democratic villages, the prerequisites for developing the cities will have been created. Then we must shift back our center of gravity to the cities." (Both these statements quoted in Monthly Report, (Shanghai: Millard Publishing Co.) September 30, 1949. p. 15.) Such statements may have had their effect on official policy; at any rate, in 1950 and 1951, the agrarian reform program of the Communist party again took a top priority. But, the emphasis then, as in these statements by Lin Piao as well, is that reform in the countryside was primarily important as the necessary prerequisite to industrialization of the country.

17/ Li Li-san, "The Labor Movement in China." People's China, Peking, January 16, 1950. p. 25.

and of assuring benefits for both labor and capital. We have strongly emphasized that any 'leftist' deviation from this policy would harm the long-range interests of the working class." 18/ At the same time, the Communists set about creating an all-inclusive, nation-wide labor federation under their control which was likely to facilitate the task of implementing such a policy in the future.

Businessmen too, had to be convinced of the merit of "mutual benefits" and of the genuineness of the parallel Communist slogan of "taking into account both public and private interests." Though generally disillusioned with the Nationalists and, because of the weakness of their own position, somewhat more inclined to accept than to challenge the Communist conception of China's future economic and political organization, they nevertheless viewed their prospects with misgivings. While for the present they were being encouraged to continue their activities, they felt they could look forward only to ultimate expropriation. In the meantime, should they expand and thus become "big capitalists", they might be denounced as a potential threat to the dominant state-owned sector of the economy. Also, achieving a satisfactory labor-capital relationship would be difficult for them since Communist theory maintained that such a relationship must, by its very nature, be an exploitative one.

On entering the cities, the Communists sought to reassure the private capitalists on these points. For example, Liu Shao-chi himself traveled to Tientsin after its capture in January 1949 and, in a meeting with local commercial and industrial leaders, attempted to allay such fears. He reportedly assured the businessmen that they could expand their facilities without danger, that "communism" could not be instituted for at least twenty to thirty years, and that the present employer-private employer relationship was a form of "exploitation" temporarily acceptable to the Communist party as a necessary means of expanding and developing industrial production. 19/ Li Li-san also dealt with this question at that time and admitting that "some skepticism prevailed...among the capitalists", affirmed that the Communist party agreed that a profit should be retained by the private capitalist in order to enable him to reinvest and thus expand his production. Mao, foreshadowing this policy, had already warned, in his December 1947 report to the Communist Central Committee that "erroneous, ultra-left policies toward the petty bourgeois and middle bourgeois economic elements must be avoided, and that the party must adopt as its general objective, not the "short-sighted, unilateral so-called welfare of the toilers", but the development of production and the creation of a "flourishing economy." 20/ In taking this stand, the Communists cited China's extreme industrial weakness, and conceded that if they were to realize their ambitious plans for industrialization of the country 21/ the aid of private enterprise as well as state enterprise would have to be enlisted.

18/ Ibid., p. 26.

19/ Shang Pao, Shanghai, June 7, 1949. Quoted in Monthly Report (Shanghai: Millard Publishing Company), July 31, 1949. p. 20.

20/ North Shensi Radio, January 1, 1948.

21/ The March, 1949, plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist party had resolved that China's agricultural production be restored to its prewar levels within

While such declarations almost certainly failed to dispel the Chinese businessman's doubts as to the immediate future, and his fears for the more distant future, 22/ they clearly indicated that the Communists felt it necessary to allow him to play an initial limited role in the Chinese economy, and were therefore interested in winning his support and cooperation. Thus a proclamation signed by Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh, issued on the occasion of the crossing of the Yangtze River by their troops in April 1949, promised protection to all privately-owned enterprises, with the exception of those controlled by "bureaucratic capital". 23/ Given the postwar experiences of Chinese business and the prevailing sentiment regarding the Kuomintang, this proclamation and others like it undoubtedly had its effect, and tended to counterbalance basic reservations with respect to the ultimate Communist program.

Again reflecting current Communist needs, this same proclamation also declared that apart from "incorrigible war criminals and counter-revolutionary elements with heinous crimes", no Kuomintang official would be arrested or be submitted to "indignities". All such officials were enjoined to remain at their posts, and if proven competent, were promised employment by the new regime. 24/ The wholesale transfer of allegiance to the new government by most of the lower-echelon officialdom, who themselves were very largely middle class in origin and outlook, and whose services were so essential to the Communists in this early period, further demonstrated the practical value to the Communists of their shrewd appeal to this class.

and that within the following ten or fifteen years the industrial segment of the national economy should be raised from ten percent to thirty or forty percent. See China Digest (Hong Kong), June 28, 1949. p. 15.

22/ In an important speech the following year, Mao found it necessary to again reassure those who would be affected by the eventual socialization of China's economy that their future then would be "bright" if they had faithfully "served the people" up to that point. Mao Tse-tung, address to National Committee of the CPPCC, June 1950, in China Weekly Review (Shanghai), July 8, 1950, p. 105. A further shift in policy, in 1952, is discussed on pp. 115-117.

23/ "Eight-Point Proclamation to be Observed by All Chinese People." (English text in China Digest, Hong Kong), May 3, 1949. pp. 17-18.

24/ Ibid.

FORMAL PROGRAM AND CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

Since it was both practicable and desirable, in view of the circumstances prevailing on their assumption of power in 1949, the Chinese Communist party carefully hewed to its "united front" policy (in its newly-elaborated form) in undertaking the political reorganization of China. The organizational form of this united front was now to be called the 'Chinese Political Consultative Conference' (CPPCC), and a preparatory committee was set up in June 1949 to arrange the organizational details and draw up the draft documents to be submitted to the conference. This quasi-constitutional assembly, which eventually met in Peking in September 1949 to give sanction to a new state structure, was portrayed by the Communists as the culmination of their previous efforts to achieve a united front and a coalition government. They declared it to be in the spirit of the Political Consultative Conference (PCC) which in 1946 had attempted, without success, to conciliate China's warring factions and set up a coalition government.

Mao, for example, in an address to the opening session of the CPPCC declared: "Our conference is called the Political Consultative Conference because we held a Political Consultative Conference with the Chiang Kai-shek Kuomintang three years ago. The results of that conference were destroyed by the Chiang Kai-shek Kuomintang and its accomplices, but it has left an indelible impression on the people." 1/ In putting the onus for breaking the PCC agreements of 1946 on the "Chiang Kai-shek Kuomintang", the Communists justified its exclusion from the newly-organized CPPCC.

Actually, the directive of the preparatory committee defining qualifications for representation in the CPPCC, automatically excluded all those not in basic agreement with the Communist party's so-called "minimum program". This directive had specified that the CPPCC was to be limited to representatives of those parties and organizations throughout China "who support the New Democracy, oppose imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism and agree to mobilize the entire people's democratic forces to over-throw the Kuomintang reactionary regime and establish the People's Republic of China." 2/ The preceding pages have attempted to give some of the reasons for the remarkable fact that, notwithstanding this all-inclusive limitation, the conference when held seemed broadly-based and gave the appearance of representing a very substantial segment of organized and articulate Chinese opinion.

On the eve of the convening of the CPPCC, Mao Tse-tung, in an important article written to commemorate the twenty-eighth anniversary of the Chinese Communist party on July 1, 1949, brought into much sharper focus than before the Communists' now somewhat revised views on the united front and coalition government, and set the general "line" for the CPPCC to follow in mapping

1/ China Digest (Hong Kong), October 5, 1949. P. 3.

2/ Ibid., p. 9.

China's future political and economic development. 3/ Amplifying on his earlier formulations, he now termed the New Democracy a "people's democratic dictatorship" in which there would be "democracy for the people and dictatorship for the reactionaries." 4/ State power is to be wielded by the combined dictatorship of four classes: labor, the peasantry, "the petty bourgeoisie, and the national bourgeoisie," who together constituted the "people." This dictatorship was to be largely based on an alliance of labor and the peasantry, with the former class (acting through the Communist party) given leading status. The "reactionaries" over whom this dictatorship is to be exercised were defined as the landlords, the "bureaucratic capitalists", and the "reactionary clique" of the Kuomintang.

In this projected political system, only the "people" are to have the right to vote or voice their opinions, while the "reactionaries" are to be suppressed. In uncompromising terms, Mao declared: "Such state apparatus as the army, the police and the courts are instruments with which one class oppresses another. As far as the hostile classes are concerned, these are instruments of oppression. They are violent and certainly not 'benevolent' things....We definitely have no benevolent policies toward the reactionaries or the counter-revolutionary activities of the reactionaries." 5/ Such methods, he asserts, are the only effective means of preventing the "people" rule from being overthrown by "domestic and foreign reactionaries." Though the period in which this was written was marked by extreme moderation on the part of the Communists toward their actual or potential enemies, Mao here both foreshadows and presents the traditional Communist justification for the nationwide purge of "counter-revolutionaries" in 1951.

While denied various rights, members of the "reactionary classes" still have duties to the state, since the Communists make a sharp distinction between the "people" on one hand, and "citizens" on the other. Paradoxical it is the latter category which is the all-inclusive one. To it are relegated all "reactionaries" pending their "transformation" into worthy member of the new society. In the words of Communist leader Chou En-lai, such people "cannot enjoy the rights of the people but they have to observe the obligations of citizens." 6/

While endorsing the usual Communist view on the ultimate "withering away" of state power, Mao hastened to add that "we cannot afford to abolish state power just now. Why not? Because imperialism still exists. Because internally, reactionaries still exist and classes still exist."

Mao acknowledged that "reactionary influences" were still very strong among the "people." To remedy this, "methods of persuasion" will be used to "reform their bad habits and thoughts derived from the old society." These are to differ from the compulsory methods to be used in "reforming the reactionaries." As for the "national bourgeoisie", Mao explained

3/ Mao Tse-tung, On People's Democratic Dictatorship. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1950.

4/ Ibid., p. 16.

5/ Ibid., p. 17.

6/ Chou En-lai, Report to the CPPCC. China Digest, (Hong Kong), October 5, 1949. p. 11.

that the backward and dependent nature of China's economy makes it important for the new regime to encourage them at the present time as part of the general effort to expand the industrial and commercial sectors of the national economy. "Our current policy", he stated, "is to control capitalism, not to eliminate it." It is clear, however, that the alliance with this class is to be at best an uneasy one. Mao reassured his readers that the national capitalists are not to occupy a major position in the state administration, and that when the time comes for the complete nationalization of private enterprise, this group too, will be subject to further "education and reform". Meanwhile, "the people have a strong state apparatus in their hands, and they do not fear rebellion on the part of the national bourgeoisie." 7/

Mao also gave some hint of his recognition of the tremendous problems involved in putting through the collectivization of agriculture, but he made it very clear that this nevertheless is a vital part of Communist plans for China. "The education of the peasantry presents a serious problem", he wrote. "According to the Soviet Union's experience, it takes a long time and much painstaking work before agriculture can be socialized." But, he emphasized, "without the socialization of agriculture, there can be no complete and consolidated socialism."

By following the program he outlined, Mao concluded (with a slight touch of the Confucian spirit), China "can develop steadily from an agricultural into an industrial country and from a New Democratic into a Socialist and, eventually, a Communist society, eliminating classes and realizing universal harmony." Mao here presented the classic Marxist picture: the present "new democratic" dictatorship of several classes will evolve into a socialist stage marked by the dictatorship of the proletariat (the present theoretical stage of the Soviet Union), and finally emerge into pure communism -- described as a classless and stateless society. The current toleration of more than one political party is therefore linked by Communist spokesmen to the present existence of divergent classes in China; 8/ and since the Communist party has made itself the sole representative of both labor and the peasantry, the achievement of a socialist 'workers' and peasants' state" will presumably also usher in a one-party state.

With Mao's article as its fundamental guide, and with the basic documents to be submitted to it already drafted by the preparatory committee, the CPCCC itself convened in Peiping on September 21, 1949. It was attended by 662 delegates, all of whom, of course, met the preparatory committee's specified political qualifications for membership. 510 of the delegates represented 45 parties and groups. Of these, 102 represented geographical regions; 60 came from the "People's Liberation Army"; 142 represented 14 political organizations, including 16 each from the Communist party, the Democratic League, and the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang (a dissident Kuomintang group which had been established in Hong Kong under

7/ Mao Tse-tung, On People's Democratic Dictatorship, op. cit., p. 19.

8/ Chou En-lai, for example, declared in his report to the first session of the CPCCC, "Since classes exist during the period of New Democracy, political parties and groups will also exist." (Chou En-lai, Report to the CPCCC, op. cit., p. 10.)

the leadership of Marshal Li Chi-shen); and 206 delegates represented 16 "people's organizations", such as the All-China Federation of Labor, the All-China Democratic Women's Federation, nation-wide youth, peasant, and student organizations, and various overseas Chinese, industrial, and commercial, cultural and religious groups. 9/ The remaining 152 attendants were composed of alternates and specially invited delegates, the latter group including such prominent former Kuomintang figures as Cheng Chih-chung, Shao Li-tse, and Generals Cheng Chien and Fu Tso-yi.

Of course, actual Communist strength at the conference was very much greater than the sixteen official representatives indicated. In all probability, at least some one-third of the delegates were members of the Communist party, and many others came from organizations which were Communist-controlled. However, it cannot be too strongly emphasized that the actual distribution of seats was of secondary importance. It was important for the Communists to gain wide non-Communist participation in the conference. This they did. But since the CPPROC was based on Mao's concept of the "combined dictatorship of all revolutionary classes", and was meant to result in unanimous agreement on joint, Communist-approved goals, rather than in any parliamentary clash of opinion over divergent programs and policies, the "voting strength" of each party and group at the conference mattered little.

The CPPROC adjourned on September 30 after having unanimously adopted its own Organic Law, an Organic Law of the new "Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China", and a "Common Program of the CPPROC." Peking, now renamed Peking, was again designated the national capital, and a new flag and a temporary national anthem were selected. The CPPROC also elected the "Central People's Government Council", as well as its own National Committee to function while the CPPROC itself is not in session. On October 1 the "People's Republic of China" was proclaimed in Peking.

None of the three above-named basic documents was quite identical to a constitution, in the accepted sense of the term, but taken together, they were a detailed statement of the current philosophy, program and goals of the new regime, and of its governmental structure. They were not thought of as permanent documents, but were to serve during the more or less lengthy transitional stage which, in the Communist view, China was entering preparatory to eventual socialism and communism. 10/ The Organic Law of the Central People's Government, which most closely resembled a constitution, set up the central government structure and defined the functions of the

9/ For a discussion of these various parties and mass organizations, and of their position and significance in the Communist led government, see Chapter IV, Section C.

10/ Thus, the Common Program's only reference to socialism is the terse statement that the state-owned segment of the economy shall be "of a socialist nature", and Lin Shao-chi, in discussing this program before the CPPROC declared that though there was no doubt that China's future development would be along socialist lines, this was a matter "for the far future" and should not be written into the Common Program at the present time. (see China Digest, (Hong Kong) October 5, 1949. p. 7.)

various state organs and their relationship to one another. 11/ The Organic Law of the CPCC outlined the organizational structure, powers and functions of that body which, pending the promised convocation of an "All-China People's Congress" through universal suffrage, was to exercise the powers and functions delegated to that body -- declared to be the supreme organ of the state. The Common Program of the CPCC, a sixty-article manifesto, was a statement of the guiding principles of the new state in its present "new democratic" stage and included detailed declarations of policy in all fields -- governmental organization, economic affairs, culture and education, national minorities, and foreign affairs -- together with a definition of the various rights and duties of the people. The highly official status assigned this Program was indicated by its preamble, which declared that it "Should be jointly observed by all units participating in the CPCC, by the people's governments of all levels, and by the people of the whole country;" and Mao Tse-tung has since referred to it as "our present great basic law." 12/

The Common Program declared "New Democracy" to be the political foundation for the construction of the People's Republic of China, which it then defined in terms identical to those outlined by Mao in his On People's Democratic Dictatorship. In accordance with Mao's formula, the "people" were guaranteed the usual civil liberties, but at the same time the state was admonished to suppress "all counter-revolutionary activities", while it was further stipulated that "feudal landlords, bureaucratic capitalists and reactionary elements in general" were to be deprived of their political rights "for a necessary period." 13/ In like manner, the freedom to report "truthful news" was set forth, but "the utilization of the press for slander, for undermining the interests of the state and the people and for provoking world war shall be prohibited." 14/

According to the Common Program, at all levels of government state power was to be exercised through a system of "people's congresses", and of "people's governments" elected by such congresses. The apex of this structure was to be the "All China People's Congress" which was, eventually, to be the supreme organ of state power and was to elect the Central People's Government. For the present, the functions and powers of this Congress are being exercised by the CPCC. People's congresses on the various lower levels were also not to be organized immediately; meanwhile, the central government or the local military organization was empowered to set up Military Control Committees and local governments throughout the country. Subsequently, at the discretion of these authorities, "all-circle's repre-

11/ The English text of all three documents is contained in The Important Documents of the First Plenary Session of the Chinese CPCC. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1949. (This source will be referred to in future as Important Documents.)

12/ In speech to Second Session of the National Committee of the CPCC, given June 23, 1950. (English text in Current Background, Supplement No. 3. Hong Kong, June 28, 1950.)

13/ Article 7, Common Program of the CPCC, Important Documents, p. 4. When the famous "Regulations for the Punishment of Counter-Revolutionists" was proclaimed on February 21, 1951, it was d in accordance with the provisions of this article of am.

14/ Article 49, Common Program of the CPCC, ibid.,

representatives' conferences" were to be convened and were gradually to take over the functions and powers of people's congresses. 15/ At the final step in this process, "in all places where military operations have completely ended, agrarian reform has been thoroughly carried out and people of all circles have been fully organized, elections based on universal franchise shall be held immediately for the purpose of convening local People's Congresses." 16/ How this broadly-outlined procedure has been implemented thus far will be discussed in a later section on local government developments.

The Common Program provided that the new government be run under the principle of "democratic centralism", i.e., the minority must abide by decisions of the majority, the government organs set up at each level are subject to ratification by the government of the next higher level, and "the People's Governments of the lower levels shall obey the People's Governments of the higher levels and all local People's Governments throughout the country shall obey the Central People's Government." 17/ At the same time, the line of demarcation between central and local government jurisdiction, though undefined, was left to the discretion of the central government, with only the vague stipulation that the latter be guided by "the requirements of both national unity and local expediency."

The armed forces of the country, which were listed as including the "People's Liberation Army" and the public security forces, were to be modernized and strengthened, and an air force and a navy created. Temporarily the "militia system" was to be implemented throughout the country, but the state was instructed to make preparations "to enforce a system of obligatory military service at the appropriate time." 18/

The largest section of the Common Program was devoted to economic policy. It outlined a mixed economy for China, consisting of state-owned socialist economy; cooperative economy, defined as being "semi-socialist" in nature; individual peasant and handicrafts economy; private capitalist economy; and "state-capitalist" economy, which was apparently to consist of enterprises run jointly by the state and private capital. State-owned enterprise was to be the leading element in the national economy, followed by cooperatives, which were to be afforded "preferential treatment" by the government. Only those private enterprises were to be encouraged which were "beneficial to the national welfare and to the people's livelihood."

There were general statements of policy regarding the state's intention to modernize and expand agriculture, industry, and commerce, and to introduce planning in both state and private enterprise as soon as it became practicable. Agrarian reform was to be implemented on a nationwide basis as "the necessary condition for the development of the nation's productive power and for its industrialization." Labor participation in the management of state-owned enterprises was called for, while in private industry collective contracts were to be signed by the trade union and the

15/ A detailed picture of governmental developments on all levels during the past two years is given in Chapter V below.

16/ Article 14, Common Program of the CPFCC, Important Documents, p. 7.

17/ Article 15, Common Program of the CPFCC, Important Documents, pp. 7-8.

18/ Article 23, Common Program of the CPFCC, ibid., p. 9.

employer. Among the labor benefits to be introduced in the near future was the general institution of the eight to ten hour day, though this was qualified by the proviso that "under special circumstances this matter may be dealt with at discretion."

In culture and education major emphasis was placed on the expansion of science and the encouragement of literature and art. The educational system was to be "reformed," and the application of a "scientific-historical viewpoint" to the social sciences and culture promoted. This, interestingly enough, was the nearest thing to a specific mention of Marxism in the entire Common Program. There was also a pledge that "universal education shall be carried out", but no time limit was set beyond the general statement that it would be achieved in "a planned and systematic manner."

The many national minorities in China were promised equal rights, cultural and religious freedom, and regional autonomy in areas where such minorities are concentrated. In a concluding section devoted to foreign policy, there was the declaration that the government would examine all treaties and agreements entered into by the Nationalist regime, and "shall recognize, abrogate, revise, or renegotiate them according to their respective contents." ^{19/} The new government asserted its readiness to enter into political and commercial relations with all countries on the basis of "equality and mutual benefit", and also promised to protect "the proper rights and interests of Chinese residing abroad." Though the Common Program outlined the Peking government's foreign policy only in these general terms, Mao had already unequivocally declared that "internationally we belong to the side of the anti-imperialist front, headed by the Soviet Union"; ^{20/} and in reporting on the Common Program to the CPCC, Chou En-lai had affirmed that "all of us admit that there can be no middle camp" between the Soviet bloc of "peace and democracy", and the "imperialist camp of aggression." ^{21/}

With the Common Program providing the fundamental frame of reference, the two Organic Laws adopted by the CPCC presented detailed blueprints of the formal structure of the new central government. Under its Organic Law, ^{22/} the CPCC itself (in substituting for the "All-China People's Congress") was empowered to enact or amend the Organic Law of the Central People's Government, to elect the Central People's Government Council and vest it with authority, and to submit resolutions concerning fundamental policies or measures to the Central People's Government Council. Plenary sessions of the CPCC were to meet triennially, subject to modification by its National Committee (elected by each plenary session). The CPCC was defined as the "organization of the democratic united front of the entire Chinese people." When not in session, its National Committee, scheduled to meet semi-annually, ^{23/} was to supervise execution of its resolutions.

^{19/} Article 56, Common Program of the CPCC, *ibid.*, p. 20.

^{20/} Mao Tse-tung, *On People's Democratic Dictatorship*, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

^{21/} *China Digest*, (Hong Kong), October 5, 1949. p. 18.

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After the All-China People's Congress is convened, the CFPCC will continue to function, but only in an advisory capacity. Provision was also made for setting up local committees of the CFPCC in the major cities and provincial capitals to serve as local consultative bodies.

Since plenary sessions of the CFPCC are scheduled to meet only once every three years, the government's contact with this body is maintained chiefly through the National Committee of the CFPCC. This latter body, however, has only very limited advisory functions, as its sessions thus far have borne out. Presumably, when the All-China People's Congress replaces the CFPCC, its day-to-day contact with the government will be of the same nature as in that of the CFPCC.

Representing the most important coalition organ in China, the CFPCC's National Committee seemingly serves as a useful sounding board and limited discussion forum for the government and the Communist party, where government policy decisions may be slightly modified, but certainly not fundamentally challenged. For example, the second session of the National Committee was principally concerned with discussing a new agrarian law, which was subsequently promulgated by the government on June 30, 1950. However, the draft of this law had already been drawn up by the Central Committee of the Communist party, and a definitive and comprehensive policy report on it had been prepared by Liu Shao-chi for presentation to the National Committee. That body's contribution was limited to proposing certain minor amendments to the law as drawn up by the Communist party, and to endorsing Liu Shao-chi's report. ^{24/} Through such procedures the government is able to obtain the broadest possible "united front" stamp of approval for its important policies.

The Central People's Government ^{25/} is the supreme organ of state power when the CFPCC is not in session and, under its Organic Law, ^{26/} this authority has been vested in a Central People's Government Council, which leads the state at home and acts for it in international relations. As elected by the plenary session of the CFPCC in 1949, this Council has a Chairman, six vice-Chairmen, and fifty-six members. The Chairman (Mao-Tse-tung) and the vice-Chairmen are, respectively, Chairman and vice-Chairmen of the Central People's Government. As of late 1952, there have been no announced changes in this Council's membership.

had been held, with an interval of well over a year between the second session in June 1950 and the third session, which met in Peking from October 23 to November 1, 1951. This, in spite of the fact that, at the second session, Mao made a special point of referring to this provision: "It is stipulated in law", he noted, "that we shall meet twice in every year.... We are required to do so, and we have done so, and I think we have been right in doing so...." (Current Background, Supplement No. 3, op. cit.) However, the Organic Law of the CFPCC does provide that the Standing Committee of its National Committee may postpone its meetings when it "considers it necessary." At the end of 1952, however, a fourth session was reported planned, which was subsequently held in February 1953.

^{24/} See New China News Agency Daily Bulletins, London, June, 1950.

^{25/} The official and complete title of the central government is "The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China."

^{26/} For the English text of the Organic Law of the Central People's Government, see Important Documents, op. cit., pp. 29-44.

The Central People's Government Council, normally scheduled to meet every two months, has legislative, executive and judicial powers. It enacts and interprets laws, promulgates decrees and supervises their execution, determines the administrative policies of the state, deals with the questions of war and peace, and has the final word on the state budget, on the decisions of the Government Administration Council, and on treaties and agreements with other nations. It can appoint or remove any member of the Government Administration Council, the People's Revolutionary Military Council, the Supreme People's Court, all other important central government officials, and the top leadership of the People's Liberation Army. It also has the ultimate power of appointment or removal of key officials in the provincial and municipal governments.

The Government Administration Council (appointed by the Central People's Government Council) was defined as "the highest executive body for state administration", and, administratively at least, corresponds somewhat to the cabinet in Western political systems. The Organic Law of the Central People's Government stipulated that the Government Administration Council shall consist of "a Premier, a number of vice-Premiers, a Secretary-General and a number of Council Members." Chou En-lai is at present Premier, and there are now five vice-Premiers and sixteen members of the Council, which represents an increase of one in both these categories over the number originally named in October 1949. Its members may concurrently hold posts as heads of ministries or commissions (thus Chou En-lai is also Foreign Minister), but all heads of the ministries and commissions are not necessarily members of the Council. Normally scheduled to meet once a week, the Council is empowered to issue "decisions and orders", and is responsible for coordination and direction of the work of the various ministries and commissions, all of which are directly subordinate to it. It submits bills to the Central People's Government Council, to which it is responsible and accountable. It directs the work of local governments throughout the country, and may appoint or remove all the main administrative personnel at or above the county and municipal level who are not already within the purview of the Central People's Government Council. The Government Administration Council clearly shares many of the legislative functions of this latter Council, and its numerous "decisions and orders", directives and regulations have thus far played a major role in the legislation of the Peking government. The most important laws and regulations, however, are usually channeled through the Central People's Government Council and are issued under that Council's imprint.

Four committees were created to operate under the Government Administration Council. One of these, the People's Control Committee, is responsible for supervising the work of government institutions and public officials. It is headed by Tan Ping-shan, an ex-Communist who is now a leader of the splinter San Min Chu I Comrades Association, one of the participating groups in the present Communist-led coalition. With the original exception of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the Information Administration and the Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs, the various ministries, commissions, administrations, etc., were all grouped under one or another of the remaining three committees.

The Political and Legal Affairs Committee, under the chairmanship of the veteran Communist Tung Pi-wu, was given direction of the work of the Ministries of the Interior, Justice, Public Security, and the Commissions of Legislative Affairs and of Nationalities Affairs; the Financial and Economic Affairs Committee, headed by Chen Yun, leading Communist

expert who had held a somewhat similar post in the Communist-organized Northeast government, was given jurisdiction over fourteen ministries, including those of Finance, Trade, Heavy Industry, Railways, Agriculture, Food Industry, and Labor, as well as of the People's Bank of China and the Customs Administration. Finally, under the Cultural and Educational Affairs Committee were put the remaining six ministries and related organs: the Ministries of Cultural Affairs, Education, and Health, the Press and Publications Administrations, and the Academy of Sciences (Academia Sinica). The Cultural and Educational Affairs Committee is led by Kuo Mo-jo, China's noted "non-partisan" but Marxist scholar and writer, who has subsequently become a major spokesman of the Peking regime at various Communist-sponsored international conferences held in China and abroad.

The number of such committees, and also of ministries and other departments of the Government Administration Council, can be either increased or reduced by the Central People's Government Council. Thus in September 1950, the latter Council established a Ministry of Personnel and a Ministry of North China Affairs, while in December of that year, the Ministry of Food Industry was liquidated and its functions taken over by the Ministries of Light Industry and Agriculture. The Ministry of North China Affairs was in turn replaced, in April 1952, by a North China Administrative Committee which became the fifth committee to operate directly under the Government Administration Council.

The increasingly dominant position of the state in the national economy, as well as the advancing preparations both for large-scale industrialization and for the introduction of nationwide economic planning (both scheduled to begin in 1953) were reflected in further key administrative changes during 1952. In August of that year, five new economic ministries were formed (First Ministry of Machine Industries, Second Ministry of Machine Industries, Ministry of Building Construction, Ministry of Geology, and a re-created Food Ministry), while the Ministry of Trade was split into the two separate Ministries of Foreign Trade and Commerce. 28/ The Information and Press Administrations were dissolved at this same time, with their functions reportedly being taken over by the Publications Administration. 29/

In further administrative developments in November 1952, a State Planning Committee, a Commission to Eliminate Illiteracy, and a Physical Culture and Athletics Commission were created and a Ministry of Higher Education was formed to supplement the existing Ministry of Education. 30/ Thus at the close of 1952 there were six committees functioning under the Government Administration Council (the North China Administrative Committee and the State Planning Committee having been added to the original four); and a total of twenty-eight ministries, five commissions, two administrations, the Academy of Sciences and the People's Bank. Of these, no less than twenty-one were financial-economic organs, eight were cultural-educational, and five were political-legal in character, with the remaining three (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Personnel, and Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs) supervised directly by the Government Administration Council.

28/ Peking, New China News Agency, August 10, 1952.

29/ Henry R. Lieberman, Hong Kong dispatch to the New York Times, August 12, 1952.

30/ See Chapter VI. for further discussion of these developments.

The People's Revolutionary Military Council has control over all the armed forces in the country, and is "the supreme military command of the state." 31/ It is under the chairmanship of Mao Tse-tung, and its organization and administration, as well as its membership, are determined by the Central People's Government Council. The military forces are therefore not under ministries subordinate to the Government Administration Council, but are controlled by a body which has a status equal to and independent of that Council. The top leadership of the Military Council, it may be noted, is made up of the very highest political and military figures within the Chinese Communist party. Its seven vice-chairmen, under Mao, are Chu Teh, Chou En-lai, Liu Shao-chi, Kao Kang, Peng Teh-huai, Lin Piao, and Cheng Chien. The last named, the only non-Communist among the group, is a former Kuomintang general who surrendered his central China forces to the Communist armies during the closing phases of the civil war on the mainland.

A Procurator-General's Office is responsible for "the strict observance of the laws by all government institutions and government functionaries as well as by nationals of the country." Its organization and personnel are also determined by the Central People's Government Council. The Procurator-General is Lo Jung-huan of the Communist party's Central Committee. Procurator-General's offices are apparently organized on a nationwide basis and on all levels of government, and as "the highest prosecuting organ of the people", play a vital role in both the judicial and police activities of the state.

The Supreme People's Court is the highest judicial body and is responsible for directing the work of all judicial organs throughout China. The President, or Chief Justice is Shen Chun-ju, one of the leaders of the Democratic League. The Common Program had decreed the abrogation of all legal codes of the Nationalist government, but these were not immediately replaced by new ones. In a sense, the courts have been "playing by ear" in handling civil and criminal cases, being guided only by the broadly-formulated Common Program, which is usually referred to as the "fundamental law" of the country, the few formal laws thus far promulgated by the government, such as the Marriage Law, the Agrarian Reform Law, and the Trade Union Law (all adopted in 1950), as well as the draconian "Regulations for Punishment of Counter-Revolutionaries" of February 1951. In addition, of course, there are the numerous decrees, orders, and decisions issued by the various government organs which also apparently have the force of law. Otherwise, according to Shen Chun-ju, the people's courts are basing themselves on the experiences accumulated in the old "liberated areas", and on judicial practice in the Soviet Union. 32/ A Law Codification Committee was set up by the Peking government in the spring of 1950, however, which has been actively dealing with problems of judicial organization, and is presumably also working on the formulation of new codes.

In any case, these "technical" aspects of the law are of secondary importance in the Communist view; they look upon the courts primarily as an

31/ A Guide to New China. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1952. p. 19.

32/ From report delivered at second session of the First National Committee of the CPCCC, June 1950. New China News Agency Daily Bulletin No. 58, London, June 21, 1950.

additional instrument of the state whose primary function it is to further the state's objectives and protect its achievements. "Our judicial work must serve political ends actively," the Chief Justice declared in 1951, "and must be brought to bear on current central political tasks and mass movements." Judicial work, he added, was not "purely a technical matter", but was "a weapon to protect democracy and enforce dictatorship." 33/ As such, one of its main tasks, he had earlier declared, was "to suppress resolutely, sternly, and in good time all counter-revolutionary activitiesand the resistance of reactionary classes; (and to) protect the gains of land reform, production, reconstruction and democratic order." 34/

In accordance with this point of view, the official Communist party newspaper, the Peking People's Daily, chided those judicial workers who favored an "orthodox" system of laws divorced from political realities, and also those who "prematurely and fancifully demand the immediate enactment of a complete set of laws." 35/ There is no pretense of the courts' independence of the other branches of government. "People's governments at various levels must strengthen their leadership over people's courts", Shen Chun-ju has declared 36/; and he and other leaders continue to strongly criticize those who still talk of an independent judiciary free of political control. 37/

In September 1951 the Law Codification Committee "after numerous revisions in the light of the experience gained in judicial work.... and after consulting the organic law of the law courts of the Soviet Union" 38/, submitted a set of regulations which were adopted by the Central People's Government Council as the "Provisional Regulations Governing the Organization of Courts in the People's Republic of China". 39/ These regulations provided for the establishment of a three-level court system: hsien (county) people's courts, provincial people's courts, and the Supreme People's Court on the national level. The last named is empowered to set up branch courts

33/ Report delivered at third session of the First National Committee of the CPPCC, October 28, 1951. In Current Background No. 147. Hong Kong, December 28, 1951.

34/ Report delivered at second session of the First National Committee of the CPPCC. op. cit.

35/ Peking Jen Min Jih Pao (People's Daily), September 5, 1951.

36/ Report delivered at third session of the First National Committee of the CPPCC. op. cit.

37/ "In its system of organization, the People's Court is a component part of the People's Government. It is responsible to the People's Government Council and its superior courts and reports to them on its work." Hsu Te-hen, Explanatory Report on the provisional regulations governing the people's courts. Peking Jen Min Jih Pao (People's Daily), September 5, 1951. (Hsu Te-heng is Acting Chairman of the Law Codification Committee.)

38/ Ibid.

39/ Text of these regulations in Current Background No. 183. Hong Kong, May 26, 1952.

or sections for the various major administrative regions of the country. Cities under the jurisdiction of the provincial governments are to have hsien - level people's courts, while those larger municipalities directly under one of the major administrative regions or of the central government are to have provincial-level courts.

Under the so-called "three-level, two-trial system" set up under these regulations, a single appeal may ordinarily be filed from the verdict of a lower level court. The hsien courts are defined as "basically courts of first trial", and the provincial courts as "basically courts of second trial", so that in most cases the provincial-level trial would presumably be the final one. In more important cases the provincial court may conduct the first trial, with the appeal for a second trial going to the Supreme People's Court. This latter court too, may handle "first trials", in, "criminal and civil cases handed down by the Central People's Government." In such cases the first trial would also be the final trial.

"Unusual circumstances" may be invoked as a condition for allowing three trials, or for limiting a defendant to only one trial. This latter restriction on the right of appeal was apparently designed for use in connection with the "suppression of counter-revolutionaries" campaign underway during 1951, and was officially cited as a provision which "effectively suppresses counter-revolutionary activities and prevents cunning elements from taking advantage of the two-trial system to delay the settlement of a case." 40/ Already, for example, in July 1950, a directive issued jointly by the Supreme People's Court and the Government Administration Council had stipulated that "all important counter-revolutionaries who have been given the death penalty shall not be granted permission to appeal the verdict."

41/

Trial procedure itself is apparently highly flexible. Aside from formal court trials, the people's courts are also empowered to conduct on-the-spot investigations, on-the-spot trials, and circuit trials, with such trials in many cases involving "denunciation by the masses" as part of the declared "propaganda-education" function of the courts. On the hsien level, trials are normally to be conducted by a one-judge tribunal, though in more important cases there is to be a tribunal of three. On the provincial and national level, three-man tribunals are generally to be the rule. There is a somewhat vague proviso in the regulations calling on the people's courts to institute a "people's jury system" if the "nature of the cases to be tried is proper to the system." It has been officially stated, however, that "conditions in general are not yet ripe for universal application of this system." 42/ Under this projected people's jury system, the jurors would have the right to "assist in the investigation of cases under trial, take part in the examination of the cases, and give their views on them."

The people's courts are instructed to base themselves on "the provisions of the Common Program of the CPPCC, and the laws, decrees, decisions,

40/ Hsu Te-heng, Explanatory Report. op. cit.

41/ "Directive on the Suppression of Counter-Revolutionary Activities", issued July 23, 1950. (Text of this directive in Current Background No. 101. Hong Kong, July 24, 1951.)

42/ Hsu Te-heng, Explanatory Report, op. cit.

and orders promulgated by the People's Government. Where no provisions have been made, the policy of the Central People's Government shall be adhered to." This apparently is the current formal definition of the "legal code" under which the courts presently operate in all criminal and civil cases.

The relationship of the people's courts to the procurator-general's office is also worth noting. This latter office is defined as the primary state organ of investigation and prosecution of criminal cases, and as such normally acts as state prosecutor in the people's courts. At the same time, however, this office is also empowered to oppose "unwarranted or improper judgements made by judicial organs of all levels" and take them to higher courts for retrial. The Procurator-General's Office may even upset a final verdict of the Supreme People's Court and "request" a retrial "in accordance with legal procedure."

Actually, as the Vice-Procurator-General of the Peking government has declared, all the judicial and police forces -- the courts, the prosecuting organs, the public security forces, etc. -- have the "same general political task", with no clearly defined "division of labor" among them. ^{43/} This political task, the Communists state, is primarily the "consolidation of the people's revolutionary regime", and the structure, functions and procedure of the various security organs of the government have been developed within that framework. This new legal-judicial system -- "the revolutionary legal system" -- is clearly designed to provide the potent "weapon" for consolidating the regime and for furthering state objectives which the Communists declare to be the primary function of "judicial work".

In furthering this "revolutionary consolidation", the major task assigned the courts and related organs thus far has been that of "suppressing counter-revolutionaries". "Prosecution of cases of counter-revolution", it was officially stated in 1951, "is more important than prosecution of ordinary criminal cases today." ^{44/} Along with this campaign the courts, as instruments of government policy, have also been given "special tasks" in conjunction with other major government politico-economic campaigns. For such tasks, the people's courts system provides for the creation of "special courts" to operate on a temporary basis for the duration of such campaigns. Thus in July 1950, special "people's tribunals" were created in accordance with provisions of the Agrarian Reform Law of that year, to function during the gigantic "agrarian struggle" which got under way at that time.

Under the regulations for their organization ^{45/}, these tribunals were to be organized in every hsien (county) where land reform was in progress, with subsidiary branches within the hsien when necessary. Its duties were to be the "employment of judicial procedure for the penalization of despots,

^{43/} Li Liu-ju, Explanatory Report on the "Provisional Regulations Governing Organization of the Office of People's Procurator-General." Peking Jen Min Jih Pao (People's Daily) September 5, 1951.

^{44/} Ibid. For an account of the "suppression of counter-revolutionaries" campaign, see Chapter VI.

^{45/} Text of "Regulations Governing the Organization of People's Tribunals" in Current Background No 151. Hong Kong, January 10, 1952.

native bandits, special agents, counter-revolutionaries, and criminals who violate the laws and orders pertaining to agrarian reform, who endanger the interests of the people and the state, plot sabotage activities, and undermine social security." The tribunals were also to handle disputes relating to land plot demarcations arising in the course of the agrarian reform.

Though designed to implement the violent policy of "struggle" that accompanied land reform in the countryside, it was also claimed that these tribunals would exercise a "restraining influence" on passions stirred up in the course of these "struggles", and so prevent "indiscriminate beatings and killings" upsetting to social order. Instead, the people's tribunals would be the 'organ for systematic and orderly suppression of law-defying landlords', so that "order" could be maintained during the reform. 46/

The tribunals are empowered to pass sentences up to and including the death penalty, with the provincial governments having the right of ratification of the more severe sentences. The officers and half the membership of the tribunals are appointed by the hsien governments, and the remainder by the local 'people's representatives conferences.' When its mission is completed, these tribunals are to be disbanded on order of the provincial or higher level governments. The intense activity of the people's tribunals is indicated by a July 1951 report from only 124 counties (where land reform had been in progress), according to which more than 143,700 cases had been handled by such tribunals in the six month period between November 1950 and April 1951. 47/

In March 1952 urban people's tribunals, somewhat similar to those in the rural areas, were reported set up in conjunction with the "five-anti" campaign inaugurated early in that year, directed at various alleged malpractices of businessmen and designed to bring private enterprise under stricter state control and regulation. 48/ These urban tribunals also supplemented the local people's courts and were presumably temporary in nature.

To an even greater extent than the people's courts themselves, these special tribunals, both in the cities and the countryside, appear designed to involve "non-professional" personnel in judicial proceedings. The Peking People's Daily declared, for example, in discussing the urban tribunals, that "the view held by some that trial proceedings can be conducted only by professional judicial workers and not by others is entirely erroneous." 49/ The Peking government's Minister of Justice reported in September 1952 that during the agrarian reform and "five-anti" movements, "many excellent judges have emerged from among the workers and peasants." In Shanghai alone, he added, "six hundred workers, shop employees and housewives have taken part in the people's tribunals during the five-anti movement." 50/

46/ Peking Jen Min Jih Pao (People's Daily), July 21, 1950.

47/ New China News Agency, Hankow dispatch. In Current Background No. 151. op. cit.

48/ For a discussion of the "five-anti" campaign, see Chapter VI.

49/ Quoted in Hong Kong dispatch to the New York Times, March 30 1952.

50/ Shih Liang, 'Achievements in the People's Judicial Work Three Years.' Peking, New China News Agency, September 1952.

The creation of these special tribunals has apparently further accentuated the considerable overlapping in functions so characteristic of the judicial and security organs of the Peking regime. The vagueness of the lines of demarcation among these organs was reflected in an official editorial which cautioned against "confusing" the people's tribunals with the people's courts; "ordinary" civil and criminal cases should not be referred to these tribunals but should continue to be handled by the people's courts; furthermore, especially "complicated" cases should also not go directly to the tribunals, "but should be handled by State procuratorial organs in conjunction with public security and judicial organs." 51/ Here again, the avowedly political, "realistic" approach to questions of judicial procedure is clearly evident.

As the preceding account of judicial developments amply indicates, the Peking government is not based on the principle of the separation of powers. Legislative and executive functions are combined, and the judiciary is subordinate to both. The "old democratic" practice of the separation of powers, the Communist party newspaper in Shanghai observed, "is not in harmony with the principles of New Democracy which aims at the centralization, the unification, and the coordination of all democratic forces." 52/ This is declared to be in accordance with the concept of "democratic centralism", the principles of which, as outlined in the Common Program, have already been described.

In number of departments and of top-echelon executive or quasi-executive personnel and in the range and diversity of the affairs it proposes to concern itself with, the Central People's Government is clearly organized on a ambitious and massive scale. Such executive bodies as the Central People's Government Council, the People's Revolutionary Military Council, the Government Administration Council, and the five committees operating under this latter Council (excluding the newly-established State Planning Committee) have a combined membership of over three hundred. In addition, there are presently thirty-seven government organs of "cabinet" rank, each with its full quota of ministers or directors, vice-ministers, etc.. The number and character of these organs plainly demonstrates the state's intention to play a dominant role in the country's economic, cultural and educational life.

Structurally, the new Chinese state is patterned in many respects on the Soviet Union. The projected local people's congresses leading to an All-China People's Congress are equivalent to the Russian system of Soviets culminating in the Supreme Soviet. The Central People's Government Council of China and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet seem to play similar structural roles and are responsible, respectively, to the All-China People's Congress (now to the CPPCC) and to the Supreme Soviet, which are formally

Current Background No. 218 . Hong Kong, November 5, 1952.

51/ Peking Jen Min Jih Pao (People's Daily), July 21, 1950. There have been reports that "extraordinary tribunals" were also set up in July 1950, to deal specifically with the "suppression of counter-revolutionaries". This writer, however, has seen no official mention of such tribunals. (See Robert Guillain, "Revolution in China: The Reign of Terror," Hong Kong dispatch to the Manchester Guardian Weekly, November 22, 1951.)

52/ Chieh Fang Jih Pao (Liberation Daily), (Shanghai), September 30, 1949.

the highest organs of state power 52a/; also, the Council of Ministers in the Soviet system apparently parallels the Government Administration Council in the Chinese structure. In addition, the judicial system being developed in China is closely patterned on that of the Soviet Union. Finally, both countries subscribe to "democratic centralism" and the integration of legislative, executive and judicial functions.

There are some formal differences. The U.S.S.R. is legalistically a union of constituent republics, while China is a single republic with various autonomous regions which are legally as well as actually subordinate to the central government. Also, Russia has only one political party -- the Communist -- whereas in China at the present stage the existence of other "friendly" parties is not only allowed but encouraged. 52b/ However, the decisive role of the Communist party is as basic to the Chinese system as it is to the Russian. A more important difference, perhaps, is the status of the military, which, at least at present, appears to play a much more important political role in Communist China than it does in the Soviet Union.

Political factors seem to be at least partially responsible for the size of the leading Chinese central government organs. All of the outstanding political and military leaders of the Communist party, as well as its important regional representatives, are included in every top government body. In accord with the coalition character of the Peking regime, virtually all such organs also include leaders of the many parties and splinter groups allied with the Communists, as well as important unattached "democratic personages." National minority groups from such areas as Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia are represented in line with Peking's desire to conciliate these elements while at the same time bringing them under firmer central control. Many important Kuomintang leaders who defected to the Communists have also been rewarded with posts in the central government. General Fu Tso-yi, for example, the Nationalist commander who surrendered Peking to the Communist armies and who was also instrumental in bringing Suiyuan province under Communist control, has been given the post of Minister of Water Conservancy, as well as membership in the leading government councils.

This picture is somewhat reflected in the affiliations of the six vice-chairman of the Central People's Government, under Chairman Mao Tse-tung. They are Liu Shao-chi, a leading party theorist and probably next in importance to Mao in the Communist hierarchy; Kao Kang, Northeastern (Manchurian) regional and party chief, a representative of what is perhaps the most important region of the country to the Communists, in view of their intense desire to speed the industrialization of China; Chang Ian, chairman of the Democratic League, the leading non-Communist component of the Peking coalition; Li Chi-shen, chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang, probably the most important of the many figures now working with the Com-

52a/ However, the Central People's Government Council apparently has much greater importance in Peking than does the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in Moscow. Mao Tse-tung serves as chairman of the former (his most important government post), while the head of the Soviet Presidium is the President of the Soviet Union, a largely honorary post, with Malenkov serving as chairman of the Council of Ministers (which is the top government post in the Soviet structure).

52b/ See Chapter IV for further discussion of this point. ***

munists who had once been relatively high in Kuomintang government or military circles; and Soong Ching-ling (Madame Sun Yat-sen), who because of her past association with liberal causes and the great prestige of her name, both in China and abroad, is undoubtedly the most important symbol of the non-party "democratic personage" in China today. 53/

The profusion of posts created under the Peking government gives a somewhat misleading impression of the total number of different individuals holding high office. Actually, prominent figures serve simultaneously on a number of government bodies. The same top political and military leaders in the Communist party, for example, occupy key positions in most of the important central government organs, and many of them also hold controlling posts in regional, provincial, and even municipal governments. 54/ Much the same people, in fact, comprise the key leadership of the Communist party, the People's Liberation Army, and the government itself; and the nationwide structural organization of all three parallel one another closely. In this interlocking structure, supplemented by a multitude of Communist-led "people's organizations", is concentrated the decisive power in China today. For a realistic picture of the government in operation, therefore, the foregoing discussion of the formal program, philosophy and administrative machinery of the new state must be supplemented by an analysis of this intricate power complex itself.

53/ The proportion of Communists to non-Communists in the leading government bodies is as follows ("non-Communist" in this case simply means not listed as official members of the Chinese Communist party, and is not an evaluation of the personal political philosophy of the individuals concerned):

Central People's Government Council: Chairman and three vice-chairmen Communist, three vice-chairmen non-Communist; of fifty-six members, half from Communist party and half non-Communist.

Government Administration Council: Premier, three vice-premiers and Secretary-General members of the Communist party, two vice-premiers non-Communist. Of sixteen members, seven are Communists.

People's Revolutionary Military Council: Chairman and six vice-chairmen, from the Communist party, with one vice-Chairman and six of the twenty members of the Council non-Communist. In addition, the Director and the two Deputy Directors of the Political Department are Communists. Of the thirty-seven heads of ministries and directors of commissions, administrations, etc., some twenty are Communists. Key ministries, such as Foreign Affairs, Labor, Public Security, Interior, and Finance, are all under Communist ministers and in every case where a non-Communist heads a ministry, a leading deputy minister is a member of the Communist party. (A full listing of the officials of the Central People's Government at the time of its formation, and of their party affiliations, is contained in The China Weekly Review, (Shanghai), November 5, 1949. pp. 155-160.)

54/ The leaders of the non-Communist coalition groups also serve simultaneously on many different government bodies, holding important, but subordinate, positions in policymaking spheres of government.

CHAPTER IV.

THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP IN OPERATION

A. The Role of the Army

The armed forces hold a special position in China. Military power has played a vital role in modern Chinese politics -- has indeed been the sine qua non of political power. The Communists themselves of course were dependent on their military strength in winning power, and have since relied on their armies to help further the political consolidation of the new state, for continued military operations against bandit and guerrilla forces in various sections of the country 1/ and, obviously, for actual and potential operations beyond the borders of the Chinese mainland.

The importance of the military organization is reflected in the completely interrelated nature of high Communist political and military leadership. The military commanders are in almost every case important leaders of the party, while the top party figures who themselves have no direct military command, such as Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, and Liu Shao-chi, hold key positions on the country's supreme military organ -- the People's Revolutionary Military Council -- which itself is above "cabinet" rank, independent of the Government Administration Council, and responsible directly to the Central People's Government Council. The top leadership of this Council, as already noted, is virtually exclusively Communist. In the present extended stage of quasi-military control over most of the country, the commanders of the various field armies hold dominant positions in the politico-military administrations of the regions in which their armies are based. In addition, these field commanders are all members of the Communist party's central committee, and of the central government itself. Even in the Northeast (Manchuria), where a full-fledged 'civil' regional government has been operating since 1949, 2/ the chairman of this government, Kao Kang, is concurrently commander of the Northeast military district.

It would be a mistake, however, to think of the Chinese government as being dominated by the military. The civil and military are thoroughly integrated and virtually inseparable arms of the government, and both are directed by the Communist party which furthers its objectives through one or the other interchangeably. In this regard it should be noted that it is Mao the leader of the party, rather than Chu Teh the commander of the army, who is chairman of the People's Revolutionary Military Council.

1/ The Communists had an especially troublesome time with such groups in south and southwest China, particularly in the provinces of Kwangsi, Kwangtung, and Yunnan. The scope of the Communist military effort to subdue such armed opposition is indicated by their claim, in October 1951, that over 1,060,000 'bandits' had been 'inactivated' in central-south China over the previous two-year period. (Peking Jen Min Jih Pao) (People's Daily), October 30, 1951. It should be noted, however, that this figure undoubtedly includes large numbers of regular Nationalist forces captured in the closing months of 1949 and early 1950 in the course of the Communist sweep of Southwest China.

2/ For a discussion of the present regional organization of Chapter V.

The significant role of the military is due to more than the overwhelmingly important part played by its armies in the achievement and consolidation of Communist power. The army, in a sense, has also made up for the absence of a well-organized and disciplined mass proletarian base for the Communist party and the government, and it is a major source of disciplined, indoctrinated, and organized manpower in the country today. For example, in line with a directive issued by Mao Tse-tung in December 1949 ^{3/}, the army has apparently been employed directly in production, particularly agricultural work, construction projects (such as the new rail line between Chungking and Chengtu in Szechuan province), and some industrial activities. It is forbidden, however, to engage in commercial transactions.

By its very nature, the army can serve as a mobile and fully-controllable labor force, and is thus particularly valuable in furthering the economic development of such vast, potentially-productive, but sparsely-settled regions as Sinkiang, in China's northwest. In that largely arid region, only large-scale and organized efforts, involving substantial investments of both labor and capital, can achieve important results, and it is in Sinkiang more than elsewhere, apparently, that the army has been playing a major part in the government's economic development plans. The PLA there is reported to be engaged in vast agricultural projects based on water conservancy and irrigation works it itself has constructed; and to be building cotton, steel, cement and other industrial plants, as well as residential housing. It is further reported to be erecting a "new city" of over fourteen square kilometers, scheduled for completion in 1956. "Today", a semi-official account claims, "the PLA (in Sinkiang) has its own large complement of specialists in many fields of engineering and construction work." ^{4/} At the same time, army units are being used to establish experimental collective and state mechanized farms, to serve as prototypes for future agricultural organization, and to provide rotating training for army personnel in the operation of agricultural machinery. Four mechanized and up to ten collective farms were called for in the 1952 plans of the PLA in Sinkiang, which also called for army production of 110,000 tons of grain. ^{5/} All in all, therefore, the army clearly has an importance which goes far beyond its purely military functions.

The "People's Liberation Army" (PLA) is organized under a General Headquarters, commanded by Chu Teh. Under this headquarters are the field armies: the first commanded by Peng Teh-huai, the second by Liu Po-cheng, the third by Chen Yi, and the fourth by Lin Piao, with a fifth sometimes reported to be in existence, commanded by Nieh Jung-chen. ^{6/} Before the Korean war, these field armies were reported based, respectively, in north-west China, southwest China, east China, central-south China, and north China. In all these areas but east and north China, the army commander is also chairman of the top regional administrative body; in the case of east

^{3/} See China Digest (Hong Kong), December 14, 1949. pp. 3-4.

^{4/} C.Y. Ying, "The PLA Makes the Desert Bloom", People's China, (Peking), August 1, 1952. p. 30.

^{5/} Ibid., p. 31.

^{6/} See "Mao Tse-tung's Red Army", a Special Correspondent's Hong Kong dispatch to The Times (London), October 19, 1950.

China, Chen Yi is instead mayor of Shanghai, while north China has had a special administrative status directly under the central government. Each of these regions, as well as northeast China and, seemingly, the important and troublesome southern province of Kwangtung, has been designated a major military district under its field army commander, with Kao Kang in command of the northeast district and Yeh Chien-ying (who is also governor of the province and mayor of Canton) in command of the Kwangtung military district. Each of these districts has a political commissar as well as a military commander, though in some cases the two posts are held by the same individual. 7/ Overall direction of the army's political work is carried on by the highly-important Political Department of the People's Revolutionary Military Council, headed by Communist Central Committee member Lo Jung-huan.

After the outbreak of the Korean war, and perhaps even before, the Chinese armies, particularly Lin Piao's fourth army, were reported moving north towards Manchuria. 8/ Subsequently, after Chinese intervention in Korea, the "Chinese People's Volunteers" there were reported to consist of elements of Lin Piao's fourth army, and to be under his command. By the spring of 1951, however, elements of various field armies (including former Nationalist troops) were apparently in Korea with Peng Teh-huai officially disclosed as their commander. The major elements of the third army seemingly remained in east China, opposite Formosa, while Liu Po-Cheng's southwest command undertook the limited military action against Tibet in the fall of 1950. In the fall of 1952, the fourth army was reported to be moving its headquarters from its original base in central China to Canton, with Yeh Chien-ying appointed its acting commander. 9/ Lin Piao was reported at that time to be occupied in Peking on problems of modernization of the Chinese armies, for which task he was presumably drawing upon his experiences in the Korean war.

At the close of 1949 the PLA was officially reported to be more than five million strong 10/, though over half this total consisted of ex-Nationalist troops taken over by the PLA, as well as certain auxiliary militia forces. In June 1950, just before the Korean war, Mao Tse-tung, in a report to the central committee of the Communist party, declared that "while retaining its main forces," the army should be partially disbanded during 1950 as a contribution to the government's efforts at financial retrenchment. 11/ According to one account, the intention at

7/ Current Background No. III. Hong Kong, August 29, 1951.

8/ See Robert Guillain, "Revolution in China". Hong Kong dispatch to the Manchester Guardian Weekly, December 28, 1951.

9/ Henry R. Lieberman Hong Kong Dispatch to the New York Times, September 24, 1952.

10/ Figure given in New China News Agency editorial of December 4, 1949. (Reprinted in condensed form in China Digest, (Hong Kong), December 14, 1949. pp. 4-5)

11/ Report to third plenum of the seventh central committee of the Chinese Communist party, June 6, 1950. (Text in Current Background, Supplement No. 1. Hong Kong, June 13, 1950.)

this time was to demobilize as many as one million members of the army. 12/

It is highly doubtful that such plans were ever implemented, since the Korean war followed almost immediately. At any rate, intensive efforts were already under way before then to modernize the PLA by equipping it with heavy armament, providing it with a degree of mechanization, and instituting unified organizational, training, and command procedures. The Russians provided the equipment as well as, reportedly, many technicians. Technical and officer training schools have been reported set up, and a modern air force and the beginnings of a navy created.

Heavy recruiting for the army is reported continuing so that, despite losses in Korea, the PLA's present strength is estimated to remain at somewhat over five million, with the proportion of front-line regular troops higher than ever before. 13/ A method of recruiting based on the "militia system" -- declared to be a transitional procedure preceding the eventual introduction of a system of conscription -- seemingly suffices thus far to fill the army's needs, with such recruiting undoubtedly facilitated by the favored treatment and prestige of the soldier in China today. The creation of the highly-important officer cadres is also proceeding rapidly. An independent report has noted that the regime has been able to create "a wave of nationalism and genuine patriotism" among the youth, so that the army was actually able to handle only about one-fifth of the 350,000 youths who volunteered for the military schools in 1951. 14/ In addition, the country's local militia forces, presumably the present source of manpower for the PLA, are being steadily expanded, and were officially claimed to have reached a total of almost thirteen million by late 1951. 15/

It is obvious that the new army and air force, and the continuing war in Korea must be a vastly greater economic burden on the Peking government than was the old-style PLA and the type of war it fought on the Chinese mainland. It is impossible to know how much of this increased financial burden is being borne by the Soviet Union, but the Korean war particularly, with its heavy toll in men and material and its general strain on the entire economy, has certainly been severely felt in China. But at the same time, the war has also served to accelerate the process of Communist political and economic reorganization of China and has provided Peking with a further opportunity for greatly stimulating nationalist fervor throughout the country. It has also given tremendous impetus to the army's modernization process, first, in that it has almost certainly speeded Soviet arms deliveries and technical military assistance, and second, by providing invaluable experience in large-scale, modern warfare for the Chinese Communist armies and high command. The Communist military leaders, who had already demonstrated their

12/ "Mao Tse-tung's Red Army". op. cit.

13/ See Robert Guillain "Revolution in China: Becoming a Military Power", Hong Kong dispatch to the Manchester Guardian Weekly, December 20, 1951. See also Taipei dispatch to the New York Times, March 7, 1952.

14/ "Revolution in China: Becoming a Military Power", op. cit.

15/ Chou En-lai, Report to the third session of the First National Committee of the CPCCC, October 23, 1951. New China News Agency, Special Supplement No. 78, London, November 6, 1951.

capacity and resourcefulness during the long years of fighting within China, have now also been exposed to the complex problems of modern positional warfare, and of maintaining a huge, relatively well-equipped army over fairly lengthy lines of communication. As a recent article observed, the Chinese Communist leaders could previously have had only superficial knowledge of "the all-important fields of staff organization, planning, and the command of units the size of a division", but Peking is very likely to emerge from the Korean war "with military leaders and staffs capable of blue-printing and fighting a first-class war." 16/

With Soviet arms deliveries making up in part for China's lack of an adequate industrial plant, it is clear that China, at least in terms of its defensive capabilities, is fast becoming one of the world's leading military powers as a result of its current accelerated modernization, recruitment and training program, and of the regime's ability effectively to mobilize the country's vast population for military as well as other purposes.

B. The Role of the "Middle Parties"

Officially the Chinese Communist party is but one of many parties and groups working together through a coalition government, though the party freely acknowledges that it "leads" this coalition. 17/ It is clear, however, that the Communist party wields ultimate and unchallengeable authority in this alliance. Its leaders hold key posts in the central, regional, and local governments; it has firm control over the armed forces; and it is the moving force behind the mass "people's organizations" which extend upward from all localities into huge national federations of labor, the peasantry, women, youth, students, teachers, and many other segments of Chinese life.

The party itself, with its 'elite' standing and immense political prestige, is the country's leading "mass organization, and from its nearly six million members, organized in a closely-knit, centrally-directed nationwide structure, come the hundreds of thousands of political "cadres" who play a vital role in the government's effort to organize, indoctrinate, and mobilize the four hundred-odd million Chinese people in support of its objectives. As one observer sums it up, "Party representatives are the key personnel at all levels of national, social and economic life." 18/ Equally important, the ideology of the Communist party is now becoming, essentially, the ideology of the country, as expressed in its politics, education, culture and press. In contrast to all this, the other parties associated with the Peking regime are none of them mass parties, nor do they control any of the

16/ James Colwell, "Korea: Are We Teaching More Than We Learn?", The Reporter (New York), February 3, 1953, p. 25.

17/ "The Common Program of the CPPCC and the Organic Law of the Central People's Government both provide that the administrative authority of the State is held under the leadership of the working class. The Chinese Communist Party is the vanguard of the working class, and the leadership of the working class is being exercised through its vanguard." Tung Pi-wu, "On Strengthening the Work Connected with Conferences of People's Representatives". Peking Jen Min Jih Pao (People's Daily) January 30, 1952.

18/ H. Arthur Steiner, "Perspectives on the Chinese Revolution". Social Science, Vol. 25, No. 4, October 1950. p. 216.

real sources of power in China today.

When all this has been said, however, it must still be noted that the present coalition form of government does serve very real political functions. At the time it achieved victory, the Communist party itself was something of a "united front", both in its membership and in the wide appeal of its "minimum program"; and through the "New Democracy" sought to represent interests much broader than those usually associated with Communism. The alliance with the "middle parties" necessitated no drastic changes in the party's outlook or program at that time, and served to symbolize its continued adherence to such policies -- now formalized in the Common Program. Also, in the early stages of political and economic stabilization, calling as it did for the broadest possible collaboration of the former Nationalist governmental bureaucracy, and the cooperation of business and intellectual elements generally, a government containing these middle parties could more readily attract and reassure, as well as give a sense of participation in government, to such groups, than could a purely Communist regime.

Thus, such organizations as the "Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang", composed of expelled critics of that party's leadership; and organized in Hong Kong in January 1948 under Marshal Li Chi-shen, could more easily appeal to bureaucratic and certain business elements, as could such closely-allied groups as the "Kuomintang Association for Promoting Democracy" and the "San Min Chu I Comrades Association." Most important of the middle groups was the China Democratic League. It had been organized in 1941, originally as the Federation of Chinese Democratic Parties (composed of five such parties and groups), and then reorganized in 1944 as the more closely-knit China Democratic League. Representative chiefly of liberal and leftist intellectuals and other middle class elements, it had attempted to function as a "third force" between the Kuomintang and the Communist party, and had called for a coalition government and for political and economic reforms. With the outbreak of civil war in 1946 it had moved further to the left in opposing the Kuomintang and was outlawed by the Nationalist government in October 1947 (though a section of its right wing split with the League and joined the Nanking government earlier that year). Reorganized in Hong Kong, it gave its complete endorsement to the Communist campaign for a new united front under Communist leadership. Still led by Chang Lan, Lo Lung-chi, Shen Chun-ju, and others who had been identified with it since its founding, the League could very likely continue to exert a strong attraction among Chinese intellectuals particularly.

Finally, the "united front" had been a major Communist political slogan for over a decade, in the course of their criticism of the one-party government of the Kuomintang, and it had a powerful emotional appeal in Chinese politics. The appeal of this slogan was strengthened by the fact that the high tide of Chinese resistance to Japan, and of a national spirit of enthusiasm and sacrifice, had occurred during the period following the outbreak of war in 1937, when a united front more or less prevailed in the country. As already noted, therefore, the Communists were very anxious in 1949 to portray the new government as the culmination of all their previous efforts at such a united front.

The middle parties have since come to serve an additional function. The Communist party's membership, already varied in social composition in 1948, has become even more so as a result of its tremendous expansion in the

subsequent two-year period. By mid-1950 the party had launched an "ideological remolding" campaign, aimed at a thorough "purification" in the thinking of its huge membership, and at the same time announced its determination to speed the 'proletarianization' of the party. 19/ So long as the Chinese economy retains any 'new democratic' features, with limited encouragement of private business and other "bourgeois" groups, the organized political cooperation of such elements is important to the regime. But rather than further dilute its already weak proletarian base, the Communist party prefers to work through the middle parties. As a British journal has noted, the Communists 'need to retain and consolidate the support they had during the civil war from these classes, who were inspired by disgust at Kuomintang corruption and fiscal incompetence and also by nationalist motives -- but they do not want them in large numbers inside the Communist party.' 20/

Such politically useful groups could be siphoned off into the middle parties, however, and the latter were therefore encouraged in 1951 to undertake a membership expansion -- but only among certain groups of the population. Thus, according to a joint declaration of these parties, issued early in 1951, they announced their intention to recruit new members in accordance with the following formula defining those "principally eligible" for membership in the various parties: 21/

For the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang: Kuomintang members who at present still occupy government positions and those who have rendered distinguished services in the work of resisting American aggression and helping Korea or in the land reform.

For the China Democratic League: Petty bourgeois intelligentsia, particularly educational and cultural workers, college students, technicians, practitioners, government employees and patriotic and overseas Chinese.

For the China Democratic National Construction Association: National industrialists and merchants.

For the China Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party: Government employees, specialists and technicians.

For the China Association for Promoting Democracy: Progressive intelligentsia, practitioners and administrative workers.

The Chiu San Society will admit new members mainly from among progressive workers in cultural, educational and scientific fields.

19/ These developments are discussed in a later section of this chapter.

20/ The Economist (London), February 10, 1951. p. 309.

21/ New China News Agency Daily Bulletin No. 211 (min.), London, January 31, 1951.

Those eligible for membership are thus to be limited to the subsidiary "petty and national bourgeois" elements of the "people's democratic dictatorship"-- groups the Communists have always looked upon as the sources of heterodox tendencies among its own membership -- while the two key classes in the new state, labor and the peasantry, remain the exclusive preserve of the Communist party. Li Wei-han, Chief of the "United Front Work Department" of the Communist party's Central Committee, responsible for liaison with the middle parties, himself acknowledged the lack of mass strength of the latter parties and that their expansion was necessary to give greater substance to the Peking coalition. "The various parties and groups are thus enabled to acquire organizationally necessary and definite mass character" he explained, "so that they can play a more active part in the people's democratic front." 22/

At the same time, these parties continue to affirm their undeviating support to the Communist party and its policies. In a May 1950 joint declaration they declared that, "We, the democratic parties of China, are unconditionally united under the leadership of the great Communist Party and Chairman Mao Tse-tung for the building of an independent, free, democratic, united and prosperous China. To achieve this, we pledge ourselves to carry out fully all the [Communist party's May Day] slogans." 23/ Membership in these parties has been automatically restricted to those who support the current policies of the government. The 1951 joint declaration already referred to requires that all new members "support the Common Program of the PFCC, participate in the land reform, and [participate] in resisting American aggression and helping Korea..." 24/ Similarly, at its first national congress since the creation of the Peking government, the China Association for Promoting Democracy adopted the Common Program as its political platform and pledged loyalty to carry out the government's policies. 25/ The Democratic League's Central Executive Committee, meeting in January 1951, issued a political report along virtually identical lines. 26/

As a further step in this direction, at least one of these parties, the China Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party, in a recently adopted platform, specifically invited Communist party members to accept key posts in its organization. According to this platform, "An appropriate number of Chinese Communist Party members and New China Youth League members (the Communist youth organization) should be won over to our party in order to strengthen the leadership of our party." 27/ Developments along such lines will obviously weld these parties even more firmly to the Communist party.

22/ Li Wei-han, "The CCP and the People's Democratic United Front of China". Text in Current Background No. 89 (mime.), Hong Kong: American Consulate General, July 5, 1951.

23/ New China News Agency Daily Bulletin, No. 22 (mime.) London, May 4, 1950.

24/ loc. cit. No. 211 (mime.), London, January 31, 1951.

25/ loc. cit. No. 26 (mime.), London, May 10, 1950.

26/ loc. cit. No. 201 (mime.), London, January 17, 1951.

27/ Hong Kong dispatch, by Henry R. Lieberman, to the New York Times, January 4, 1952.

A possible indication of the future of the middle parties, once they have fulfilled their assigned political function or when China has advanced further in the direction of complete socialism, was contained in the announcement, in December 1949, of the voluntary dissolution of the "National Salvation Association", an important "third force" group founded in 1936, principally to work for the resistance to Japan, though it had since broadened its activities and subsequently become affiliated with the Democratic League. Shen Chun-ju, a leader of the Association, and now President of the Supreme People's Court, stated at that time, "Our historic mission has come to an end and...we will follow closely the Chinese Communist Party in the cause of constructing the New China." 28/

In encouraging the middle parties to expand while simultaneously strengthening their ideological and organizational ties to itself, the Communist party can build organized support and share responsibility for implementing its current program on a broadened basis, at the same time reserving to itself a decisive policy-making role -- a combination which cannot help but be a source of great strength to the regime. This approach also seems to indicate that the party intends to operate through the present coalition form of government for an extended period, and that it expects to be able to continue to generate relatively wide support for its policies among "middle groups". It may be noted here that while an unascertainable degree of disillusionment must have developed among many non-Communist supporters of the government in the course of the past three years, there have thus far apparently been no public defections among important "democratic personages", nor have any been reported dropped from the government. 28a/

On lower bureaucratic levels, however, the existence of a good deal of friction between veteran Communist functionaries and their non-Communist colleagues emerges from various articles and editorials appearing in the Communist press. In many cases, non-Communists and "new" Communists, because of their technical competence and training, or because they are representative of important, newly-emerging urban forces such as labor, have been given positions superior to those of veteran Communists -- so many of whom have poor, untutored peasant backgrounds. Many of the latter apparently feel that their past sacrifices and contributions to Communist victory entitle them to special preferment and treatment now, including good jobs in the government bureaucracy, whether they have qualifications for such jobs or not. An important editorial in the official Peking People's Daily in October 1950, for example, strongly condemned the "arrogance and self-conceit" of many veteran Communist cadres who, the editorial declared, in numerous cases 'complain about their treatment, believe in better treatment which they think their 'better qualifications' merit, consider their position too low, but forget that their work and record is of inferior

28/ New China News Agency Weekly Bulletin No. 135 (min.), London, January 3, 1950.

28a/ However, Chang Tung-sun, a leading figure in the Democratic League, and a member of the Central People's Government Council, underwent public "self-criticism" in the spring of 1952 at formerly American missionary-sponsored Yenching University, where Chang was chairman of the Philosophy Department. He was subsequently removed from this post and may have since been dropped from the Central People's Government Council as well.

quality." Such cadres, the newspaper continued, "despise new Party member and cadres, and belittle personages outside the Party and also the general masses of people." 29/

Some months later, the official study organ of the Communist party took up this same problem, using as the text for its sermon a letter from an old party member who complained that "new revolutionaries were better off than old revolutionaries." According to this letter, the complainant, who came from a poor Shansi peasant family, joined the Communist army in 1939 and the party itself the following year. Now, after victory, however, he found himself doing secretarial work in a city government department, sharing the status with "intellectuals fresh from schools", some of whom had even been elevated to positions of greater responsibility than his own. "To think", he concludes, "that we are now treated equally with, or even worse than, new cadres, is something very disheartening." The magazine then naturally took the writer to task for this attitude and reminds him that a party member's duty is "to serve and not to be served by the nation." 30/

Li Wei-han, responsible for united front relations of the Communist party, also wrote on this problem in 1951, with more particular reference to the situation prevailing between Communist and non-Communist administrative workers. He said that while there had been a "steady improvement in the relationship between Communists and senior non-Communists, a great deal still remains to be done in connection with relationships between junior and intermediate personnel." Many non-Communist personnel on lower levels, he wrote, "have complained that they have been given the cold shoulder by Communists in spite of their willingness to cooperate", and, he warns, "it is up to the responsible Communist cadres of various organs to have this phenomenon rectified effectively." However, he also attempts to reassure technically untrained Communist personnel, telling them that though in many cases they may be inadequate "in terms of the concrete requirements of certain posts" when properly led and organized, they can still "do much good for the people." 31/

This is likely to be a continuing problem for the Communist leaders. Determined to achieve vitally needed efficiency in administration, and faced with the present political necessity of promoting amicable relations with non-Communists in the government, they must make an effort to check abuse and incompetency in office among those of its veteran cadres--particularly the great many unsophisticated ones -- who in many cases are being infected by personal ambition, arrogance, and "commandism", as well as the corrupting influences of the previously non-existent temptations of urban life. At the same time, the party cadres are the indispensable element in the political structure being created throughout the country, and the party must avoid

29/ Peking Jen Min Jih Pao (People's Daily), October 10, 1950.

30/ Hsueh Hsi (Study), Peking, January 1, 1951. (Reprinted in Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 161, Hong Kong, August 24, 1951.)

31/ Li Wei-han, "The Further Strengthening of United Front Work Within the Government Organs", This report was made on April 29, 1951, and released by the New China News Agency on June 9, 1951. (Text in Current Background No. 96 (mimeo.), Hong Kong, July 12, 1951.)

the dissatisfaction which would develop among much of its veteran membership if the notion should keep spreading that, with victory, "old revolutionaries", particularly of peasant background, were being discriminated against in favor of students, intellectuals, and labor representatives with superior education and the skills necessary for handling the new problems of state administration. Also likely to cause repercussions among the millions of Communist party members from the countryside is the current effort to speed the growth of the urban proletarian wing of the party, particularly since this wing, in keeping with present plans, will come to dominate the party in time. But before these and related points are discussed in any detail, a review of the structure and functioning of the Communist party itself is in order

C. The Role of the Communist Party and the Mass Organizations

According to Liu Shao-chi, the Chinese Communist party had over 5,800,000 members in mid-1951 -- a total which would make it second in size only to the Soviet Communist party. Of these, Liu reported, over 2,700,000 were in the armed forces, government administration, factories, mines, and schools; while more than 3,000,000 were "distributed through the countryside." Women members totaled 600,000, and over 1,200,000 were under the age of twenty-five. This membership was distributed among some 250,000 branches, the party's basic unit of organization. 32/ Apparently no important changes in overall membership took place during the following year, for Liu Shao-chi's figure on total party membership was still being officially cited in mid-1952.

However, in the five or six year period preceding this recent leveling off, the Communist party underwent tremendous expansion. It now has (as of July 1952) almost five times as many members as it did in 1945, and has virtually doubled in size since the end of 1948. 33/ In addition to the party itself, the China New Democratic Youth League, a somewhat more loosely organized youth affiliate of the party first created in 1949 34/, claimed over 5,000,000 members toward the end of 1951. 35/

32/ Liu Shao-chi, "Address on the 30th Anniversary of the Communist Party of China." (Speech delivered in Peking, June 30, 1951.) People's China (Peking), July 16, 1951, p. 5.

33/ According to Mao Tse-tung, the party had 1,210,000 members in mid-1945, and 3,000,000 members in November 1948. (See Mao Tse-tung, "Revolutionary Forces of the World Rally to Combat Imperialist Aggression." For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy! (Bucharest), No. 21, November 1, 1948.)

34/ This League, its constitution states, is open to all youths between the ages of 14 and 25 who, among other qualifications, "support the principles of the Chinese Communist Party." One of the functions of the League is to give its members "an education based on the principles of Marx-Leninism and the ideology of Mao Tse-tung." (Text of this constitution in Current Background No. 7. Hong Kong, September 7, 1950.)

35/ Peking, New China News Agency, January 11, 1952.

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mittee members and the elevation of four alternates to regular membership, the totals apparently stood at 43 regular members and 29 alternates. ^{37/} The party constitution stipulates that the Central Committee is to be summoned to meet in plenary session every six months by its Political Bureau, though again, at the discretion of this bureau, such sessions may be postponed or convened sooner. Since 1945 only three plenary sessions have been held, the first in 1947, the second in 1949, and the third and latest in June 1950. The Central Committee has various subsidiary departments and committees, operating under the direction of its Political Bureau and Secretariat, through which it channels its numerous activities and directs party and national affairs. These include departments on party organization, propaganda, cadre training, united front work and others.

The Central Committee elects the Central Political Bureau, the Central Secretariat and the chairman of the Central Committee, who is concurrently chairman of the Political Bureau and the Secretariat. Mao, who has held these posts since 1935, was re-elected chairman at the 1945 congress. The Central Secretariat, the top-level administrative organ of the party, "attends to the daily work of the Central Committee", under the direction of the Political Bureau which, as in other Communist parties, is at the apex of the party hierarchy. In the words of the party constitution, "The Central Political Bureau shall be the central leading body of the party during intervals between the plenary sessions of the Central Committee." ^{38/}

Information as to the present exact composition of the Political Bureau seems difficult to come by. While Central Committee membership has been freely publicized by the Communists, a complete and official list of Politburo members has apparently not been made public, though the officially released list of the Presidium of the seventh national party congress includes the names of virtually all those usually identified as belonging to the Politburo. According to information contained in various official Communist news releases, nine Communist leaders can be positively identified as being in the Politburo as of the end of 1952. ^{39/} An authoritative non-Communist source ^{40/} lists, in addition to these nine, six others who

^{37/} See Current Background No. 137 Hong Kong, November 15, 1951. A semi-official Communist source, published in Peking in March 1952, also lists 43 regular members, but only 27 alternates. (A Guide to New China, op. cit. pp. 48-49. Alternate members have the right to participate in plenary meetings of the Central Committee, but have no vote. It appears that no alternate has as yet been elevated to regular membership to fill the latest gap in the Central Committee left by the death of Jen Pi-shih in October 1950.)

^{38/} Article 34, Constitution of the Communist Party of China (adopted June 11, 1945). English text in Liu Shao-chi, On the Party. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1950. p. 181.

^{39/} They were most recently listed in a report naming high party figures who greeted Liu Shao-chi at the Peking airport on his return from a trip to Moscow on January 11, 1953. Peking Radio, New China News Agency, January 11, 1953.

^{40/} Current Background No. 137. op. cit. An American authority on the Chinese Communist leadership has called this source "the most reliable analysis of the Central Organization of the Communist Party of China." Robert C. North, Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites. Stanford: Stanford University Press, July 1952. p. 92.

The latest national congress of the party (the seventh) was held at Yenan from April to June 1945, at which its present constitution was adopted and its current Central Committee and other leading bodies elected. It was at this congress also that Mao made his famous political report, "On Coalition Government", and that Liu Shao-chi, reflecting his emergence during the 1940's as a leading party theoretician, presented a discussion of the new constitution which is now regarded as the definitive statement of the Communist Party's theoretical and organizational principles. 36/

As does the government, the Chinese Communist party operates in accordance with the principle of "democratic centralism", with a parallel structure at all levels organized in an ascending hierarchy up to the central party organs which direct and have jurisdiction over the entire party organization; and with the complete subordination of the minority to the majority on all levels. For the entire country, the key party organizations are the National Party Congress, the National Party Conference, and the Central Committee, with these bodies duplicated on provincial, county, municipal, district and even branch levels, where a general membership meeting serves as the branch "congress." Theoretically, the national congress is the supreme organ of the party, but in actual practice it is the Central Committee which wields the power in the long intervals between the irregularly-held congresses, and which determines the date as well as the number of delegates and the procedure of election to such congresses.

The National Party Congress, when convened, is empowered to decide basic party policy, orientation and program, and to determine the size of and elect the Central Committee of the party. Normally scheduled to be held every three years, it can, under "extraordinary conditions", be postponed or convened earlier at the discretion of the Central Committee. In fact, there has been no national party congress since that held at Yenan in 1945, which in turn came some seventeen years after the sixth congress, held in Moscow in 1928.

The National Party Conference is of less formal nature, and may be convened by the Central Committee at any time between party congresses. Composed of members of lower-level party committees, such conferences are designed to discuss and take action on some current question of party policy. Thus, in 1947, an agrarian conference of the party was held at which the basic postwar Communist agrarian reform law was adopted, which presumably guided its agrarian policies until superseded by the June 1950 agrarian law. Another National Party Conference (on organizational work) was held in March 1951, at which an intensive, long-range "overhauling" of the party was mapped out.

As stated above, the directing force of the Communist party is its Central Committee and, even more particularly, that Committee's Central Political Bureau and Central Secretariat. At the 1945 national party congress, 44 regular and 33 alternate members were elected to the Central Committee; as of mid-1951, as a result of five deaths among Central Com-

36/ This report has been published in Peking in English translation as On the Party, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1950. Included also is the text of the 1945 constitution of the party.

mittee members and the elevation of four alternates to regular membership, the totals apparently stood at 43 regular members and 29 alternates. 37/ The party constitution stipulates that the Central Committee is to be summoned to meet in plenary session every six months by its Political Bureau, though again, at the discretion of this bureau, such sessions may be postponed or convened sooner. Since 1945 only three plenary sessions have been held, the first in 1947, the second in 1949, and the third and latest in June 1950. The Central Committee has various subsidiary departments and committees, operating under the direction of its Political Bureau and Secretariat, through which it channels its numerous activities and directs party and national affairs. These include departments on party organization, propaganda, cadre training, united front work and others.

The Central Committee elects the Central Political Bureau, the Central Secretariat and the chairman of the Central Committee, who is concurrently chairman of the Political Bureau and the Secretariat. Mao, who has held these posts since 1935, was re-elected chairman at the 1945 congress. The Central Secretariat, the top-level administrative organ of the party, "attends to the daily work of the Central Committee", under the direction of the Political Bureau which, as in other Communist parties, is at the apex of the party hierarchy. In the words of the party constitution, "The Central Political Bureau shall be the central leading body of the party during intervals between the plenary sessions of the Central Committee." 38/

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37/ See Current Background No. 137. Hong Kong, November 15, 1951. A semi-official Communist source, published in Peking in March 1952, also lists 43 regular members, but only 27 alternates. (A Guide to New China, op. cit. pp. 48-49. Alternate members have the right to participate in plenary meetings of the Central Committee, but have no vote. It appears that no alternate has as yet been elevated to regular membership to fill the latest gap in the Central Committee left by the death of Jen Pi-shih in October 1950.)

38/ Article 34, Constitution of the Communist Party of China (adopted June 11, 1945). English text in Liu Shao-chi, On the Party. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1950. p. 181.

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The latest national congress of the party (the seventh) was held at Yanan from April to June 1945, at which its present constitution was adopted and its current Central Committee and other leading bodies elected. It was at this congress also that Mao made his famous political report, "On Coalition Government", and that Liu Shao-chi, reflecting his emergence during the 1940's as a leading party theoretician, presented a discussion of the new constitution which is now regarded as the definitive statement of the Communist Party's theoretical and organizational principles. 36/

As does the government, the Chinese Communist party operates in accordance with the principle of "democratic centralism", with a parallel structure at all levels organized in an ascending hierarchy up to the central party organs which direct and have jurisdiction over the entire party organization; and with the complete subordination of the minority to the majority on all levels. For the entire country, the key party organizations are the National Party Congress, the National Party Conference, and the Central Committee, with these bodies duplicated on provincial, county, municipal, district and even branch levels, where a general membership meeting serves as the branch "congress." Theoretically, the national congress is the supreme organ of the party, but in actual practice it is the Central Committee which wields the power in the long intervals between the irregularly-held congresses, and which determines the date as well as the number of delegates and the procedure of election to such congresses.

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have been variously mentioned in non-Communist reports as Politburo members.

The nine who are definitely members of the Political Bureau include, in addition to Mao Tse-tung as chairman and Liu Shao-chi as deputy chairman, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, the two veteran Communists Lin Tsu-han (also known as Lin Po-chu) and Tung Pi-wu, financial and economic expert Chen Yun, Manchurian Communist chief Kao Kang, and the present mayor of Peking and secretary of that city's party committee Peng Chen. The six others who may perhaps be members are military leaders Lin Piao and Peng Teh-huai, Kang Sheng, Shantung Communist leader who reportedly once headed the party's "special service" operations, Wang Chia-hsiang and Chang Wen-tien, Peking's former and current Ambassadors to the Soviet Union, respectively, and Chen Shao-yu (Wang Ming), formerly closely identified with the Comintern and at one time much more prominent in Chinese Communist party affairs. It is extremely doubtful, in fact that Chen Shao-yu is still important enough within the party to be a member of its Political Bureau. Jen Pi-shih, who died in October 1950, had been one of the more prominent members of the Political Bureau.

Thus in the Politburo and also the Central Secretariat 41/, are most of the key political and military figures in the party, and their names, as well as those of other members of the Central Committee, crop up consistently as holders of leading posts in the government, the army, and the most important mass organizations in the country. It may be noted as an indication of the experienced and stable nature of present-day Chinese Communist leadership that every member of the Politburo has been in the party at least twenty years, and that there has been an apparent absence of serious open rifts among the party's top command for the past fifteen years. Not since Chang Kuo-tao's break with the party in 1938 (a development which was essentially the final step in the intra-party struggle in which Mao won recognition as undisputed party leader in the mid-nineteen thirties), has any top figure within the Chinese Communist hierarchy been publicly disgraced, dropped from the party, or otherwise eliminated; though the relative standing within the party of some formerly important figures who had not originally been closely associated with Mao, such as Chen Shao-yu (Wang Ming) declined noticeably as a result of the wartime (1942-44) "ideological rectification" movement. The close ties among the Chinese Communist leaders, it has been observed, have been "forged in twenty years of living together, fighting together, hiding together, and governing together" and are a "special characteristic" of Chinese Communism. 41a/

Administratively, the Central Committee functions through six regional bureaus which, interposed between Peking and party organizations at provincial and lower levels, not only coincide with a similar administrative structure for the government, but undoubtedly provided the pattern for the latter. These bureaus actually serve as branches of the Central Committee; they are directly responsible to that body and their chairmen are in all

41/ Mao and Liu Shao-chi are chairman and secretary, respectively, of the Secretariat, and most of its other members are also in the Political Bureau.

41a/ H. Arthur Steiner, "Maoism or Stalinism for Asia." Far Eastern Survey, January 14, 1953. p. 3.

cases members of the Central Committee. Through these bureaus the party can apparently combine decentralization of administrative responsibility with thoroughly centralized control and direction from Peking. This regional organization is clearly a further development and outgrowth of the party structure developed during the period of scattered and relatively isolated Communist-controlled bases during the Japanese war, ^{42/} and is a characteristic feature of Chinese Communist administration today.

In some cases sub-bureaus have been set up under one or another of the regional bureaus, seemingly for areas of special character or significance. There is an Inner Mongolian sub-bureau, operating under the Northeast Bureau; one for Sinkiang, under the Northwest Bureau; and a Shantung sub-bureau, subordinate to the East China Bureau. There is also a South China sub-bureau, with jurisdiction over Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Hainan Island. Though this latter is called a sub-bureau, it is unclear whether it is actually under the Central-South Bureau of the party. This may in fact be a transitional stage preaging the administrative division of vast and populous South-Central China into two separate regions. The single-province Shantung sub-bureau is rather puzzling, particularly since its chairman, Kang Sheng, is reportedly a member of the Politburo itself. One can only surmise that the special importance of Shantung as a Communist base for operations in north and central China during the conflict with the Nationalists resulted in the creation of a powerful party organization there to which it has been necessary to give special significance and status.

The basic unit of the party is the branch, which may have as few as three or, apparently, as many as several hundred members. The principle followed is that each branch represent some specific area of activity or some small locality, such as a factory, mine, office, school or army company on one hand, or a village or a city street on the other. Such branches may be organized only on the approval of the higher level county or city party committees. ^{43/} As already noted, there are now some 250,000 party branches officially reported in existence -- making an average of a little over twenty members per branch. As the "grass roots" foundation of the party, the branches are specifically instructed to "carry on propaganda and organizational work among the masses of the people", as well as to serve as a check on policy by acting as the party's eyes and ears in reporting back local sentiments and demands to higher party bodies. In addition, of course, they are the essential instrument for implanting party discipline and for indoctrination of the party's vast membership. ^{44/}

^{42/} A recent analysis of the party's wartime period notes: "Another distinctive feature of the wartime Party was the importance of the Central Committee's regional departments. Beyond the barriers of Japanese troops, the Northwest, North China, and Central China Bureaus carried on the Central Committee's work in the War Base areas, apparently serving as miniature central committees with their own organs and schools. It can be assumed that similar departments functioned underground in south and east China. The importance of the departments can be disputed but 1950 finds six regional bureaus of the Central Committee with great power and some independence." Boyd Compton, Mao's China. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1952. p. xxi.

^{43/} Article 49, Constitution of the Communist Party of China. op. cit. p. 191.

^{44/} Article 52, ibid., pp. 192-193.

A particularly significant form of party organization is the so-called "party fraction". Such fractions, the party constitution stipulates, are to be formed in any government body or mass organization in which three or more party members hold "responsible" positions; in other words, they are to be composed of party cadres. "The task of a Party fraction", it continues, "shall be to guide the Party members in the leading body of the said organization, to strengthen the influence of the Party and to carry out the policy of the Party." ^{45/} The importance of such "party fractions" in assuring the overwhelmingly authoritative position of the Communist party within the government has been candidly affirmed by a top-ranking administrative expert of the party himself. In a September 1951 address to a North China conference of hsien magistrates, long-term Communist leader Tung Pi-wu discussed the working relationship between the Communist party and the government, "How does the Communist Party exercise its leadership of the organs of administrative authority?", he asked. "Through the work of members of the Party in the state administrative organs, the latter are made to accept the policies of the Party, and to turn them into the policies of the State. In any state administrative body where there are more than three members of the Party, they will be organized into a Party fraction to ensure the leadership of the Party in the said organization." ^{46/}

Tung Pi-wu cautions against the party organization itself implementing policy, warning that this procedure would undermine the prestige of the government. "Because the party assumes leadership of the state administrative organs, it cannot itself undertake the latter's tasks on their behalf." As an example of a "correct" relationship, he cites that of the Central Committee of the Communist party to the central government. "The Central Committee has never once issued an order to the Central People's Government. All the laws and orders issued by the Central People's Government have been in keeping with the decisions of the Party, and many important documents and proclamations had first been drafted by the Party (there has not been a single document which had not been prepared or at least considered first by the Party), the drafts being then brought before the National Committee of the CPPCC, or its Standing Committee for discussion, after which it was passed on to the Central People's Government Council or the Government Administration Council for further discussion and adoption."

Summing up, Tung Pi-wu defines the "correct relationship between the party and government" as follows: "1) the Party should issue proper directives to the state administrative organs on the nature of the tasks to be carried out and the proper course to follow in their implementation; 2) through the state administrative organs and their subsidiary departments, the policy of the Party should be enforced, while the operations of these organs should be supervised; and 3) by the selection and promotion [presumably by the party organization] of loyal and capable cadres (Party members or non-members of the Party) for work in the state administrative organs."

The "party fractions" play a similarly vital role in the rapidly burgeoning network of mass organizations in China today. The importance of this aspect of the Communist party's work cannot be overestimated, for

^{45/} Article 60, ibid., p. 199.

^{46/} Tung Pi-wu, "On Strengthening the Work Connected with Conferences of People's Representatives". op. cit.

these mass "people's organizations" allow the party immensely to magnify its influence and control, and they are the essential media through which the party and the government "mobilize" the people for the implementation of their program and for the ever-present political and ideological "movements" and campaigns. Through its "fractions", and its occupancy of "responsible" positions in these organizations, the party is able to exercise direct leadership over many tens of millions of people drawn from every key group in society and all areas of activity. In virtually every case these mass organizations are nationwide in scope, extending upward from all localities into "All-China" federations.

The officially-reported membership figures for many of these federations reach fantastic totals. Chou En-lai, for example, reported in October 1951 that membership in peasants' associations in but four of the six major regions of China had climbed to over 88 million; with militia forces organized under the aegis of these associations totaling almost thirteen million for the entire country. ^{47/} Toward the close of 1951 the All-China Federation of Labor had over six million members, the New Democratic Youth League, as already noted, over five million, and the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association some twenty-three million! ^{48/} Among other important mass organizations are the All-China Students' Union, the All-China Federation of Democratic Youth, and the All-China Democratic Women's Federation, with this last organization claiming an "affiliated membership" of thirty million at the end of 1950, with another source reporting in 1952 that the Federation was "able to keep in contact with" more than seventy-six million women at that time. ^{49/}

It is evident that in their effort to galvanize key segments of the Chinese population, the Communists are directing special attention to both the women and the youth of China. To the former they are promising "equal status" through the elimination of many of the social and economic impediments to such equality. The Chinese Communist leaders fully appreciate how potent such an appeal can be, and their new Marriage Law was, significantly, one of the first formal laws promulgated by the Peking regime. As for the youth, the creation of three separate nationwide organizations for them reflects the Communist concentration on this portion of the population. The youth, particularly the students, are viewed as the key to the "ideological remolding" of the country as a whole, for from among them are to come the great numbers of trained and indoctrinated "activist" elements so vitally necessary for the fulfillment of Communist plans for China. It may be noted, in addition, that a Young People's and a Children's Corps have also been set up for organizing children down through the primary school level.

Though the reported membership figures may be substantially inflated in many cases, while great numbers of those who have joined one or another organization are members in a purely formal sense only, they can nevertheless not be casually waved aside as being merely paper organizations. The

^{47/} Chou En-lai, Report to the third session of the First National Committee of the CPCCC, October 23, 1951. op. cit.

^{48/} New China News Agency, Peking dispatches, January 11, 1952; February 13, 1952.

^{49/} A Guide to New China, op. cit., p. 61.

Communist talent for organizing people and the tremendous importance they themselves attach to these organizations caution against such an approach. Thus, top-ranking Communist leaders have been placed at the head of the important federations. Liu Shao-chi, for example, heads the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association; the Democratic Women's Federation is led by Tsai Chang, the only woman who is a regular member of the Communist party's Central Committee; the All-China Federation of Labor is directed by Communist leaders Chen Yun, Liu Shao-chi, and Li Li-san; the Federation of Democratic Youth by Communist Central Committeeman Liao Cheng-chih; while the New Democratic Youth League was headed, until his death, by Politburo member Jen Pi-shih, and is now led by a lower-ranking Communist, Feng Wen-pin. In addition, the presence and activity of the party cadres operating as "fractions" within these organizations not only make the latter thoroughly responsive to party directives and needs, but also serves to keep them all "humming" in carrying out their assigned roles.

These mass organizations also have a semi-legal status and specifically defined functions and areas of responsibility. In the indirect method of elections now used, they serve as a major source of representatives to the various political conferences and congresses held at all levels, with over one-third of the delegates to the CPPCC itself chosen from these nationwide "people's organizations". In rural areas, the peasant associations are specifically empowered to elect peasant congresses which theoretically exercise advisory governmental authority on all rural levels; they are also closely interrelated with the militia forces in the countryside. Particularly important in implementing the Communist land reform program, these peasant associations have been officially referred to as "the main organizational form and executive organs of the forces of agrarian reform" 50/, while a student of Communist agrarian activities calls them "the foundation of Communist rural reorganization." 51/

Many of the other mass organizations also operate on a quasi-governmental level. The Democratic Women's Federation, for example, shares with the more formal government agencies the responsibility for enforcing the new marriage law, with its representatives serving on the "Central Direction Teams" set up to check on the law's operation. 52/ The All-China Federation of Labor not only arranges collective contracts between labor on the one hand and the state and private employers on the other, but plays a significant role in factory administration, and in running various social services such as insurance, vacation and health facilities, and consumer

50/ Liu Shao-chi, "On the Agrarian Reform Law". Report made to the second session of the First National Committee of the CPPCC, June 14, 1950. (Text in The Agrarian Reform Law of the People's Republic of China. Together With Other Relevant Documents. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1950. p. 97.)

51/ G. William Skinner, "Peasant Organization in Rural China", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, September 1951. p. 95.

52/ Shen Chun-ju, Report to the third session of the First National Committee of the CPPCC, October 28, 1951. op. cit.

cooperatives. It plays a key part in government efforts to increase labor productivity by instilling a state-inspired "new democratic spirit" among the workers, and through "emulation" campaigns and the "new record movement" -- this latter apparently somewhat analogous to the Soviet Stakhanovite movement. As an official source has phrased it, "the trade unions help to guide the workers along lines needed by production." 53/

In similar fashion, the New Democratic Youth League serves as a special corps in spurring the production and construction requirements of the government in the factories and farms, and in furthering the state's ideological program there as well as in the schools and the army. Its leader has termed the League "the able assistant of the People's Government and of the Chinese Communist Party." 54/

In addition, all these organizations conduct intensive educational and propaganda activities, and in many cases run their own schools and publish magazines and newspapers specifically directed at their memberships. The Sino-Soviet Friendship Association operates mainly on this level, and is actively engaged in promoting Soviet ideology, technique and culture in China. To this end, it organizes lecture tours throughout the country of teams of Soviet experts, artists and intellectuals in various fields; and sponsors performances by Soviet musical, dramatic, dance, athletic and other troupes. It also runs bookstores, furthers the study of Russian and is active in still other ways in its impressive efforts to "sell" the Soviet Union to the Chinese people.

The significance of these mass organizations in the complex political power structure being erected by Peking was underlined by the recent decision to create a new "All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce", representative of both state and private enterprise. This federation is being formed as an integral part of the campaign inaugurated early in 1952 to bring the private business classes under closer state supervision and control, which includes a concerted effort to "remold" the thinking of these people along lines more acceptable to the government, and a movement to purge their business activities of various "capitalist sins". 55/

Thus, according to general rules enacted by the Government Administration Council in August 1951 for the organization of Industrial and Commercial Associations (the local units out of which the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce is to be constructed), the "basic tasks" of these associations are "to lead the industrialists and merchants to observe the Common Program and the policies and laws of the People's Government", "to direct private businessmen "to develop production and improve operations under the general economic plans of the state", and to organize these businessmen "to conduct studies, reform their ideology and participate in all kinds of patriotic movements". Such associations are also supposed to "represent the legitimate interests of private industrialists and merchants" and to hold

53/ New China News Agency, "Report on China's Trade Union Movement." In The First Year of Victory. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1950. p. 88.

54/ Feng Wen-pin, "Report on China's Youth Movement". ibid., p. 93.

55/ Henry R. Lieberman, Hong Kong dispatch to the New York February 1, 1952.

consultations with trade unions on the question of labor-capital relations. 56/ However, since the representatives of state and cooperative enterprises are to join such associations, the increasingly dominant position of state-owned enterprise in the Chinese economy will inevitably be reflected in the relative position of state and private business representatives within these associations as well. For example, a government official in commenting on these general rules, declared that state enterprises and cooperatives should "assume a certain responsibility" in the industrial and commercial associations. 57/

To sum up then, the "people's organizations" have been an indispensable factor in the Peking government's ability to involve great masses of people in the many state-sponsored political and economic "movements" which have been so characteristic of the Chinese Communist governing technique. These organizations, all properly controlled and directed, are the primary vehicles through which the Communists are endeavoring to identify the individual Chinese with larger social, economic and political groupings, in an effort to counteract the individual and family-centered focus of traditional Chinese life with a newly-fostered "social consciousness", and to generate a state-centered loyalty and allegiance. The Communists thus hope to create a governing apparatus with organizational and popular roots reaching into every locality and reflecting each stratum and activity of Chinese life. Certainly, their tremendous effort in this direction must be taken into account in any realistic assessment of the strength and stability of the Communist regime.

Specific measures have also been taken to insure promotion of the Communist program and ideology on an organized mass basis throughout the country. One important step has been the institution of "study periods" (hsueh hsi) at set hours each day in government offices, factories, schools, and army units, during which prescribed, basic Marxist-Leninist texts, as well as the works of Mao Tse-tung, are read and discussed within the framework of current events. In addition, the party has acted to put its propaganda work on a highly organized and intensified level. A resolution issued by the party's Central Committee on January 1, 1951, announced the creation of a "party propaganda network". The resolution directed that official propagandists be appointed by all party branches, whose duties would be to "constantly propagate and explain in a simple and direct manner, to the surrounding masses, current domestic and foreign affairs, party and government policies, the people's duties (particularly everyday local duties), to dispel reactionary rumors and wrong ideas circulating among the people, ... and to report back regularly to the party organization on the local situation so that the party can more easily decide on the proper content and approach in propaganda work for any specific period. 58/

56/ Peking, New China News Agency, August 17, 1952.

57/ Report to the Government Administration Council by Hsueh Mu-chiao, Director of the Central People's Government Bureau of Private Industries. August 1, 1951.

Peking, New China News Agency, August 17, 1952.

58/ "Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Establishment of a Party Propaganda Network toward the People." Hsin Hua Yueh Pao (New China Monthly) (Peking); January 1951. pp. 507-508. (in Chinese).

Aside from these specially designated propagandists, all operating under the direction and authorization of higher party organs, the Central Committee's resolution noted that one of the duties of all party members "is to promote propaganda towards the masses at all times and places, to educate the masses with tireless revolutionary zeal, uncompromisingly to fight all reactionary and incorrect thoughts and opinions, and to inspire and spur the awakening of the masses." 59/ In view of the tremendous emphasis on mass campaigns in Communist China, it is worth noting the following section of this resolution: "In all the national propaganda movements the party organizations should be skilful in cooperating with all democratic parties and groups, and in organizing all workers in the people's governments, the People's Liberation Army, the cultural, educational and artistic professions to combine in producing the broadest propaganda campaign in accordance with outlined objectives." 60/

Formal educational and cultural facilities are also fast becoming primary vehicles for dissemination of the new ideology. Educational and cultural head Kuo Mo-jo has declared that "...the fundamental task of our cultural and educational work lies in the education of all our people in Marxism-Leninism, and in the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung which form the concrete manifestation of Marxism-Leninism in China, and in the consolidation of the people's democratic dictatorship on the ideological front." 61/ It may be noted how much more direct this statement of 1951 is than the somewhat more allusive wording of the Common Program on this same subject. 62/ Kuo also noted that "a systematic movement for the criticism of ideology has just been started among our literary, arts and educational circles. It is up to us to unreservedly and positively unfold such ideological discussions all along the cultural front, including education, the sciences, the arts, publications, etc., in order to reform old ideology, (and to) consolidate the leading position of Marxism-Leninism in cultural and educational work."

With regard to the press and other media of mass communication, a similarly rigid pattern prevails, though within the framework of undeviating support for the government's overall policies and leadership, the Communist authorities do utilize the press for controlled 'criticism and self-criticism' of abuses in local administration, of short-comings of minor functionaries, and of other malpractices on lower levels of the country's economic and political life. As the Communist Party's Central Committee stated, in a 1950 resolution encouraging "self-criticism" in the press, "Editors, reporters and correspondents of newspapers and publications and newspaper reading groups should welcome and develop correct criticism and oppose destructive criticism. As for destructive criticism -- especially that designed to sabotage the people's democratic dictatorship by counter-revolutionary elements -- it should and must be rejected." 63/

59/ Ibid. p. 507.

60/ Ibid., p. 509.

61/ Kuo Mo-jo, Report to third session of First National Committee of the CPCC, October 25, 1951. (Text in Current Background No. 140, Hong Kong November 22, 1951.)

62/ See Chapter III.

63/ New China News Agency Daily Bulletin No. 18 (mimeo.)

In the innumerable and varied activities undertaken by the Communist Party in connection with virtually every aspect of Chinese life, a tremendous and important role is played by the cadre. A cadre in Communist China has been defined, in a recent study, as a "dynamic element, who serves as the transmission belt between the Party, the State, and the masses." 64/ The cadres' key function in maintaining the party's controlling position in both the mass organizations and in the various organs of government has already been discussed. However, the cadres are vital, not only as a primary instrument of party control, but in supplying trained, disciplined, and ideologically dedicated leadership elements" on every level and in all areas of party and governmental activity -- political, economic and cultural. With the state embarking on a program of industrialization, increasing attention is now being directed at training "technical cadres" and in their assignment to what the state considers to be key sectors of the economy. A "cadre" is therefore actually an all-inclusive term covering all those working under state or party direction and holding positions of some responsibility, whether the particular work involved is political, administrative or technical in nature. The cadres are in fact the indispensable, as well as highly effective, means for implementing government and party directives of all kinds, particularly on the local "grass roots" level of the country.

While all party members can be viewed as cadres of a sort -- in the sense of being politically "advanced" individuals -- by no means all of them have the specific functional leadership duties usually associated with the cadre. At the same time, a great number who do have such duties are not members of the party at all. Complete political reliability, though always a highly desirable attribute, is not the only qualification of the cadre. For undertaking the technical, administrative, propaganda and organizational tasks required by the party and government, particularly in economic affairs, the cadre must also have special aptitude, training and experience. With the party, particularly in the 1949-50 period, so largely peasant in composition, very many such people had to be found outside party ranks, in the universities, in business and the professions, and in the government offices of the former regime.

A dual trend developed: Special schools, "people's revolutionary universities", study groups, newspapers and magazines (the foremost being Hsueh-shi [Study], issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party) were established for the thorough political indoctrination and "thought remolding" of such non-party cadres, great numbers of whom subsequently entered the party itself. (These study facilities, of course, have also been utilized for the further ideological training of old party members as well). At the same time, efforts were begun to retrain many relatively unschooled veteran party cadres in the technical and administrative "know-how" necessary to handle the complexities of a comparatively modern government and economy.

1950. (Text of Decision of Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Self-Criticism in the Press. Issued on April 19, 1950.)

64/ Walter E. Gourlay, The Chinese Communist Cadre: Key to Political Control. Cambridge, Mass. Russian Research Center, Harvard University, February 1952. pp. ii-iii. See this study for a more detailed analysis of this aspect of Chinese Communist politics.

Thus, special short-term schools have been set up to train cadres for work in connection with such specific activities as land reform, journalism, radio communications, and in the application of modern agricultural techniques. 65/ Chou En-lai reported in late 1951, for example, that a "land reform working corps" of 360,000 had been trained in advance for work in areas undergoing land reform during 1951 and 1952. 66/ Such cadres not only direct the agrarian "struggle" through its various phases, but are also instrumental in the organization and control of the all-important peasant associations being set up throughout the countryside. 67/ Kuo Mo-jo, chairman of the central government's Committee on Cultural and Educational Affairs, stated in October 1951 that some 150,000 "senior technical cadres", 500,000 "intermediate technical cadres", 200,000 "senior and intermediate health cadres", and "large numbers of financial, political-judicial, and nationalities cadres" would have to be trained within the next five to six year period. Such a program, he added, called for a tremendous expansion in the number of intensive short-term schools and classes, since the regular middle schools and colleges could not possibly train that many in the specified time. 68/ Here the term "cadre" is used to mean technician, engineer, teacher, doctor and government worker, rather than "active elements" in the political sense, but such technical people are also expected to undergo serious political indoctrination during their course of training.

At the same time, the existing supply of trained "technical cadres" such as the bulk of ex-Kuomintang government workers, technicians, teachers and other professional people, are generally required to undergo short but strenuous periods of "political schooling", during which they are exposed to the essentials of Marxist-Leninist theory and the "thought of Mao Tse-tung", and are expected to "remold" their thinking through the medium of highly personal, mutual and self-critical group discussions, leading in most cases to a "graduation essay", also highly personal in tone and autobiographical in nature, in which the individual critically examines his previous life, thinking and activities from the standpoint of his newly-acquired Marxist perspective. Essays of this sort, written by eminent people, are frequently published and given wide circulation. 69/

65/ Ibid., p. 34.

66/ Chou En-lai, Report to the third session of the First National Committee of the CPCC, October 23, 1951. op. cit.

67/ See G. William Skinner, "Peasant Organization in Rural China". Op. cit., pp. 92-99.

68/ Kuo Mo-jo, Report to third session of the First National Committee of the CPCC, October 25, 1951. op. cit. "...we must still have schools which require longer periods of attendance; he stated, "but within the coming 5 to 10 years, such schools can only be of a limited number restricted to a smaller number of students, and subjects while the short-course method must be adapted for the preponderant number of students and subjects.

69/ For example, the essay of Fung Yu-lan, prominent Tsinghua University Professor of Philosophy, appeared in People's China. Fung Yu-lan, "I Discover Marxism-Leninism". People's China, (Peking) March 16, pp. 10-11, 21. An essay by Hu Shih's son was published hi

This process, particularly as applied to the intellectuals, has recently been greatly extended and formalized into a "Thought Reform Movement", originally "suggested" by Mao in a June 1950 address, and again stressed by him in October 1951, when he stated that "ideological remolding, first of all of the different types of intellectuals, is one of the most important conditions for completing our democratic reforms in various fields and for the gradual industrialization of our country." 70/ "Winning over" the intellectuals has always been a chief concern of the Chinese Communists, and their earlier successes in this direction have already been discussed in a previous chapter. Cooperation with the Communists and general support of their immediate program was enough to make an intellectual a "progressive element" in 1949; and for the relatively simple propaganda and political work for which the party utilized the students and intellectuals then -- such as accompanying the army into newly-occupied areas as members of the "Rural Service Corps" --, little in the way of fundamental ideological re-training was necessary.

But as the Communist party consolidates its position, accelerates the socialization of China's economy, and moves towards the elimination of "bourgeois" influences in thought, education and culture, much more is required of the intellectual than mere acceptance and cooperation with the regime. While the Communists are apparently still perfectly willing to work with the "old-style" intellectuals (at least until a new crop rooted in a more favorable worker-peasant background can be trained, a process which itself will require the all-out utilization of the country's present stock of trained intellectuals), these people must now repudiate their non-Marxist pasts, affirm completely the Communist philosophical world outlook, and pledge to apply it in their daily lives and thinking.

Since the Anglo-American educational tradition has been one of the most important influences among many Chinese intellectuals, the importance of this "remolding" campaign to the Communists is obvious, particularly in view of the latter's continuous denunciation of America's past "cultural aggression" against China. Thus a sympathetic Chinese observer explains: 71/

To a man brought up in the educational system of capitalist countries, liberalism and individualism are sacred and absolute tenets of truth not to be doubted or opposed for a single moment. For the building of new China and in planning for socialism, however, liberalism and individualism are found to be hindrances.in order to usher in, after a transitional period, a new age of socialized industry and agriculture, corresponding advances in the realm of thought are both desirable and imperative.

press (Hu Sze-tu, "Criticism of My Father". Reprinted in China Daily News, New York, September 30, 1950. (in Chinese).)

70/ Mao Tse-tung, Address to Third Session of National Committee of CPPCC, October 23, 1951. People's China, (Peking), November 1, 1951.

71/ Chen Ren-bing, "New China's Thought Reform Movement". China Monthly Review, (Shanghai), February 1952. pp. 127, 130.

How effective such a pattern of "thought reform" is likely to prove in the case of many older intellectuals whose entire lives have been molded by traditions they are now called upon to repudiate remains to be seen. The Communists, realistic in these matters, certainly cannot expect such people to discard completely lifetime habits of thinking as a result of a few months of "self-education and self-remolding", no matter how sweeping the public statements of these intellectuals may be in this regard. For the long pull, of course, the Communist leaders will make their greatest effort among the much more malleable youth, and toward the creation of a politically reliable, new "proletarian intelligentsia."

As one step in this direction, a "Chinese People's University" was opened in Peking in February 1951, where veteran party cadres, as well as "positive elements" among intellectuals, and picked industrial workers are being trained as specialists in finance, trade, planning, and other branches of economics, factory administration, law, foreign affairs, and the Russian language. 72/ Many Soviet professors are reported to be teaching at this university, which is described as following "the advanced experiences of the Soviet Union." 72a/ Its purpose is apparently to train thoroughly reliable personnel for top echelon positions in the state's political and economic administrative structure, with prime emphasis on training cadres of worker or peasant background. 72b/ A total of 6,750 students were stated to be attending this university at the close of 1952, with some 2600 cadres reported to have received training there during 1951 and 1952. 73/

At the same time, the regular middle schools and universities have been directed to admit students of worker and peasant background despite shortcomings in their earlier academic training 74/, with plans announced for having 100,000 workers attending the middle schools within five to six years. 75/ Special short-term worker-peasant schools, in which the six-year curriculum has been condensed into three years, are being opened throughout the country, while sparetime schools for adult workers and peasants have also been created in great numbers. It was officially claimed that some 1,780,000 workers attended such sparetime schools in the cities.

72/ Walter E. Gourlay, op cit., p. 37.

72a/ Shanghai Wen Hui Pao, January 13, 1953.

72b/ The university's chief aim is declared to be "the training of worker and peasant cadres so as to turn them into the backbone of national economic construction." Ibid.

73/ An Tzu-wen, "Achievements in Work Connected with Cadres During the Past Three Years." Peking, New China News Agency, September 30, 1952 (Abridged translation in Current Background No. 218 - Hong Kong, November 5, 1952.)

74/ Theodore Hsi-En Chen, "Education and Propaganda in Communist China." Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, September 1951, p. 142.

75/ Kuo Mo-jo, Report to third session of the First National Committee of the CPCC, October 25, 1951. op. cit.

during 1951, and that 25 million peasants were enrolled in over 290,000 "winter schools" in 1950-51. According to announced goals, over 100 million peasants are to be enrolled annually in winter study and literacy classes within five to six years, with the stated aim of eliminating illiteracy among "rural cadres and peasant youths" by that time. For industrial workers, the "possibility" has been broached of wiping out illiteracy within three years. 76/

According to the Peking government's Minister of Personnel, the number of cadres (exclusive of the military services), increased fourfold between 1949 and 1952, totaling some 2,750,000 in September of the latter year. These new cadres, he reported, have been drawn principally from "activists among workers and peasants", graduates of colleges and middle schools, and "old intellectuals from the old society." 77/ The continued importance of this last group is indicated by the report that the "people's revolutionary universities", primarily concerned with the "ideological reform" of the "old intellectuals", have "graduated" nearly 100,000 during this three-year period.

Virtually all college graduates are now being drawn into the state cadre system and assigned to jobs in accordance with overall state plans and requirements. Of almost 16,000 such graduates in the summer of 1951, for example, 99.4 percent were reported to have "submitted to the centralized job allotment scheme" under which the central government determines the work these graduates are to do and the locality to which they are to be sent. 78/ A certain number are being assigned to private enterprises which are considered "beneficial to the nation." Some 40,000 college graduates were assigned to jobs in this manner from 1950 to 1952, though Communist authorities report that the total number of graduates available is "still far behind" national needs. 79/ The current stress on economic construction is reflected in the fact that an exceedingly high proportion of these graduates (forty-six percent of the total in 1952) are now being sent into factories and mines, with current overwhelming emphasis, in the reorganized centers of higher education, on a scientific engineering curriculum.

Coincident with the current emphasis on industrialization has been the greatly accelerated drive to develop greater numbers of cadres from among industrial workers. This trend has been particularly marked in the Northeast (Manchuria), where the relatively advanced level of economic development has created the largest industrial working class base in China; and it was claimed in late 1952 that over 84,000 "worker cadres" had been pro-

76/ Ibid. (See chapter V for comment on the Commission to Eliminate Illiteracy, established in November 1952.)

77/ An Tzu-weh, "Achievements in Work Connected with Cadres During the Past Three Years". *op. cit.*

78/ Ibid.

79/ Peking Jen Min Jih Pao (People's Daily), August 7, 1952.

noted there during the previous three year period. 80/ As an area where Communist plans can be more readily implement'd than elsewhere in China, Manchuria has tended to serve as a prototype for new policies and programs which are subsequently introduced on a national scale. Thus this policy of placing "activist workers" in important technical and administrative posts (at the same time easing out great numbers of "hold-over" personnel from Kuomintang days) first swung into high gear throughout the country in 1952. 81/

Behind these developments lay the basic Communist tenet regarding the "progressive character" of the working class, with this class (particularly after it has been greatly expanded through industrialization) looked upon as potentially the most reliable base and support for the Communist regime in the country. One of the chief concerns of the Communist hierarchy therefore has been to give greater actuality to the formally-proclaimed "leadership" of the new state by labor, a problem compounded by the fact that the "vanguard" of this class, the Communist Party, is itself so heterogeneous in social composition. From the Communist point of view, the tremendous expansion of the party's ranks, together with the varied background of the membership -- both new and old -- had an injurious effect on the ideological level and general reliability of the party membership, and made for "deviationist tendencies" of one sort or another. Thus a member of the party's Central Committee wrote in mid-1951, "We have a large number of Party members from the petty bourgeois intelligentsia and the peasantry. We have a large number of new Party members. They have revolutionary enthusiasm but do not understand revolutionary theory or methods. They know little or nothing about Marxism-Leninism and the teachings of Mao Tse-tung. There are even a few Party members of bad calibre who are lacking in warm feeling for the workers, peasants, and other labouring masses." 82/

Since mid-1950, in the increasingly frequent public criticisms directed against many party cadres for corruption, bureaucracy, "commandism" (authoritarian tendencies), "pride and arrogance", etc., the situation within the party described above has invariably been listed as the root cause of the trouble, with the declared solution being to transform the party into an ideologically "pure" and socially more cohesive organization. Action was taken on two fronts. First, the party underwent an "ideological remolding" in late 1950 affecting the entire membership, but directed primarily at its cadres. Somewhat similar in nature to the original wartime "rectification movement" of 1942-44 (the so-called cheng feng) 83/, this campaign was aimed both at new members, among whom, it was officially stated, had arisen "various ideologies and styles of work estranged from the masses", and at "certain" veteran party cadres who had "serious bureaucracy commandism in their work." 84/

80/ An Tzu-wen, "Achievements in Work Connected With Cadres During the Past Three Years." op. cit.

81/ See pp. 68-70 for a further discussion of this development.

82/ Teng Hsiao-ping, "To Maintain Close Ties with the Masses is our Party's, Glorious Tradition." People's China, (Peking), July 1, 1951. p. 34.

83/ See Boyd Compton, Mao's China. Party Reform Documents, 1942-44. op. cit.

84/ "Notes on Party Rectification and Remolding." Hsueh Hsi (Study) (Peking) August 1, 1952. (Translated text in Survey of China Mainland Press No. 402. Hong Kong, August 26, 1952.)

Simultaneously the drive to "proletarianize" the party was further accelerated in order to remove what Communist leaders looked upon as the major factor leading to these unsatisfactory developments within the party.

Mao himself launched the movement in his June 1950 report to the Central Committee of the Communist party, when he declared that during the remainder of that year the entire party must "carry out a large scale ideological remolding... in order to raise the ideological and political level of the cadres and party members in general" so that the faults referred to above could be eliminated. Expanding on this, the official Peking People's Daily reporting a Central Committee decision to inaugurate the campaign, stated editorially: 85/

It is now necessary for the Communist Party of China not only to regulate the social composition of the Party membership, but also to exert its utmost efforts to give Party education to a large number of new members and take appropriate measures to sift out those who have great defects and are unwilling to correct them even after receiving education, and to exclude them from the Party.

In accordance with this desire to "regulate the social composition of the party", the editorial declared it to be the "hope" of the Central Committee to absorb one-third of all industrial workers into the party within the next three to five year period. At the same time, it stated, the party "has decided to stop accepting members in the countryside of the old liberated areas in general, and not to expand Party organizations in the newly liberated areas prior to the completion of the agrarian reform." 86/

The attempt to proletarianize the Communist party faces special obstacles in so unindustrialized a country as China, where there are at most some three million individuals who can be classified as industrial workers. Thus what they consider to be the political necessity for greatly expanding the working class base probably ranks in importance with economic and military incentives as a factor in the Communist anxiety to speed industrialization. Furthermore, until "liberation", the Chinese urban workers had in recent years been relatively uninfluenced by and out of contact with the Communist party, so that even the existing working class was very largely "politically backward" from the Communist point of view. The party's intensive efforts to change this situation during 1950 and 1951, particularly in connection with its campaign to promote "democratic reform" in factory management, made only slow progress. A leading Communist official acknowledged in mid-1951, for example, that success had been limited and that a great deal still remained to be done by the party both in trade union and factory management work and in raising the workers' "ideological consciousness." 87/ At that time, it may be noted, the Communist party was still eighty percent peasant in its membership, a decline in proportion of

85/ Peking Jen Min Jih Pao (People's Daily), July 1, 1950. (Reprinted in English translation in Shanghai News, July 4, 1950).

86/ Ibid.

87/ Hsi Chung-hsun, "To Follow Mao Tse-tung Means Victory", Peking Jen Min Jih Pao (People's Daily), July 4, 1951. (English text in Current Background No. 100. Hong Kong, July 18, 1951.)

some ten per cent as compared with 1948. 88/

As already indicated, strenuous efforts were again underway in 1952 to enhance the status of urban labor. This effort was in a sense a by-product of a new campaign (known as the san fan or "three-anti" movement), directed at "corruption, waste, and bureaucratism" in government organs and state economic enterprises, with politically reliable "activist" elements among the workers replacing many of the personnel removed in the course of the campaign. Indicating that the "ideological remolding" movement of 1950 had fallen short of its goal of "cleansing" party ranks, the new drive was directed at lower level officials in the government bureaucracy, state trading companies and financial organizations, the mass organizations, and the Communist party itself. As it affects the party, the "three-anti" campaign was aimed at "backsliders" among party cadres who had lost their "revolutionary enthusiasm" or who had succumbed to various material temptations and become corrupt, as well as at "enemy elements" who may have infiltrated party ranks during the 1949-50 period of mass expansion. It seemingly ran the gamut from another ideological re-examination of the party membership as a whole, to a purging from the party of many, and on to the jailing, and in some cases, execution, of a certain number who "had suffered a change and transformation to become criminals." 89/

Equally important, the "three-anti" movement marked the first widespread campaign directed at technical and administrative personnel taken over from the previous regime. Many of these, accused principally of corruption and waste, were summarily removed from their posts and replaced by worker "activists", though the latter were in many cases technically unqualified for such posts. In an editorial entitled "Boldly Promote the Cadres", the Peking People's Daily strongly criticized those "leadership cadres" who

88/ Peng Chen, 'The Victory of Marxism-Leninism in China'. People's China, (Peking), July 1, 1951. p. 38.

89/ "The three-anti and five-anti struggle (a concurrent campaign to "cleanse" the ranks of private business) has shown that the majority of our Party members have stood firm on their class stand and maintained the excellent traditions of the Party. But at the same time it has also exposed the fact that within our Party, there have been a considerable number of members who, on the success of the revolution, either because of a lack of adequate vigilance against the corrosion of the bourgeois class or due to an inability to distinguish clearly between ideological differences, have come under the influence of the bourgeois class and thereby given themselves to corruption, waste and bureaucratism, and brought damage to the prestige of the Party and the people's government. There have even been individual cases of members who have seriously lost their Party stand, suffered a change and transformation to become criminals who have betrayed the Party and the state." An Tzu-wen, "Strengthen the Work of Party Reform and Party Expansion on the Foundation of Victory in the Three-Anti and Five-Anti Movements." Peking Jen Min Jih Pao (People's Daily), July 1, 1952. (Text in Current Background No. 191. Hong Kong, July 18, 1952.)

over-emphasized technical and cultural qualifications and who "in the past have never relied upon the masses but largely depended on the retained personnel and the unreformed technical personnel as well as the intellectuals. Facts have shown that these people, having undergone no thorough reform, are not reliable." On the other hand, the editorial continued, though worker "activists" may be deficient in technical and cultural knowledge, they are reliable people who "have withstood tests through struggles", and who, given adequate guidance and special training, can replace the "corrupt elements" who have been removed. 90/ As an example of the extent of the three-anti purge, this same editorial refers to the Tientsin Railway Sub-Bureau, where 316 "activists" were promoted to be foremen, technicians, chiefs of sections, and station masters, to fill vacancies "following the removal of the corrupt elements." Later press reports indicated that such "new cadres" of urban labor origin were being given responsible posts in government offices, state enterprises, and trade unions in ever-increasing numbers. 91/

The "three-anti" campaign was accompanied by another vast, parallel movement, the so-called "five-anti" or wu fan, specifically directed at "cleansing" private business of five "poisons", listed as tax evasion, bribery of state employees, fraud, theft of state economic secrets, and pilfering of state property. This campaign was in the nature of a reexamination by the regime of its relations with the "national bourgeoisie", both on the ideological and the politico-economic level, and will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. The "five-anti" drive also had direct relevance to the "three-anti" movement, for the alleged malpractices of many private businessmen were held to be responsible for creating the opportunity for much of the corruption among state and party personnel.

Though the Communist party, as already noted, consistently refers to itself as the "vanguard of the proletariat" despite the still weak representation of labor in its ranks, various developments such as the ideological remolding movement, the proletarianization campaign, and the three and five-anti movements all indicate, among other things, the continued uneasiness of Communist leaders over the actual social background of the party cadres and general membership, as well of the non-party cadres. While evidently determined basically to change this composition eventually, they now attempt to counteract its effects principally through such periodic "cleansing" campaigns as those mentioned above, through all of which run the objective of "raising the ideological level and the class consciousness" of party members. With the party now moving in the direction of more fundamental economic and social changes, additional "overhauling" of the party membership and organization was projected for the latter half of 1952, with stricter ideological standards, along the lines indicated above, demanded of party members. These new standards were clearly set forth in a set of eight "conditions" required of party members, which were adopted at a National Party Conference on organizational work, held in 1951. These "conditions" are now the basic criteria used for passing on party personnel; it was officially stated in July 1952 by the Peking Minister of Personnel, for example, that the newly-announced "overhauling of the Party organiza-

90/ Peking Jen Min Jih Pao (People's Daily), April 9, 1952.

91/ See, for example, Henry R. Lieberman Hong Kong dispatch to the New York Times, May 16, 1952.

tion means the education and examination of members of the Party in accordance with these eight conditions." 92/ These 'conditions' also include a specific outline of the broad objectives of Communist policy in China, and are therefore well worth noting in full: 93/

- (1) Each and every member of the Party must realize that the Chinese Communist Party is the political party of the Chinese working class; the advanced and organized force of the working class.
- (2) The ultimate goal of the Chinese Communist Party is the realization in China of the Communist system. It seeks at the moment to struggle for the consolidation of the New Democratic system, and will proceed to the struggle for the nationalization of industry, the collectivization of agriculture, that is to say, the transition to the socialist system, and finally to the struggle for the realization of the Communist system. All members of the Party must have the determination to struggle persistently for the thorough realization of these objectives of the Party.
- (3) Each and every member of the Party must be determined to devote his whole life to persist in the revolutionary struggle courageously.
- (4) All the struggles and tasks of members of the Communist Party must be carried out under the unified leadership of the Party. The Party's decisions must be carried out under the unified leadership of the Party. The Party's decisions must be carried out faithfully, and the Party's discipline must be rigidly upheld.
- (5) All members of the Party must place the public interests of the people, that is to say, the interests of the Party, above those of individual selves. The personal interests of a Party member must be subservient to the public interests of the people, that is to say, of the Party.
- (6) Each and every member of the Party must regularly employ the methods of criticism and self-criticism to review the mistakes and defects of his work, and to rectify them in time.
- (7) All members of the Party must sincerely and wholeheartedly serve the masses of the people, humbly listen to the demands and views of the masses of the people and reflect them to the Party in good time, and at the same time undertake the propagation and explanation of the policies of the Party before the masses of the people so that the Party may maintain the closest ties with the masses of the people and the latter may be led on the road of progress.
- (8) All members of the Party must bend efforts at study in order to come to a greater understanding of Marxism-Leninism and the Thought of Mao Tse tung so that their own consciousness may be further raised.

92/ An Tzu-wen, "Strengthen the Work of Party Reform and Party Expansion on the Foundations of Victory in the Three-Anti and Five-Anti Movements." op. cit.

93/ Quoted in ibid.

The above requirements are declared to be based on the standards outlined in the party constitution adopted in 1945, though defined "in a more clarified manner." In line with the current party effort to promote "class consciousness" among its members, the very first condition, which so unequivocally proclaims working class supremacy within the party, is particularly important. It is significant that the party now considers it desirable to make acceptance of this point a prime condition for party membership, especially so since the new "overhauling" campaign is directed principally at the party organization in rural areas. It must nevertheless be stressed, however, that Communist power in China, as reflected in the party's membership, the army, the peasants' associations and the people's militia, as well as in the present stage of the country's economic development, is still, in the last analysis, based principally on the peasantry. While the drive towards increasing reliance on a newly-emerging urban proletariat to be developed through industrialization is being greatly intensified, for the immediate future the fact of peasant power will continue to have its effect on Communist policy, particularly of course, as it is related to the peasantry.

But in the view of the Communist leaders, this very fact of peasant predominance in China today gives added urgency and importance to their constant campaign stressing the primacy of the working class both in the revolution and in the party and state today, as a means of dispelling doubt and confusions regarding this basic tenet of Marxist theory. This is a vital matter for party leaders for two reasons: first of all, given the key status of ideology in the structure they are creating, no opening must be left for questioning the validity of orthodox Communist doctrine on any fundamental point; and secondly, since the party obviously fully intends to switch to a predominantly proletarian base eventually, adequate ideological preparation for that development is necessary among its millions of peasant (as well as its middle class intellectual) members.

Thus in an article 94/ written in 1951 Peng Chen, a politburo member, castigates those "members of the reaction" who see in the distinctive characteristics of the Chinese revolution evidence that "Marxism-Leninism has 'gone bankrupt in China.'" There is no limit, he continues, "to their lies and slanders so that even some people of goodwill...find themselves half-believing and half-doubting their stories." Addressing himself to these "skeptics" who "doubt whether a party with this kind of social composition (i.e., overwhelmingly peasant) can be sure that it will be a pure 'vanguard' and organized detachment of the working class", he argues that the Communist party is based on a proletarian ideology, that its leading elements, though originally of peasant origin, are now "professional revolutionaries", and that the majority of party members can be considered "proletarians and semi-proletarians of the countryside." Therefore, he concludes, whether the party is actually the "vanguard of the proletariat" must be determined not solely on the basis of its social composition, but also on the basis of "its ideology and action, the political qualities of its core of leadership, the political and fighting life of its members and their present material conditions of life and on the basis of its revolutionary practice." But Peng Chen also hastens to add that he in no way implies that "a political party of the working class may overlook the social composition of its membership; that it may neglect to fully utilize all possible

94/ Peng Chen, "The Victory of Marxism-Leninism in China." op. cit.

conditions to improve its social composition, that is, to increase the proportion of workers among its membership.' It is clear that party leaders will continue to be uncomfortable as long as this disparity between theory and reality continues.

That difficulties have been encountered in the ideological effort to convince the peasant members of the party to accept their eventual subordination to urban labor, both within the party and in the state as a whole, is clearly evident from another article written at about this same time by Po Yi-po, also one of the party's veteran leaders, who is now Finance Minister in the Peking government. 95/ This article was, significantly, concerned with the situation in North China, which had served as a major Communist base during the civil war and where the party has therefore long been entrenched in the countryside, with 1,500,000 of its 1,800,000 membership in that region (as of mid-1951) of peasant origin. 96/ Po Yi-po is by no means as sanguine as Peng Chen regarding the essentially "proletarian outlook" of the older peasant members of the party. "...it is a difficult thing", he writes, 'to conduct systematic Marxist-Leninist education among Party members and cadres of peasant origin to convince them of socialist and communist principles. But at any rate we should and must educate them, for there is no other way than reform of their thoughts through education. Peasant economy is individual and scattered, and peasants only accept the leadership of the working class after they have proved by their experience its correctness.... Party members and cadres of peasant origin essentially show this characteristic of peasant masses.'

But Po Yi-po also acknowledges that the peasantry currently 'occupies the most important place in the state power' -- a position which the nationwide extension of the Communist land reform program during the past two years has tended to strengthen, with its tremendous emphasis on organizing the peasantry and on securing their participation in peasant associations, militia forces, and local governments, as well as through the extension of individual peasant proprietorship throughout the country. It is suggestive in this respect that Po Yi-po vigorously denies that such currently encouraged widespread practices in agriculture as trade and marketing cooperatives, labor exchange brigades and mutual aid teams are preliminary steps to collectivization. Present mutual aid teams, he insists, "are built on the foundation of private property, (and are) generally designed to protect and not weaken or negate private property." However, he advances the hope that "these cooperative practices will 'prove to the peasants that collective economy is superior to individual economy. Thus the peasants will be enabled to gradually understand and accept the socialist principle of a collective economy.'

But by the following year it was this last point which was receiving greatest prominence. Though the keynote remained caution and gradualness, with the ground to be prepared through further experiences in cooperative practices combined with so-called 'propaganda-education' among the peasants, the primary emphasis was now on formation of permanent mutual aid teams

95/ Po Yi-po, 'Strengthen the Party's Political Work in the Countryside.' Peking (People's Daily), June 29, 1951. (Text in Current Background No. 100. Hong Kong, July 18, 1951.)

96/ Ibid.

(which in 1951 had constituted only ten percent of all such teams) and of the more advanced "agricultural producers cooperatives" as direct preliminaries to collectivization. Thus while Kao Kang, in a report to high level party cadres in the Northeast, labeled the "commandist" tactics of some cadres in attempting to force peasants to form mutual aid teams as a "leftist deviation"; he at the same time strongly criticized, for holding "mistaken rightist thoughts", those cadres who "deny that the various agriculture production cooperatives now existing represent the transitional form to agricultural socialism". 97/

While actual collectives are thus far limited to a few experimental farms 98/, an intensive ideological campaign has been undertaken among "advanced elements" in the countryside to prepare the way for eventual collectivization. For example, an officially announced prime purpose of the party "overhauling" scheduled to begin in the fall of 1952 was "to further strengthen the ties between the Party and the masses in the rural areas, ... so that mutual assistance in labor projects and cooperation on the road to agricultural collectivization may be achieved." 99/ It should also be noted that collectivizing agriculture is listed among the objectives for which "all members of the Party must have the determination to struggle persistently", in the "eight conditions" for party members already quoted in full.

Thorough ideological and organizational preparation for their long-range agricultural program is clearly considered essential by the Communist leaders. Given the strong position of the peasantry, particularly within the party and the armed forces, any attempt at a more drastic and forceful approach, along the lines of what Kao Kang, in his report cited above, had referred to critically as collectivization "at one stroke" 100/, could easily lead to serious political repercussions not only among the peasantry but within the Communist party itself. That such a "leftist" approach has by no means been eradicated as yet among many rural cadres was evident in a Ministry of Agriculture report in the fall of 1952, which again cautioned cadres to avoid "intimidating" the peasants, criticizing the guilty ones for "failure to profoundly understand the long term nature and difficulty of reforming small peasants' economy." 101/ The need to develop at least a minimal degree of industrialization before agriculture can be collectivized on a national scale is a further factor militating against any hasty action by the Communist leaders. At the same time, however, the fact of peasant strength in China today is a key element in the Communist anxiety to move in the direction of collective agricultural practices as rapidly as the situation permits, for only under such conditions do they feel confident of creating that "proletarian outlook" among the peasantry mentioned by Peng Chen, and which Po Yi-po had indicated would be difficult to develop

97/ Text of report in Peking Jen Min Jih Pao (People's Daily), January 24, 1952. (Reproduced in Current Background No. 163, Hong Kong, March 5, 1952)

98/ For specific collectivization developments, see chapter VI.

99/ An Tzu-wei, "Strengthen the Work of Party Reform and Party Expansion on the Foundations of Victory in the Three-Anti and Five-Anti Movements." op. cit.

100/ Peking Jen Min Jih Pao (People's Daily), January 24, 1952.

101/ Peking, New China News Agency, September 3, 1952.

as long as peasant economy remained "individual and scattered." 102/

In conclusion, the positive aspects for the Communists of the currently strong position of the peasantry in the Peking power structure should not be overlooked, for it must also be seen as a reflection of the high state of Communist organization in the countryside, and of the party's long experience and background in rural work. Operating in a nation which is eighty percent peasant, this gives to the Communist regime an effective strength and security it would not otherwise possess. It also means that party work among the peasantry, not only in preparing the foundations for collectivization, but in such things as the so-called "patriotic production" and "emulation" campaigns to spur agricultural output can largely be carried out through a well-established and extensive rural party network (particularly in the older "liberated" regions), enlisting cadres from among the peasantry themselves. The party's problem now, and one with direct relevance to its current agricultural policies, is how to industrialize the nation's economy and build its desired political base in the cities without simultaneously creating serious peasant political and economic dissatisfactions upsetting to its position in the countryside.

D. Impact of the Sino-Soviet Tie

There is no definitive method of determining the precise nature of present Sino-Soviet relations; one can only judge by official declarations, overt policies, the probable interests of the two countries concerned, and currently unfolding trends within China. As already pointed out, during civil war days the Chinese party's nationalist characteristics had "coexisted" side by side with its proclaimed loyalty to the international Communist movement and its insistence on the "bolshevik" character of its organization and doctrine. The latter elements have become even more clearly apparent since the Communist victory in 1949. Now acting through a formally-constituted government, Chinese Communist policy has based itself on what it evidently regards as an all-embracing unity of interest and purpose with the Soviet Union.

This has been reflected in Mao's celebrated "leaning to one side" foreign policy declaration of mid-1949, later implemented in the Sino-Soviet alliance of February 1950; in the apparently fully-integrated joint policy and strategy of the two countries, in the various special economic agreements and developing trade relations between Peking and Moscow; and in the extensive utilization by the Chinese of Soviet experts, experience and techniques in military, governmental, economic, cultural and educational affairs. Current Chinese Communist internal policies, as well as pronouncements on future intentions, leave no doubt of the party's determination eventually to create in China a Communist state along essentially orthodox Leninist-Stalinist lines 102a/ and Soviet experience and progress in "socialist construction", particularly in the economic sphere, clearly exerts a strong attraction for the Chinese leaders.

102/ A further examination of Chinese Communist agrarian policy in terms of the regime's consolidation of power, is undertaken in the concluding chapter of this book.

102a/ "The Soviet Union of today will be the New China of tomorrow", Finance Minister Poyi-po declared in a report to the Central People's Government Council on the 1953 national budget. (Peking, New China News Agency, Feb. 17, 1953.

China is now embarking on a program of industrialization in the tradition of the Soviet five-year plans, though thus far on a much less ambitious scale. 103/ With an economy that is on the whole even more backward and unindustrialized than that of pre-Communist Russia, it plainly faces many of the same obstacles and problems which confronted the Russian Communists some three decades ago. This similarity in economic circumstances and goals is further reinforced by a common ideological outlook. All in all, it must be assumed, the specific Soviet pattern of development has a powerful appeal for the Chinese Communist leaders and is being taken as their guide in working out the problems of rapid industrialization and overall modernization. The Chinese are therefore increasingly looking to Moscow for the necessary technical, administrative, and organizational training and advice, and it is primarily in this sphere that Russia is very likely most willing and able to make a major contribution to Chinese development.

Large numbers of Soviet technical advisers, reportedly organized in mobile auxiliary teams which move about from one specific task to another within their fields of specialization, have in fact been active in China since 1949, operating mainly in the fields of railway repair, industrial rehabilitation, planning, medical aid, and military training -- particularly in connection with air force developments. 104/ As noted earlier, Russian instructors have also been engaged in training high-level Chinese cadres for specialized economic and administrative work. With the launching of an economic development program in China, this process is now evidently to be greatly expanded. In his most recent policy statement, for example, Mao Tse-tung listed "learning from the Soviet Union" as one of the three guiding principles of national policy for 1953. "We are going to carry out great national construction," he declared. "The work facing us is hard and our experience is not adequate. So we must take pains to study the advanced experience of the Soviet Union. Whether inside or outside the Communist Party, old or new cadres, technicians, intellectuals, workers or peasants, we must all learn sincerely from the Soviet Union.... We must set going a tidal wave of learning from the Soviet Union on a nationwide scale, in order to build up our country." 105/ It is therefore in the realm of economic planning, and of technical and economic administration generally, even more than in other spheres, that the direct Soviet impact on the new Chinese state is likely to be felt most of all.

It is nevertheless evident, however, that China today cannot be equated with the small Communist nations on the European periphery of the Soviet Union. China's vast size and population; its deeply-rooted heritage as once one of the great cultural and political centers of the civilized world; the independent sources of power and the proven ability and tradition of independent initiative and responsibility of the Chinese Communist leaders; the fact that the Communist victory itself was inseparably connected with the modern Chinese nationalist and revolutionary movements: all these con-

103/ See Chapter VI and Postscript for a further discussion of current Chinese economic plans.

104/ Robert Guillain, "The New China Whirlpool of the Revolution," Manchester Guardian Weekly, May 24, 1951. (M. Guillain, who was in China during the first year of the new regime, adds that these technicians are generally "of no exalted rank" and "do not work the controls.")

105/ Address to fourth session of the First National Committee of the CPCCC, February 7, 1953. Peking, New China News Agency, February 7, 1953.

tribute to China's unique status in the non-Soviet Communist world. It is in fact a second great Communist power and, given the factors enumerated above, must be presumed able to act in promotion of what it conceives to be its own interests.

This has been reflected, for example, in the emergence within China of an authentic national Communist hero, Mao Tse-tung who, in the Chinese view, now ranks as an ideological leader among the legendary figures of world Communism itself. It is significant that the first really important steps in this development occurred at the time of the Chinese Communist party's growth in self-assurance and power during the anti-Japanese war, particularly following its ideological maturation as a result of the cheng feng movement of 1942-44. Thus in important ideological pronouncements by Party theoretician Liu Shao-chi, in 1939 and 1941, there is no specific mention of Mao, though there are copious references to Marx, Lenin and Stalin.^{106/} But by 1943 the change is evident. Writing then, Liu Shao-chi emphasizes that the Chinese Party had "found its own leader" in Mao, and also talks of the "ideological system of Comrade Mao Tse-tung."^{107/} By the time of the seventh national congress of the party at Yenan in 1945, these points had been fully elaborated and were being constantly reiterated. Mao's writings and ideas were now formally referred to as the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung" which, according to the party constitution adopted at that congress, held equal place with Marxism-Leninism as the basis on which "the Communist Party of China guides its entire work."^{108/} In his major report to the 1945 congress, Liu Shao-chi further declared that Mao "had been boldly creative, discarding certain specific Marxist principles and conclusions that were obsolete and incompatible with the concrete conditions in China and replacing them with new principles and new conclusions that are compatible with China's new historical conditions." This, he added, was "one of the greatest achievements in the history of the Marxist movement all over the world."^{109/}

Today this approach to Mao, who is now a national as well as a party leader, has been further developed, and the adulation and prestige he enjoys in China very closely parallel that accorded Stalin in the Soviet Union. It is significant that while Stalin receives a full measure of respect in all Chinese Communist pronouncements, and his past writings and views on China are widely quoted, it is Mao who more and more emerges with the chief

^{106/} Liu Shao-chi, How to be a Good Communist. (A series of lectures delivered in Yenan in July 1939). Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1951; On Inner Party Struggle. (Lecture delivered in July 1941) Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1951.

^{107/} Liu Shao-chi, "Liquidate the Menshevik Ideology Within the Party". op. cit.

^{108/} The Constitution of the Communist Party of China. (Text an appendix to Liu Shao-chi, On the Party Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1950. P. 157.)

^{109/} Liu Shao-chi, On the Party. op. cit. P. 35.

credit for developing the concrete policies leading to Communist victory in China. 110/

This was most strikingly evident in a series of important articles written by Communist leaders in China on the occasion of the Chinese party's thirtieth anniversary in July 1951. In all of these, Mao is pictured as having exercised correct judgment throughout the long and tortuous history of the Chinese Communist struggle for power, in opposition to the many "deviationists" within the party, both of the right and the left, many of whom had studied in Moscow and had presumably held their high positions within the Chinese party with Comintern support. The major Chinese Communist setbacks are presented as having occurred when such "deviationists" were in dominant policy-making positions within the party, and when Mao's influence was subordinated. Only when the latter achieved undisputed leadership of the party in the mid-thirties did his "correct viewpoint" win out completely and was eventual Communist victory in China assured. 111/

Current evaluations of the Chinese Communist party's sixth national congress, held in Moscow in 1928, illustrate this point. At that time, Mao was already busy organizing resistance in the Chinese countryside and was not present at the congress, though he was elected a member of the party's Central Committee there. The decisions of this congress, it must be supposed, reflected current Comintern views on the Chinese situation. Though recent official Chinese analyses refer to the "generally correct" decisions reached at the Moscow congress, they also declare that "the leadership of Chairman Mao, based as it was on the practical experiences of the revolution at Chinggangshan 112/, easily surpassed the decisions of the 6th Party Congress in penetration and practicability in the solution of various

110/ Even one of the most laudatory articles yet to appear in China on Stalin's contributions to the Chinese revolution appears to leave this impression. Written in celebration of Stalin's seventieth birthday in December 1949, the article discusses the Soviet leader's theoretical formulations on contemporary Chinese developments over the past quarter century. However, the author explains, these significant contributions of Stalin's were not readily available to the Chinese Communist leaders until about 1942. "...there were many comrades in our party," he continues, "who were actually leading the Chinese revolution but who did not have an opportunity to make a systematic study of Stalin's many works about China. Comrade Mao Tse-tung was also one of them. ... But despite this situation, Comrade Mao Tse-tung has been able to reach the same conclusion as Stalin on many fundamental problems through his independent thinking based on the fundamental revolutionary science of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. Thus, the correctness of himself and his comrades-in-arms was maintained." (Chen Po-te, "Stalin and the Chinese Revolution." China Digest (Hong Kong), January 1, 1950. p. 2.)

111/ See, for example, Hu Chiao-mu, Thirty Years of the Chinese Communist Party. London: Lawrence & Wishart, Ltd., 1951; Hsiao Hua, "The Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese People's Liberation Army", and Lu Ting-yi, "The World Significance of the Chinese Revolution.", in Current Background No. 89. (Hong Kong), July 5, 1951.

112/ The first rural resistance base set up by Mao after the Communist split with and defeat by the Kuomintang in 1927.

problems" 113/, and add that "the problems that had not been solved by the Sixth Party Congress were solved later by Comrade Mao Tse-tung both in practice and in theory." 114/ Similarly, the Communist military defeat by the Kuomintang in Kiangsi in 1934, leading to the "Long March" to the northwest, is being blamed on a temporary shift in military strategy -- from Mao's guerrilla tactics to positional warfare -- initiated by "leftist" party leaders who, at the time, were in the main proteges of the Comintern. 115/

In all this, there is at least the implication that Mao's on-the-spot analyses and judgment were superior to those of Communist leaders in either Moscow or Shanghai, and as such, represented independently creative and original contributions to Marxism. For example, still another article written in this 1951 period declares that Mao's decision to stage "a protracted revolutionary war in the rural areas" represented "a new Marxist conclusion." 116/ To the quadrumvirate of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, the Chinese Communists have added Mao, and Marxism-Leninism seems on the way to becoming "Marxism-Leninism-Maoism." It certainly appears to indicate a definite assurance and independence on the part of the Chinese, reflecting what might be called a "party nationalism", already evident as far back as 1943 when Liu Shao-chi proclaimed, on the twenty-second anniversary of the Chinese Communist party: 117/

It may be said that within these twenty-two years our Party has witnessed more important changes and accumulated more experiences of the revolutionary struggle in various complicated forms (whether it be armed struggle or mass struggle, civil war or international war, legal struggle or illegal struggle, economic struggle or political struggle, struggles inside the Party or outside the Party) than any other Communist Party in the world.

This "party nationalism" takes on larger significance today, for the Chinese Communists are now the governing group of a leading Asian power, with a special sensitivity to and encouragement of Asian nationalism, as well as of traditional Chinese interests in the region of Asia. The Chinese now claim for example, that their revolutionary formula is peculiarly applicable to the so-called "colonial and semi-colonial" countries of Asia. "Mao Tse-tung's theory of the Chinese revolution", Chen Po-ta asserts

113/ Chen Yi, "Learn From the Marxist-Leninist Creative Style of Work of Chairman Mao". Current Background No. 110. Hong Kong, August 24, 1951. p. 8.

114/ Hu Chiao-mu, Thirty Years of the Chinese Communist Party. op. cit., p. 31.

115/ Ibid., p. 16.

116/ Chen Po-ta, "Mao Tse-tung's Theory of the Chinese Revolution is the Combination of Marxism-Leninism with the Chinese Revolution." Peking Jen Min Jih Pao (People's Daily), June 28, 1951. (Text in Current Background No. 126. Hong Kong, October 15, 1951.)

117/ Liu Shao-chi, "Liquidate the Menshevik Ideology"
op. cit., p. 1

"is really the development of Marxism-Leninism in the East." 118/ A member of the Chinese party's Central Committee adds that just as "the classic type of revolution in imperialist countries is the October Revolution", so "the classic type of revolution in colonial and semi-colonial countries is the Chinese revolution." Mao's theories should therefore be studied by workers and Communists in "various countries" in order that they may be "more fully armed with the revolutionary theory of Marxism-Leninism." 119/ Already in 1949, at an Asian labor conference held in Peking, Liu Shao-chi had declared, "The way taken by the Chinese people...is the way that should be taken by the peoples of the various colonial and semi-colonial countries in their fight for national independence and people's democracy." 120/

The implication is clear. Communists in Asian countries are being advised to look primarily to Peking for ideological, as well as practical guidance, and actual developments indicate that Moscow may in fact be prepared to concede a primary responsibility in Asia to China, at least in such areas of traditional Chinese interest as Korea, Indochina and other regions of Southeast Asia. It is perhaps noteworthy in this respect, that it was China which publicly took the initiative in recognizing the Ho Chi Minh regime in Indochina on January 18, 1950; to be followed by Moscow and the remainder of the Soviet bloc. Also reflecting a Chinese initiative in Asian affairs, the Communist-organized "Asian-Pacific Peace Conference", held in Peking in the fall of 1952, was followed by the formation of a permanent "Peace Liaison Committee of the Asian and Pacific Regions", with headquarters in Peking. Soong Ching-ling (Madame Sun Yat-sen) is chairman of this committee, which also has a Chinese secretary-general, Liu Ning-yi, with a Soviet representative as one of the seven deputy secretaries-general 121/ Liu Ning-yi is also secretary-general of the Asian-Australasian Liaison Bureau of the World Federation of Trade Unions, set up in Peking following a labor conference held in that city in November 1949.

If the foregoing analysis is substantially correct, the current close ties between Moscow and Peking, it must be assumed, are primarily based on a mutual recognition, from the Communist point of view, of joint interests and goals. As to "Titoism", the concept itself is basically inapplicable. As one student of Chinese Communism has recently written, "The question of Titoism in China cannot even be broached because, among other things, Titoism implies an end of obedience on the part of a state Communist Party; the Chinese Communist Party has not been in a position of obedience, at least since Mao's consolidation of power." 122/ Even were such a relation-

118/ Chen Po-ta, "Mao Tse-tung's Theory of the Chinese Revolution is the Combination of Marxism-Leninism with the Chinese Revolution", op. cit., p. 39.

119/ Lu Ting-yi, "The World Significance of the Chinese Revolution", op. cit.

120/ Quoted in Shanghai News, February 21, 1951.

121/ New China News Agency Daily Bulletin, Supplement No. 107 (min.), London, October 21, 1952.

122/ Boyd Compton, Mao's China. op. cit., p. 11.

ship to exist between the Russian and Chinese Communist parties, it is quite certain that the Yugoslav experience must have left its mark on Russian policy. It is highly unlikely that the Russians would consciously risk in any way the loss of Chinese support and thus profoundly affect -- to their disadvantage -- the entire world balance of power. The London Economist reported in mid-1952, for example, that "such reports as filter through (from China), indicate that the Russians there are extremely careful to avoid any impression of domineering the Chinese." 123/

At the same time, however, the Soviet Union, in political prestige, experience and authority, as well as in military-economic power, is clearly China's superior in the Communist world, and this fact must inevitably be reflected in their relationship. The following key statement of Communist strategic principles by Liu Shao-chi may also have its application to Sino-Soviet relations: "Where there is conflict between the partial, temporary interests of the masses of the people and their total, long-range interests, the former must be subordinated to the latter. This means that a small reason must be subordinated to a big reason, a small principle to a big principle." 124/ In determining international Communist policy and strategy, in line with this thinking, the "big principle" of overall Communist interests -- with its focus in Moscow -- would presumably justify the subordination, where there is conflict between the two, of the "small principle", i.e., the "partial" factor of purely Chinese national interests.

While the Korean war has undoubtedly increased Chinese dependence on Russian support and further solidified the Sino-Soviet alliance, it has simultaneously provided the opportunity for an appreciable expansion of Chinese military strength and experience and for a great consolidation of Chinese Communist power internally, and has also very likely served as an additional stimulus to Chinese nationalism itself. All in all, it is probably safe to say that in Sino-Soviet deliberations aimed at determining the total, long-range interests of world Communism, in accordance with Liu Shao-chi's "big principle", the Chinese Communist view and the Chinese interest will be bound to play an increasingly prominent role.

123/ "Moscow-Peking Axis." The Economist (London), July 19, 1952. p. 144. This report adds, "...there is no evidence that Moscow has attempted the same kind of interference (in China) that drove Tito out of the fraternity of Communist states." ibid., p. 144.

124/ Liu Shao-chi, On the Party. op. cit., p. 63.

1. The first part of the paper discusses the importance of the study of the history of the United States. It is argued that a knowledge of the past is essential for a full understanding of the present and for the development of a sound policy for the future. The author points out that the study of history is not only a means of satisfying a natural curiosity about the past, but also a means of developing a sense of responsibility for the future.

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4. The fourth part of the paper discusses the importance of the study of the history of the United States. It is argued that a knowledge of the past is essential for a full understanding of the present and for the development of a sound policy for the future. The author points out that the study of history is not only a means of satisfying a natural curiosity about the past, but also a means of developing a sense of responsibility for the future.

5. The fifth part of the paper discusses the importance of the study of the history of the United States. It is argued that a knowledge of the past is essential for a full understanding of the present and for the development of a sound policy for the future. The author points out that the study of history is not only a means of satisfying a natural curiosity about the past, but also a means of developing a sense of responsibility for the future.

THE PATTERN OF REGIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

A key factor in the imposing power complex being created by the Chinese Communists is their rapidly-growing ability effectively to exercise this power on all levels, and throughout the country. They are developing, in addition to the party, army and mass organization network already referred to, an intricate nationwide administrative structure parallel to and integrated with this network on each geographic level. Utilizing the Communist techniques of popular participation and broad organizational bases, this new governmental structure is at the same time closely-knit and directly linked to Peking in accordance with the Communist principle of "democratic centralism." The Peking government is clearly determined to combat regionalism, and the decentralization of real authority so characteristic of recent Chinese governments -- a characteristic reflected not only in the prevalence of 'warlordism', but also in the Communists' ability to establish "border regions" as a prelude to their overthrow of the Nationalist regime.

A. The Local Government Network

As an important step in this direction the Communists set up a new regional governmental organization for the country in December 1949 under which the country was divided into six major administrative areas. China's vast size and multiplicity of provinces, the largely undeveloped communications and transportation systems, and the general economic backwardness of the nation put tremendous obstacles in the way of a complete centralization of administrative functions. Thus, though the new regional governments represented a certain measure of federalization of executive machinery, it undoubtedly also made for the more effective centralization of the powers of control and decision so important to the Communist leaders. Mao for example, declared that only with the establishment of these strong regional organizations could things be done properly in a big country like China." He also asserted that the danger of such regional units splitting the country was non-existent because "the historical conditions giving rise to past feudal partitioning of the country have been eliminated." 1/

As the Organic Law of the new regional government councils made clear 2/ the regional administrations are to act essentially as agents of the central government in directing the work of the provincial, municipal and hsien (county) governments under their jurisdictions, and in carrying out central government decisions and orders in their respective regions. As "middlemen" between Peking on the one hand, and the provinces, municipalities and counties on the other, their activities and decisions (including such matters as the regional budget and important personnel changes) are always subject to Peking's approval and, when desirable, the central government can even circumvent the regional administrations completely and deal directly with the provincial and local governments on 'certain particular issues.' Basically, however, the pattern of governmental authority is

1/ China Digest (Hong Kong), December 14, 1949. p. 28.

2/ Passed by the Government Administration Council on December 16, 1949. Text in Current Background No. 170. Hong Kong, April 8, '

the familiar one for China today: the provincial and local governments under the jurisdiction of the various regional administrations are subordinate and responsible to the latter, which in turn are subordinate and responsible to the Central People's Government in Peking.

In organization, each regional government was designed to be a replica of the central government structure itself. The six regions created were the Northeast, with its capital at Mukden and jurisdiction over the five Manchurian provinces and Jehol; North China, with headquarters at Peking and control over the provinces of Hopei, Shansi and Suiyuan (this region also originally included the provinces of Ping-yuan and Chahar; the first, a new province created by the Communists in 1949 out of portions of Hopei, Honan and Shantung, was reincorporated in November 1952 into Honan and Shantung, while the province of Chahar was also broken up at that time and incorporated into the provinces of Shansi and Hopei); East China, with its seat in Shanghai and jurisdiction over the provinces of Shantung, Chekiang, Fukien, Kiangsu and Anhwei; Central-South China, with headquarters at Wuhan and control over the provinces of Honan, Hupeh, Hubei, Kiangsi, Kwangtung and Kwangsi; Northwest China, with headquarters at Sian and comprising the provinces of Shensi, Kansu, Ninghsia, Sinkiang, and Tsinghai; and, finally, the Southwest, with its seat in Chungking and jurisdiction over the provinces of Sikang, Kweichow, Yunnan, and Szechuan.

In the Northeast, a full-fledged "people's government" was set up on August 27, 1949, even before the creation of the Peking government itself, under the chairmanship of Communist politburo member Kao Kang, who also heads the party and army organizations in the Northeast. The North China region originally also had a fully-functioning "people's government" and government council, which had been organized for the North China "liberated areas" in mid-1948. It was headed by Tung Pi-yu, another veteran politburo member, and had its original headquarters in central Hopei province, moving to Peking in February 1949. With the formation of the Peking government, however, this regional organization was dissolved and its functions taken over by the central government, operating after September 1950, through a newly-established Ministry of North China Affairs. Finally, in December 1950 this ministry was replaced by a North China Administrative Committee, also under the Government Administration Council, headed by Communist central committeeman Liu Lan-tao, who had been serving as Minister of North China Affairs. The other two key posts in North China, in the party and army, are held respectively by Po Yi-po and Nieh Jung-chen, both of them Communist leaders long active in that region. Po Yi-po, who is incidentally, the Peking government's Finance Minister, also serves as political commissar of the military district, while both Nieh Jung-chen and Liu Lan-tao hold the second and third leading posts respectively in the regional party organization.

The remaining four regions have each been administered, since the end of 1949, by Military-Administrative Committees which were declared to be temporary expedients pending the establishment of "people's governments" in these regions. Such a transition was scheduled to occur when "military action has been concluded, agrarian reform thoroughly carried out, and people of all circles fully organized", at which point "popular elections" were to be held for regional people's congresses which in turn were to elect the regional government councils. These preconditions had been largely met throughout the country when, in November 1952, a central government decree transformed all the regional regimes, including that in the Northeast, into

"Administrative Committees." 3/ Under this decree, the function of these committees in serving as regional administrative agents of the central government was more sharply defined than before and it seemed probable that the formerly ambitious organizational blueprint for the regional governments had been largely discarded. It is still unclear whether the already-existing North China Administrative Committee will prove to have been a prototype for the other five regional committees. It is more than probable, however, that the latter, as "representatives" of the central government in their respective regions (in the words of the November 15 decree), will not operate as departments under the Government Administration Council in Peking, but will instead continue to retain their separate administrative existences. It appears evident, at any rate, that the Peking government's organizational consolidation during the past three years, combined with the announced introduction, as of January 1953, of a large-scale program of industrialization and of national economic planning, had created both the possibility and desirability of an even greater centralization of government in Peking than had previously been the case 4/, with the new regional committees scheduled to play a lesser role than that originally planned for the regional people's governments. At the same time, it may be noted, this move appeared to be a further step in the formal transition from military to civil rule throughout the country, though no changes have thus far been announced among top personnel in the regional administrations.

In East China, the Military-Administrative (now Administrative) Committee, set up in January 1950, is headed by Jao Shu-shih, who also serves as political commissar of the military district. Chen Yi, veteran Communist general, is head of the military district and has also been serving as Mayor of Shanghai. Jao Shu-shih and Chen Yi, both members of the Communist party's central committee, are respectively first and second in command of the regional party organization. In Central-South China, the Military-Administrative (or Administrative) Committee, established in February 1950, is headed by famed military strategist Lin Piao, who also heads the military district and the party organization. He has apparently been absent from his post since the Korean war, however, when major units of his field army were reported shifted to the northeast and possibly into Korea. As already noted he has most recently been reported busy in Peking with problems concerning modernization of the Chinese military forces. 5/

3/ According to a November 15, 1952 decision of the Central People's Government Council, "The People's Government or Military and Administrative Committee of every administrative area is without any exception changed into an Administrative Committee. The Administrative Committee represents the Central people's Government to direct and supervise the work of the local governments in its area. Peking, New China News Agency, November 17, 1952.

4/ In a December 10, 1952 meeting of the Southwest Military and Administrative Committee, vice-chairman (Gen.) Ho' Lung was quoted as stating: "In order to meet the necessary requirements of large-scale economic construction, the Southwest Military and Administrative Committee must proceed at once with changes and adjustments of the organizational structure by transforming the present set-up into an administrative committee in accordance with the Central Government Council's decision." Peking Radio, December 18, 1952.

5/ See Chapter IV. page 43.

the familiar one for China today: the provincial and local governments under the jurisdiction of the various regional administrations are subordinate and responsible to the latter, which in turn are subordinate and responsible to the Central People's Government in Peking.

In organization, each regional government was designed to be a replica of the central government structure itself. The six regions created were the Northeast, with its capital at Mukden and jurisdiction over the five Manchurian provinces and Jehol; North China, with headquarters at Peking and control over the provinces of Hopei, Shansi and Suiyuan (this region also originally included the provinces of Ping-yuan and Chahar; the first, a new province created by the Communists in 1949 out of portions of Hopei, Honan and Shantung, was reincorporated in November 1952 into Honan and Shantung, while the province of Chahar was also broken up at that time and incorporated into the provinces of Shansi and Hopei); East China, with its seat in Shanghai and jurisdiction over the provinces of Shantung, Chekiang, Fukieh, Kiangsu and Anhwei; Central-South China, with headquarters at Wuhan and control over the provinces of Honan, Hupeh, Hunan, Kiangsi, Kwangtung and Kwangsi; North-west China, with headquarters at Sian and comprising the provinces of Shensi, Kansu, Ninghsia, Sinkiang, and Tsinghai; and, finally, the Southwest, with its seat in Chungking and jurisdiction over the provinces of Sikang, Kweichow, Yunnan, and Szechuan.

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5/ See Chapter IV. page 43.

In the Northwest, the Military-Administrative (Administrative) Committee, established in January 1950, is officially headed by Peng Teh-huai, who has been serving as commander of Chinese forces in Korea. In his absence, Hsi Chung-hsun, vice-chairman of the region and a member of the Communist central committee, is presumed to have taken over leadership. Hsi is also political commissar of the military district and heads the regional party bureau.

In Southwest China, the Military-Administrative (Administrative) Committee was set up in July 1950 with Liu Po-cheng, another Communist military leader, serving as its chairman. Ho Lung, also a veteran Communist military figure, heads the military district, while Teng Hsiao-ping, of the party's Central Committee, has the leading post in the party organization and serves as political commissar of the military district.

It is therefore once again clear that top Communist officials, virtually all of whom are active in national government, party, and military affairs, hold the reins of leadership on the regional level as well, serving thereby as the thoroughly reliable unifying links in the chain reaching from the central government to the various regional units and, through the latter, to the lower levels of government in China today.

Below the regional level the country is still administratively divided into provinces, now numbering twenty-nine, as opposed to thirty-five under the Kuomintang. (The Communists also list Taiwan (Formosa) as a thirtieth province.) Three densely-populated provinces (Anhui, Kiangsu and Szechuan) were originally divided by the Peking government into a total of eight administrative areas, but were all reconstituted as provinces during 1952. 6/ Also, as before, the most important cities (thirteen as of November 1952) are labeled "special municipalities", giving them a status administratively equivalent to the provinces, directly subordinate only to the regional central governments; many other urban centers, also as before, are classified as "municipalities" (approximately seventy) and are directly under their respective provincial governments rather than of the county in which they are located. 7/

Below the provincial and municipal levels, the political subdivisions remain the hsien (county), now numbering somewhat over two thousand, with populations varying from 300,000 to 800,000 and each, as before, headed by a hsien magistrate, the leading government official in rural China. Then comes the chu (district) -- both rural and urban, and finally, the hsiang (some 280,000 for the entire country), the basic rural government unit, somewhat above the village level and with populations usually varying

6/ The Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region and Tibet are not part of this provincial system, and their special status is discussed later in this chapter.

7/ The importance the Communists attach to the key cities is reflected in the fact that Peking's mayor is Peng Chen, a politburo member; the Shanghai government, as already noted, is headed by Chen Yi; and Canton is ruled by Yeh Chien-ying, South China's most important Communist figure. It is also of interest to note that the Port Arthur-Dairen combined urban area, jointly garrisoned by China and Russia under the terms of the Sino-Russian treaty, is now also one of the nation's "special municipalities", and apparently has the same status, administratively, as other leading cities.

between 1500 and 2500. There are also 'special districts', operating between the provincial and hsien levels, but apparently these, as well as the chus or districts, are not as fixed or formalized a part of the administrative picture as are the others.

While the organizational structure is thus very similar to that prevailing under the Nationalists, the foundation on which the structure rested under the latter differed drastically from that being developed by the Communists. In its own efforts to extend effective control and authority over the nation, particularly the countryside, the Kuomintang revived China's ancient pao-chia system, both in rural areas and in the urban centers. Under this system, groups of families were organized into chia which were in turn combined to form a pao. Each pao contained perhaps five to fifteen chia and had a chief who was made responsible to the government for all acts of members of his pao. In some areas, the pao chief was chosen through pao assemblies, in others he was appointed. In either case, however, the heads of the pao tended to be the men of means and authority in the local community. Above the pao, in the rural areas, were the hsiang and hsien governments respectively, to whom the pao chiefs were responsible. The hsien was ruled by a magistrate appointed by the central government, and though some slight progress was made towards instituting elective procedures on the various levels of local government, such measures remained largely ineffective up to the time of the Communist victory.

The Communists who looked upon the pao-chia system as one of the Nationalist weapons for combatting their rise to power, lost no time in abolishing it, particularly since it usually represented the 'landed gentry elements in the countryside they had set out to destroy. The Peking regime, no less determined than the Kuomintang to extend its control on the local level, is instead utilizing its highly-developed organizational and propaganda techniques, centered around specific economic and political 'movements', such as the agrarian reform movement in the countryside, thereby creating a vastly broader base for its local governments than was the case under the Nationalists. The all-important peasants' associations and "people's militia", the women's organizations, the youth brigades, and the cooperatives, with the moving force behind them contributed in all cases by the Communist party's cadres, have become the foundation for rural government. Similarly in the urban centers, labor unions, youth, student and teacher associations, commercial and business organizations, women's groups, and the various political parties are the bases for forming governing bodies there.

As previously noted, the Communists propose eventually to establish a 'people's congress' system ascending from the lowest administrative level (the hsiang) up to an "All-China congress for the entire country, with congresses at each level electing their local government councils and officials. These congresses, they state, are to be elected by 'universal franchise'. 8/ Meanwhile, however, "people's representatives' conferences of all-circles" are being held throughout the country, as well as "peasants' representatives' conferences on the lowest rural levels, as temporary substitutes for such congresses. These conferences correspond, on the regional level and below, to the CPCC on the national scene.

8/ See Postscript for plans in this direction announced in early 1953.

According to regulations issued by the Peking government in early 1950, these conferences are to gradually "exercise the rights and functions of peoples congresses... (and) shall hear and verify the reports of provincial, city and county people's governments, verify and pass the local government budget, submit proposals and resolutions on the policies of these people's governments and elect government councils." 9/ Thus, for example, the hsien people's representatives conferences, as they come to assume the functions of local congresses, are to elect the hsien magistrate and hsien government council. The development and characteristics of these conferences are well worth noting, for they are not only exercising the authority of, but have essentially become, the "people's congress" system itself in operation. Liu Shao-chi in fact declared in February 1951 that "in the near future [these people's representatives conferences] shall be directly transformed into People's Congresses of all levels." 10/

By the end of 1951, Communist sources claimed that such conferences had been convened, at least once, in all the provinces, in virtually every hsien and hsiang, in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, and in one of the regional administrative areas (the Northeast, where it elected the "North-east People's Government Council"). It was also maintained that these conferences had elected the governments of about half the provinces and municipalities. 11/ In the remaining provinces, cities, and in most of the hsien 12/, the governments are presumably still being appointed by the higher authorities. In addition, the military control commissions set up in the provinces and municipalities when the Communists took over are apparently still functioning on those levels side by side with the civil governments.

The various official regulations governing the organization and functioning of the provincial, municipal and hsien governments, and of the representatives' conferences at these and lower levels, clearly illustrate the highly centralized nature of governmental authority in China today. For example, the regulations on provincial conferences states that, "Any resolution passed by the Provincial All-Circles People's Representatives' Conference that is in contradiction to the policies, laws, and directives of the people's government at a higher level or of the Central People's Government, may be abolished, revised, or held in abeyance by the people's govern-

9/ Peking, New China News Agency, March 3, 1950.

10/ Liu Shao-chi, "On the People's Representative Conferences". People's China (Peking), April 16, 1951. p. 6.

11/ Chien Tuan-sheng, "How the People's Government Works". China Reconstruction (Peking) No. 4, July-August, 1952. p. 10.

12/ As of the end of September 1951, according to an official report, the representatives' conferences in only 186 hsien "had exercised the powers of people's congresses." Tung Pi-wu, "On Conferences of Representatives of the People." Peking Jen Min Jih Pao (People's Daily), January 30, 1952. This, and other Communist reports also complain that the development of "representative government" on the hsien and hsiang level, as reflected in the above fact and in the quality of the representatives' conferences at these levels, is lagging badly. By the following September 436 hsien conferences were reported to have elected their government councils, still only some twenty-five percent of the total. (Liao Lu-yen, "The Great Victory of Agrarian Reform in Past Three Years." Peking, New China News Agency, September 26, 1952).

ment at a higher level or by the Central People's Government." 13/
Similarly, the provincial governments must 'submit to the people's government at a higher level for appointment and dismissal, or for the approval of appointment or dismissal, the names of important administrative personnel of the province -- and the hsien under its jurisdiction...' 14/

In their turn, the provincial governments have the power "to nullify or revise the resolutions or directives passed by hsien or municipal governments, or the hsien and municipal people's representatives' congresses.... which contradict the resolutions and directives of the people's government at a higher level." 15/ A similar chain of command operates in financial affairs. Provincial budget estimates and fiscal reports must be submitted to the regional government council for examination and for transmittal to the central government for approval, while it in turn performs the same functions for the hsien and municipal governments under its jurisdiction. 16/

The absence of financial autonomy was further underlined in a Government Administration Council decision on March 3, 1950 aimed at achieving overall financial unification. Regarding the assessment and collection of the all-important grain tax, it stated, 'The amount of public grain to be collected...., including the grain surtax collected by the local governments, as well as tax regulations, taxable items and rates of taxation, shall all be determined and enforced by the Government Administration Council on the recommendation of the Ministry of Finance. The various local People's Governments shall not increase, decrease, or change them without authorization.' 17/ It might parenthetically be added here that the separate currencies used in Manchuria and in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region were superseded in March 1951 by the national currency, and in October of that year Sinkiang silver notes were also replaced by the Peking 'people's dollar'. As a result, the entire country now has a unified currency system, the first time in China's history that one particular currency has had such wide and exclusive circulation', as a student of the Chinese economy has recently noted 18/ This high degree of financial centralization has been an important factor in the Peking government's

13/ General Regulations for Provincial All-Circles People's Representatives Conferences. (passed by the Central People's Government Council, December 2, 1949). (English translation given as Document No. 1, Research Project on the Chinese Communist Party Line, Cambridge, Mass. Russian Research Center, Harvard University. p. 3.)

14/ Ibid., # 3.

15/ Ibid., p. 3.

16/ General Regulations for the Organization of the Provincial People's Government (passed by the Government Administration Council on January 6, 1950) (English translation given as Document No. 4, in Research Project on The Chinese Communist Party Line, op cit., p. 3.)

17/ "Decisions on the Unification of the Financial and Economic Work of the State." (English text in China Wins Economic Battles.) Peking Foreign Language Press, 1950. pp. 52-53

18/ Douglas S. Paauw, "Monetary Control in Communist China." East and West, September 1952. p. 36.

apparently effective efforts to achieve relative price and currency stabilization and to move towards a balanced national budget (which the government claimed it had achieved by 1952). 19/

The same process holds in choosing delegates to the representatives' conferences. Above the municipal and hsien level, delegates to higher level conferences are elected not directly, but by the lower governmental bodies. Thus the regulations for provincial conferences provides that, "The hsien (and) municipality shall be the unit for (the election of) regional representatives and (they) shall be elected by the hsien (or) municipal All-Circles People's Representatives' Conferences...." 20/

The electoral procedure itself is worth examining as an excellent illustration of the differences between accepted western democratic -- parliamentary practices, and the "new democratic" system instituted by the Communists. This discussion is based on developments in such urban centers as Peking and Shanghai, for which details from official and semi-official sources are available. It can be assumed that political processes are less "advanced" from the Communist point of view in the more remote areas, particularly the rural regions, where the level of literacy and of political sophistication is much lower.

In the beginning delegates to the representatives' conferences were largely selected by the local military control commission, but gradually this has given way to a mixed procedure under which certain of the delegates are "invited" by the local government (which itself has representatives at the conferences), others are chosen through a "consultative" process, and the remainder are elected either directly or indirectly by the organizations officially entitled to participate, in accordance with the quota of delegates assigned them. 21/ In direct elections a school or factory, for example, chooses its delegates at a mass public meeting; in indirect elections committees representing the organizations involved choose its delegates. In Peking, it was claimed in late 1951, some 87 per cent of the delegates were being elected either directly or indirectly in the above manner. 22/

19/ For a detailed discussion of recent monetary developments in China, see Ronald Hsia, Price Control in Communist China. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1953.

20/ General Regulations for Provincial All-Circles People's Representatives Conferences. op. cit., p. 1.

21/ For example, a list governing distribution of delegates to a Shanghai conference in late 1950 assigned the following quotas:

Trade unions -- 165; peasants' associations -- 20; youth groups -- 77; women's groups -- 40; cultural and educational circles -- 149; industrial and commercial circles -- 128; cooperatives -- 5; national minorities -- 4; religious circles -- 6; demobilized army men -- 5; "ordinary inhabitants" -- 70; army and public security forces -- 54; Shanghai Committee of the Communist party -- 7; "democratic parties and groups" -- 33; Shanghai Military Control Commission -- 10; Shanghai People's Government -- 20; specially invited delegates -- 30. Shanghai News, September 2, 1950.

22/ Chien Tuan-sheng, "How the People's Government Works." op. cit. P. 9.

These developments are very likely creating the greater sense of popular participation in government so desired by the Communists, though the latter's dominant position in most of the participating "people's organizations", as well as the procedure used in these elections, ensures adequate Communist supervision over the type of representatives chosen. In the first place, it must once again be noted, delegates on local levels, just as on the national level, must subscribe to basic government policy in order to qualify for election. "Naturally", an account of a people's representatives conference in Shanghai states, "there is always the basic requisite that the person under consideration as representative must be one who has accepted the political principles set forth in the Common Program." 23/

The electoral procedure follows the Communist practice of presenting single lists of candidates. Nominees are sifted, through a process of "consultation and agreement" by committees of the respective organizations, after which the agreed-upon names are submitted to the entire body, with the voting itself merely signifying final approval of the list of nominees by the electors. In describing a Shanghai conference in which this procedure was used, a participant writes, "Those who were brought up in the old tradition [of western democracy] might wonder at the fact that the number of names appearing on the ballot equaled that of the number to be elected." But, he reassures his readers, "This is a great contrast to the practice of old democracy in which an individual voter is faced with a hodge-podge of candidates and often the voter does not really know enough about the candidates to make an intelligent decision." 24/ The voting itself is conducted largely by open balloting. Even in Peking, where the new electoral process is more developed than elsewhere in the country 25/, only college and university units were choosing delegates by secret ballot in 1951. In all other organizations, voting took place by "a show of hands." 26/

In an apparent effort to counter prevailing doubts, particularly among educated circles in the cities, as to the "democratic" nature of this system, Liu Shao-chi told a Peking people's representatives conference in 1951 that "the old slogan of 'universal, equal, direct and secret balloting'" while "progressive" when raised against the Kuomintang, was "not quite suitable" under present conditions. Citing widespread illiteracy and inexperience in voting as major obstacles, he continued: "Should we, under

23/ Chen Ren-bing, "The People's Representatives' Conferences." The China Monthly Review (Shanghai), December 1950. p. 118.

24/ Chen Ren-bing, "The People's Representatives' Conferences." op. cit., p. 119.

25/ Liu Shao-chi has declared that in holding representatives' conferences, 'the example set by Peking' should be followed throughout the country. Liu Shao-chi, "On the People's Representative Conferences". op. cit., p. 5.

26/ Ibid., p. 5.

such conditions, register all the voters, mechanically draw up electoral zones, and everywhere elect delegates ... by secret and direct voting and in proportion to the numbers of the population, such elections... would be a mere formality", and would not necessarily make for representatives' conferences of "a more popular character." Acknowledging that such elections are "valued by the old-type democrats of the bourgeois class", he insisted that the "substance" is of greater importance than the "formality". 27/ In other words, if the conferences have a "popular character", in accordance with the Communist definition of that term, then they are "democratic" in nature, no matter what the method of selection may have been.

In actual fact, given the highly-organized nature of Communist leadership over participating units, and the fact that major policy decisions and guidance always come from above, the more representative and "popular" in character these conferences are, the better from the Communist point of view, since they are useful both as public opinion sounding boards, and as effective means of channeling and implementing policy down through the various mass organizations active in China today. As an official editorial declared, the major purpose of these conferences is to provide "an effective means of mobilizing the broad masses of people to assist the Government in implementing revolutionary and construction work." 28/ Thus, for example, after Chinese intervention in the Korean war a special Shanghai people's representatives conference was called in December 1950 for the specific purpose of mobilizing the city in support of the movement for "Resisting the United States, Aiding Korea, Protecting Homes and Defending the Country," as the domestic Chinese campaign in support of the war is known. As a Shanghai newspaper declared, "the prime task confronting the Conference... is to better organize the entire people in Shanghai in order to enable them to join in total fighting." 29/ Similarly, another special Shanghai conference was called in February 1951 to "oppose the U.S. Rearming of Japan." 30/

The Communists themselves report, however, that in many rural areas they have failed to arouse the proper enthusiasm for these conferences. The "leadership" of the party cadres is much more direct and overt in the countryside and, according to the Communist press, these cadres are prone to simplify procedure by using these conferences purely as a means of handing down orders to the delegates on specific government objectives. Taking one North China hsien as an example, the Peking Communist party newspaper complained that, "The delegates were turned into messengers for transmitting orders. Consequently, whenever they attended the conference they came with the feeling of 'accepting tasks' and not with the feeling of representing the masses..." 31/ In many hsien, the paper continued, the conferences are sarcastically referred to as "do as I say conferences" which the delegates feel are convened for the purpose of "asking things

27/ Ibid., pp. 5-6.

28/ Peking Radio, December 5, 1949.

29/ Ta Kung Pao (Shanghai), quoted in Shanghai News, December 7, 1950.

30/ Shanghai News, March 1, 1951.

31/ Peking Jen Min Jih Pao (People's Daily) editorial, August 14, 1951.

from the masses". The editorial advises the cadres to pay more attention to proposals emanating from the delegates, so that the "increasingly cold" interest and growing absenteeism at these conferences can be overcome.

In a further development of the Communist administrative pattern in the large urban centers, fairly elaborate "governments", complete with people's representatives conferences, have been set up in the major cities on the district, or chu, level. "Governments" on this level were first established in both Peking ^{32/} and Shanghai in 1950, with the latter city being divided into thirty such districts. ^{33/} These district organizations apparently carry out limited 'housekeeping' functions, such as street repair, sanitation and health work, conduct educational and propaganda activities on the "street" level, and help maintain 'revolutionary order' and "public security". In carrying out the latter duties, the Shanghai district governments were called on to help the branch public security bureaus in bringing to light cases of the enemy's special agents and spies and, through education, make people be on the alert for counter-revolutionary intrigues and activities so as to solidify the revolutionary order. ^{34/} Finally, to round off this intensive urban organizational pattern, street or neighborhood associations have also been set up in the cities as a further adjunct of the municipal governments.

The continuous meetings, discussions and conferences through which the Communists are endeavoring to enlist popular participation in support of every government objective and policy may also, as already indicated, be having the reverse effect of creating resentment at the use of these forums for the constant imposition of new tasks and goals by the government. However, there can be little doubt that the intensive and sustained organizational efforts of the Communists, combined with their many control devices, have resulted in a vastly broader foundation for, and a greater measure of central government authority and control on the local level than previous governments have had in recent Chinese history. ^{35/} At the same time, the highly organized state of the country is also severely affecting the activities of remaining anti-Communist guerrilla forces in the countryside. A January 1952 Hong Kong dispatch, for example, dealing with conditions in south and southwest China, where such forces had given the regime most trouble, reported the organization of the rural and urban populations to be so complete that the opponents of the Communists "have little chance to

^{32/} These are described by Ching Yun 'Brief Discussion on District People's Representatives Conferences of Large Municipalities.' New Observer (Peking), July 1, 1950, pp. 26-28. (*in Chinese*)

^{33/} Shanghai News, July 18, 1950. By the close of 1951, it was officially claimed that thirty cities had organized district representatives' conferences. Chou En-lai, Report to third session of the First National Committee of the CPPCC, October 23, 1951, op. cit.

^{34/} Shanghai News, July 18, 1950.

^{35/} A British correspondent has concluded that, "Never before in Chinese history has the power of the Central Government been so firmly and efficiently exerted in the countryside as it is today." ("China in Transformation. I - A Tightened Hold Over Local Government." Hong Kong dispatch to The Times (London), October 31, 1951.)

live or move about." 36/ With this organizational achievement in mind (and also in view of the intensive Communist military effort against remaining armed opposition forces throughout the country during the previous two years), independent reports seem largely to accept the Communist claim to have pacified most of the countryside by the end of 1951. 37/

B. Developments In National Minorities Regions.

The Chinese Communists have not only concentrated on consolidating their position downward, but also outward over the various border areas inhabited largely by minorities over whom the Kuomintang never achieved very effective control, and whose hostility has generally been a divisive factor in Chinese political affairs. These minorities are estimated to comprise at least five percent of the nation's total population 38/, and are concentrated chiefly in the northwest and southwest sections of the country. In the northwest, from Manchuria west to Sinkiang, are the Manchus, Mongols, Moslems, Uighurs, Kazakhs, and others, all varying in language, religion, or race from the "Han Chinese" majority. South of the great province of Sinkiang are the Tibetans of Tibet proper and the adjacent provinces of Chinghai and Sikang, while southwest China is estimated to contain some thirty to forty scattered minority groups of varying importance. 39/

The Peking government has given all these groups the status of "nationalities", and is making a special effort to promote fuller integration of the minority areas with China proper through a policy of national autonomy combined with greater political direction and control from Peking. The Common Program promises all such minorities the freedom to develop their own languages and their cultural and religious life and further states that; "Regional autonomy shall be exercised in areas where national minori-

36/ Hong Kong dispatch to the New York Times, January 3, 1952.

37/ See, for example, ibid.; and Hong Kong dispatch to The Times (London), October 31, 1951, op. cit.

38/ The Chinese Communists officially estimate that some forty million of a total population of five hundred millions belong to one or another of over one hundred different "minority nationalities". (Peking, New China News Agency, August 14, 1952.) Aside from the difficulty of determining the exact criteria used in designating such minorities, it is impossible to judge the accuracy of such estimates in the absence of scientific statistical data on the population of China. A minimum of five and a maximum of ten percent of a total population of from four to five hundred millions is probably the closest to an exact figure it is possible to give at present for the national minorities in China.

39/ A Chinese socio-anthropologist recently reported, for example, the existence of more than thirty "national groups" in Kweichow province (in southwest China) alone, totaling, he claimed, from thirty to forty percent of the province's population. Fei Hsiao-tung, "Minority Groups in Kweichow Province". The China Monthly Review (Shanghai), December 1951.

ties are concentrated, and various kinds of autonomy organizations of the different nationalities shall be set up according to the size of the respective populations and regions." On entering the Moslem districts of northwest China, for example, the Communist armies were given formal instructions to respect Moslem beliefs and customs, protect mosques and priests, and avoid disturbing religious services. 40/

It was claimed that by the end of June 1952 no less than one hundred and thirty "national minorities autonomous districts" had been established in various parts of the country, with a total national minority population of some 4,500,000. 41/ These regions have been set up at various administrative levels of government, depending on their size, and one such "autonomous area" was reported as having a population of only one thousand people. 42/ At the same time, the Peking government has been holding nationalities conferences in the capital, welcoming and feting a constant stream of delegations representing one or another of the minorities, and sending out an equivalent stream of official parties to visit minority areas on behalf of the central government. Thus a three-day conference on nationalities problems, attended by over a thousand delegates, was held in Peking in October 1950, followed by three more in 1951 on the trade, health, and education of such areas respectively. 43/ A government mission, complete with Peking opera corps, and headed by Shen Chun-ju, President of the Supreme Court, was sent on a three-month tour of the northwest in the fall of 1950 in the course of which it reported visiting thirty localities and interviewing representatives of some seventeen different "nationalities". 44/ Special cadres are being sent out to work in such areas, and large numbers are apparently also being trained at special centers from among these minorities themselves. It was officially claimed in 1952, in this regard, that 70,000 "cadres of different nationalities have been trained in various national minorities' colleges and training classes." 45/

In August 1952, a "General Program for Enforcement of National Regional Autonomy" was adopted by the Central People's Government Council. Largely an elaboration of the articles of the Common Program already alluded to, this Program established formal rules of procedure and administration for all such regions. It first of all clearly affirmed the subordinate status of all such areas to the central government: "All national autonomous districts shall be an inseparable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China....(and shall be) under the unified leadership of the

40/ The text of these instructions was published in People's China (Peking), April 1, 1950. p. 23.

41/ Report to Central People's Government Council by Inner Mongolian leader Ulanfu on August 8, 1952. Peking, New China News Agency, August 12, 1952.

42/ People's China (Peking), January 1, 1952. p. 18.

43/ New China News Agency Daily Bulletin No. 142 (min), London, October 24, 1950.

44/ "General Report of Central People's Government Mission to the Northwest". (Text in Current Background No. 69. Hong Kong, April 17, 1951).

45/ Po Yi-po, "Three Years of Achievement of People's Republic of China." Peking, New China News Agency, October 1, 1952.

Central People's Government and subject to guidance by people's governments of superior levels." 46/ All such districts are to take their place in the administrative hierarchy of government, from the village level up to the administrative area level, depending on the area and population of the district concerned. The Program even raised the possibility of carrying out "regional autonomy" in a minority district of a city largely inhabited by "Han Chinese". In each case, depending on the administrative classification of the autonomous region concerned, the next higher level administrative body would exercise direct supervision. The eventual extension of the system of regional autonomy to cover all minority concentrations within the country was promised in the Program.

The national concentrations of greatest importance to Peking are those of Inner Mongolia, Tibet and the Inner Tibetan region, and Sinkiang. The Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region was the first created by the Communists, having been originally established in May 1947 at Ulanhot (Wang-yeh-miao) in western Manchuria. 47/ It has jurisdiction over Mongol Leagues in western Manchuria (the Hsingan area), and in the northern portions of Jehol and Chahar. In 1950 its capital was moved to Kalgan, the former capital of Chahar province; and in July 1952 was shifted again, this time to Kwei-tung, the capital of Suiyuan province. It would seem from this development, that the sections of Suiyuan, which also has an important Mongol concentration, presently organized into various Banners and two autonomous districts, must be in the process of integration into the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region.

The Mongol areas of Chahar and Suiyuan were not originally included in the Autonomous Region, but the Peking government is now evidently reversing the situation created by the Kuomintang in 1928 when Inner Mongolia was absorbed into the provincial system of China proper through the creation of new provinces, such as Chahar, Suiyuan, and Ninghsia, each of which contained portions of Inner Mongolia. Though the various Mongol Leagues and Banners continued to exist within these provinces, the Nationalist government essentially attempted to solve the problem of control by de-emphasizing Mongol unity; and by integration of the area into the Chinese administrative system. The Communists, on the other hand, prefer to reconstitute the larger national unit, in line with their program of national autonomy, thereby hoping to promote a more amicable atmosphere, with the entire area controlled more directly and effectively through the same leadership and organizational methods used in the rest of China.

Thus in August 1950, three predominantly Mongol areas of Chahar province were shifted to the jurisdiction of Inner Mongolia. 48/ and the province itself was broken up in November 1952 and incorporated into the neighboring provinces.

46/ "Program for Enforcement of Nationality Regional Autonomy", (passed by Government Administrative Council, February 22, 1952, and ratified by Central People's Government Council, August 8, 1952.) Text released by New China News Agency (Peking), August 12, 1952.

47/ Much of this information on developments in Inner Mongolia is based on material in Current Background No. 190. Hong Kong, July 22, 1952.

48/ Peking, New China News Agency, October 16, 1950.

provinces of Shansi and Hopei. The slower process in the case of Suiyuan may be due to the special problem posed by the dominant position there of Fu Tso-yi, the Kuomintang's North China military commander who had surrendered Peking to the Communist armies in 1949. He was apparently allowed to retain a special position in Suiyuan, his "home" base, and the province has been unique in having a provincial military and administrative committee, under Fu Tso-yi, in addition to its regular government organs. However, the shift of the Inner Mongolian capital to Kweisui and the simultaneous appointment of Ulanfu, the Inner Mongolian regional leader, to be governor of Suiyuan, apparently indicates the beginning of the end of this special arrangement.

The Inner Mongolian Region, before the possible inclusion of the Suiyuan Mongol areas, was officially reported to have an area of 600,000 square kilometers, with a population of 2,400,000, of whom only one-third were Mongols. 49/ It is directly subordinate to the Central People's Government in Peking, and has its own party, army, and government organization, similar to that of the six administrative regions. Ulanfu (whose Sinoized name is Yun Tse) is a veteran Mongol member of the Chinese Communist party, and has been on its Central Committee since 1945 (though as an alternate member). He is chairman of the regional government, head of the Inner-Mongolia sub-bureau of the Communist party, and commander and political commissar of the Inner Mongolia military district.

The armed forces seemingly consists of an 'Inner Mongolian People's Cavalry' which, Ulanfu declared in December 1951, "is developing itself, so that it may become a part of the Chinese People's Liberation Army under a unified command and a unified system." 50/ The various mass organizations of China proper also have their branches in the region. Sixteen of the eighteen members of the Government Council (which was elected by a regional representatives' conference) are Mongols, and it was officially reported in January 1952 that some eleven thousand Mongol cadres had been trained for work in various government departments. It is claimed that newspapers, magazines, and books are being published in Mongolian "in vast numbers", and that the Mongolian language has become the official language alongside that of Chinese, and is being studied in all schools. 51/

However, Chinese cadres apparently continue to dominate the scene, and Ulanfu has publicly complained that they tend to look down upon the Mongol cadres and that many of them "do not devote themselves to the study of conditions in Inner Mongolia, nor do they want to study the Mongolian language. They do not consider carefully the mentality and feeling of their Mongol comrades. As a result, they have been unable to strengthen their ties with their Mongol comrades." At the same time, he reports, young Mongol intellectuals tend to regard the Chinese "with suspicion and to cherish narrow nationalism." 52/

49/ Peng Su-ke, "The Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region". People's China (Peking), January 1, 1952. p. 15.

50/ Ulanfu, Report to Committee on Nationalities Affairs of the Central People's Government, December 1951. Peking Jen Min Jih Pao (People's Daily), Jan. 20, 1952.

51/ Peng Su-ke, "The Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region". op. cit., p. 17.

52/ Ulanfu, Report to Committee on Nationalities of the Central People's Government. op. cit.

It thus remains to be seen whether the Communist policy of cultural autonomy can resolve the problems and antagonisms traditionally dividing the Mongols and the Chinese. Though there can be little doubt that the Peking government has achieved definite organizational control over Inner Mongolian affairs, the stability and permanence of this control may depend upon Communist success in the above respect.

Outer Mongolia has, of course, long since passed out of Chinese control and has been under Soviet influence for some three decades as a "People's Republic". The "independent" status of Outer Mongolia was recognized by the Chinese Nationalist government in 1945 following the plebiscite held there in accordance with the Sino-Soviet treaty of that year. This status was confirmed by the new Peking government in an exchange of notes with Moscow in February 1950 at the time the new Sino-Soviet alliance was signed.

However, steps have recently been taken to develop greater cordiality between Outer Mongolia and China. The Outer Mongolian Premier, Tsedenbal, attended the high-level talks between China and Russia held in Moscow in August 1952, and he subsequently visited Peking -- the first such visit by an Outer Mongolian leader to the Chinese capital -- and toured the major cities of China with a delegation of leading Mongolian officials, in order, it was reported, to "cement" relations between the two countries. A ten-day "Mongolian-Chinese friendship period" was proclaimed in Ulan Bator, the Outer Mongolian capital, to begin on October 1; a Chinese cultural delegation was dispatched there by the Peking government; and on October 4 a Sino-Mongolian "Agreement on Economic and Cultural Cooperation" was signed in Peking by Chou En-lai for China and Prime Minister Tsedenbal for Outer Mongolia. Scheduled to have effect for ten years, it provided for the two countries "to establish, develop and consolidate cooperation in the economic, cultural and educational fields"; to achieve which, "concrete agreements" would be signed by the respective trade, education and economic agencies of the two governments. 53/

This intensive Communist campaign to reverse the trend of previous decades and develop closer relations between China and Outer Mongolia is, as an American expert on Mongolian affairs has noted 54/, very probably related to Sino-Soviet plans for developing China's northwest and for greatly expanding the economic and communications links between China and Russia across this vast border region extending from Manchuria in the east to Sinkiang in the far west. 55/ One likely route for a new rail link

53/ Text of the agreement released by New China News Agency (Peking), October 4, 1952. The Mongolian Premier, on arriving in Peking, pledged "the strengthening by all possible means of (the Mongolian peoples') everlasting, fraternal friendship with the great Soviet Union and with the great People's Republic of China." Peking, New China News Agency, September 28, 1952.

54/ Owen Lattimore, "Inner Asia: Sino-Soviet Bridge". The Nation, December 6, 1952. pp. 512-14.

55/ Preliminary developments in this direction have been underway for some time. The newly-constructed Tientsin-Lanchow railroad, officially opened on October 1, 1952; has extended rail communication in the northwest up to the capital of Kansu province; and the Chinese have announced that they have now begun extending this railroad from Lanchow into Sinkiang province. New China News Agency Daily Bulletin No. 671 (mim), London, October 7, 1952.

between Russia and China would pass through Outer Mongolia, linking its capital, Ulan Bator, which is already connected by rail to the Trans-Siberian railroad, with some convenient terminal point of the present north China rail network. 56/ Outer Mongolia, geographically "in the middle", will inevitably be thrown into closer contact with the Chinese, thus calling for the present political and cultural campaign which is apparently designed to lay the necessary groundwork. There is no way of presently judging how, if at all, these developments will affect the present status of Inner Mongolia. The Peking government's policy of reasserting full Chinese control over border areas is best evidenced by its reincorporation of Tibet into the Chinese political system. Though Tibet has in fact been independent of China since the early years of the century, the latter has never relinquished its legal claim to suzerainty over the region. 57/ No less than their intervention in Korea at about the same time, the Communist military expedition into Tibet in October 1950 was an indication not only of the military strength of the "New China", but of Communist ability to apply this strength both outside China's borders and in such remote regions as Tibet.

The actual military operation, conducted by the Southwest China Military Command, seemed largely designed as a show of force to "persuade" Tibetan leaders to agree to a political settlement on Chinese terms. At any rate, after some months of desultory and ineffective resistance on the part of Tibetan troops, a Tibetan delegation arrived in Peking in April 1951, where an agreement was signed with representatives of the central government on May 23.

Under the terms of this agreement 58/, Tibet was granted "national regional autonomy under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government" with Peking promising not to alter "the existing political system of Tibet" and to respect religious beliefs and protect the monasteries. While the Dalai Lama's status and powers were not to be altered, the "equal status" of his pro-Chinese rival, the Panchen Lama, was also affirmed. The latter had long operated from the sanctuary of a lamasery in Chinese-ruled Tsinghai province, and the Chinese, in their effort to regain influence in Tibetan politico-religious affairs, had supported him as opposed to the incumbent spiritual leader of Tibet, the Dalai Lama. (In May 1952, apparently in fulfillment of this portion of the agreement, an "administrative committee" was reported formed in Lhasa on which both the Panchen and Dalai Lamas have equal status. This committee, superseding the former Cabinet of the Dalai Lama, also has representatives of "patriotic elements" and delegates from Lhasa's leading monasteries. 59/ Though the agreement

56/ Owen Lattimore, loc. cit., p. 513.

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promised that internal "reforms" were to be carried out by the Tibetan government "on its own accord", it also provided that the central government "shall have centralized handling of all external affairs of the area of Tibet", and that "Tibetan troops shall be reorganized step by step into the People's Liberation Army, and become part of the national defense forces of the People's Republic of China." It also stipulated that a military and administrative committee, and a military area headquarters were to be established in Tibet by the central government. The names of any local Tibetan representatives on the military and administrative committee were to be submitted to Peking for approval. The Tibet Military District was formally established in February 1952, with Chang Kuo-hua as commander.

Tibet thus has somewhat the same status as an administrative region in the governmental structure, and is also directly under the central government. At the moment it seems to have greater internal autonomy than Inner Mongolia, though it is quite clear that Peking's position will be further consolidated once basic "reforms" have been carried out there, and a local Communist party and the various mass organizations established.

East of Tibet proper are the adjacent areas of Inner Tibet, which the Nationalist government, as in the case of Inner Mongolia, integrated into the administrative system of China proper as part of the provinces of Sikang and Tsinghai. The Communists here also are reversing this procedure, and in November 1950 established a "Tibetan Autonomous Region Government" at Tatsienlu, in Sikang province. 60/ Comprising some twenty hsien of that province, the region is officially reported to have a population of about 700,000, four-fifths of whom are Tibetan. A Tibetan Communist, whose Sinicized name is Tien Pao, is chairman of the government of this autonomous area, which is apparently within the jurisdiction of either the Sikang provincial administration or that of the Southwest China regional government. Whether it will be expanded to include the remainder of Inner Tibet, and in what manner the region will be related to Tibet itself, is unclear at this point. It is reasonably certain, however, that no steps will be taken towards a closer integration of this autonomous area with Tibet proper until the latter is more firmly under Communist control.

The great northwestern province of Sinkiang, bordering the Soviet Union, is a third key region inhabited largely by minority peoples. The province is one-sixth the area of all China, though it has a population of only some five millions. 61/ At least nine-tenths the population is non-Chinese (i.e., non-"Han Chinese"), and there are reported to be some twelve different "national minorities" in the province, of whom the most important are the Uighurs, the Kazakhs and the Moslems. 62/

60/ New China News Agency Daily Bulletin No. 182, London, Dec. 19, 1950. See also, Current Background No. 118, Hong Kong, Sept. 25, 1951.

61/ For background information on Sinkiang, see Owen Lattimore, Pivot of Asia. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1950.

62/ Chen Ling, "Sinkiang's New Era". People's China, (Peking), May 16, 1951. p. 10.

During the Nationalist government days, a "tug-of-war" for dominant influence in the province went on between the Russians and the Nanking government. In the latest round of this struggle, a Soviet-supported "East Turkestan Republic" was established in late 1944 in regions bordering the Soviet Union, and its armed forces fought the Kuomintang provincial forces all through the post-1946 Chinese civil war.

In September 1949, however, with the surrender of Sinkiang to the Chinese Communists by the provincial government, the Turkestan movement was dissolved, its armed forces were absorbed into the Communist People's Liberation Army, and a new "national coalition" provincial government was then established in December 1949. This coalition was made up of national minority leaders who had worked with the Kuomintang, of East Turkestan leaders, and of both Communist and ex-Kuomintang Chinese. Thus Burhan (Pao-erh-han in Sinitized form), a Uighur who had served as last Kuomintang governor of the province, remained provincial chairman, while Saifudin, also a Uighur who had been one of the East Turkestan leaders, became vice-chairman, with a Chinese serving as second vice-chairman. Of thirty-one members of the provincial government council, nine were reported to be Uighurs, three Kazakhs, four Chinese, two Turgans (Moslems), and the remainder representing the other scattered national groupings. 63/

However, the Sinkiang sub-bureau of the Chinese Communist party and the Sinkiang military district are both headed by Wang Chen, a Chinese, who is a member of the Communist central committee. He is also political commissar of the military district. General Tao Chih-yueh, the former Kuomintang military commander in Sinkiang, was made vice-commander, with Saifudin occupying only third place in the military hierarchy of the province.

In 1948 the East Turkestan group had formed a "Sinkiang League for the Defense of Peace and Democracy", headed by Ahmaitikiang, the Kazakh leader of the Turkestan movement. He, together with four other league leaders, was killed in a plane crash while on the way to the CPPCC meeting in Peking in September 1949. 64/ This accident may have facilitated Chinese Communist consolidation over Sinkiang. At any rate, it brought to the fore an apparently less prominent Turkestan figure, Saifudin, who was made a member of the Central People's Government Council in Peking, and who, together with other national minority figures in Sinkiang, joined the Chinese Communist party in February 1950. At about that same time, the league mentioned above was reorganized as the "Sinkiang People's Democratic League" with Saifudin as its chairman. This league, it was officially announced, was to be "guided by the Chinese Communist Party (and) will base its work on the Common Program of the CPPCC." 65/ In May 1950, some hundreds of Sinkiang government workers were reported to have also joined the Chinese Communist party. 66/

63/ Ibid., p. 11.

64/ From June 1950 report to National Committee of the CPPCC by Hsi Chung-shu, vice-chairman of the Northwest China Military and Administrative Committee. Summary of report in Monthly Report (Shanghai), June 30, 1950. p. 6.

65/ Ibid., p. 6.

66/ New China News Agency Daily Bulletin No. 54, London, June 20, 1950.

While the establishment of joint Sino-Soviet economic companies, in March 1950, for the exploitation of Sinkiang's oil and mineral resources, indicated continued Soviet economic interest and influence in Sinkiang, it seems equally evident that the Chinese Communists are making determined efforts to see that overall political control remains firmly in Peking's hands.

This may account for the failure thus far to turn Sinkiang into an autonomous region or regions -- though in other respects, such as the promotion of national languages and culture, and the utilization of minority nationality personnel in government, developments there are apparently following the pattern established in the autonomous areas. Since the "national liberation" movement in Sinkiang did not develop under Chinese Communist auspices, the latter may feel that this movement could be brought under effective Communist control only if it were reabsorbed and reintegrated into a larger political unit in which the Chinese Communist party either was or could easily become dominant. It should be recalled, in this regard, that the Inner Mongolian autonomous movement originated under Chinese Communist direction, and thus posed no such problem of control.

This view is reinforced by the report, in late 1951, of a purge of various Uighurs and Kazakhs in Sinkiang who had been prominent in the East Turkestan movement, on charges of "narrow nationalism and pan-Islamism". Saifudin, in discussing this development, was reported to have declared that while the East Turkestan revolt had been useful to the Chinese Communist armies in tying down Kuomintang forces, it had been "only a bourgeois democratic revolution" lacking the "direct leadership" of the Chinese Communist party. As a result, he added, administrative power and key positions in the Turkestan republic had fallen into the hands of "feudalistic elements who were now, presumably, being eliminated from power. 67/

The complex multi-national character of Sinkiang is very likely an additional factor making for slower development of autonomous administrations in that province. For example, a preparatory committee set up in November 1952 to plan for the eventual establishment of "nationality regional autonomy", was reported to be made up of representatives of no less than thirteen different "nationalities". 68/ It was reported at that time that regional autonomy would be implemented after the completion of land reform in Sinkiang. Land reform for the national minority areas has generally been delayed thus far, and while a December 1952 report announced that the process had "begun" in Sinkiang (one of the first national minority areas where it has been launched) 69/, an earlier report indicated that the reform in Sinkiang would be "carried out gradually" over a period of years. 69a/ For the present, at any rate, Sinkiang has a unified provincial government and is administratively an integral part of the Northwest China region, though it is claimed that over two-thirds of the government personnel

67/ Harry R. Lieberman, Hong Kong dispatch to the New York Times, December 22, 1951.

68/ Peking, New China News Agency, November 18, 1952.

69/ Peking, New China News Agency, December 17, 1952.

69a/ H.C., "The Land Reform in China Today". People's China (Peking), July 16, 1952. p. 16.

at all levels come from the various minority nationalities. It may be assumed that a full-scale autonomy program will not be instituted until the Peking government feels that "bourgeois nationalism" in high places has been safely eliminated.

10. The following table shows the number of people who attended the
concerts in each of the five years from 1990 to 1994.

CHAPTER VI.

THE CONSOLIDATION OF POWER

A. Land Reform and the "Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries."

Hand in hand with its organizational consolidation, the Peking government is also utilizing nationwide, consciously-organized, and spectacular mass "movements" to strengthen further its formidable position, eliminate active or potential internal opposition, and achieve its various current objectives, thus paving the way in every sphere of Chinese life for a rapid development of the "people's democratic dictatorship" into a full-fledged Communist state. These movements also have the general goal of raising "ideological consciousness", and all tend to have a very high emotional content.

The gigantic agrarian reform movement, for example, begun in 1950 and scheduled for basic completion in the winter of 1952-53, has served to undermine social-economic groupings in the countryside considered hostile by the regime, and through the redistribution of the land and the intensive organizational activities accompanying it, has given the Communists the base among the peasantry so vitally necessary to the success of future Communist plans for the collectivization of agriculture. With the imminent completion of the present agrarian program, such plans are being increasingly discussed by Communist spokesmen and the Communist press.

By the third anniversary of the Peking regime, in October 1952, according to a report by the Minister of Agriculture, "more than ten" collective farms and fifty-two mechanized state farms "to educate the peasants in collective farming" had been set up; over forty percent of China's peasant families were participating in some form of "mutual aid team"; and some four thousand "agricultural producers' cooperatives" had been established. 1/ The latter are defined as "economic organizations of unified management and collective labor, based on private ownership of land" 2/, and are planned as a transitional form of organization between mutual aid teams on the one hand and full-fledged collective farms on the other: 3/

Thus far, however, the "go-slow" approach to actual collectivization, already noted, apparently continues to govern Communist policy. The report cited above, for example, adds that "the development from lower to higher forms of co-operation must be a gradual and voluntary process, determined only by the peasants' needs in production and by the level of their political consciousness." 3/ A press report on a much-publicized Manchurian experimental collective farm (established near Kiamaze) significantly notes that "the peasants are most realistic people. They will believe in collective farming, support it and take part in it, only when they have seen for

1/ Li Shu-cheng, "Achievements in Agriculture." People's China (Peking), October 1, 1952. p. 17.

2/ Fan Mo, "An Agricultural Producers' Co-operative." People's China (Peking), July 1, 1952. p. 16.

3/ Li Shu-cheng, "Achievements in Agriculture." op. cit.,

themselves that collective farming will bring them more practical advantages." To achieve this the account continues, requires "overcoming the small peasant mentality and the idea of private ownership...." But this process, the local Communist organizer of the collective is quoted as remarking, "is a long-term work." 4/ As previously indicated, the Communist party organization in the rural areas has now begun concentrating on this "long-term work." The collectives thus far established (largely in Sinkiang and the Northeast) have been organized either on reclaimed or on state-owned land, and have not as yet been formed through the amalgamation of individually-owned peasant plots.

It is evident, therefore, that the agricultural economy being created by the present reform, based as it is on the recognition and extension of individual peasant ownership of the land and on the toleration of a "rich peasant" economy, is in conflict with ultimate Communist goals in the countryside and is designed to be a temporary stage in the overall process of agricultural reorganization. Even in economic terms, though the Communists claim that the agrarian reform has greatly alleviated peasant distress and resulted in increased agricultural output (they report, for example, that total grain production in 1952 exceeded highest prewar levels by nine percent) 5/, they also acknowledge that only an extensive program of land reclamation and of irrigation and flood control (which the Communists have already begun implementing on a large scale); of industrialization, bringing with it the development of modern agricultural techniques, the extensive utilization of mechanical equipment on the land, and the draining of surplus population from the countryside; and more efficient agricultural organization, based on collectivization, can basically solve the problem of peasant poverty. 6/ At the same time, however, the Communists have viewed the current land reform program as a necessary prerequisite to these further developments; and also, by eliminating what they call the "feudal structure" in the countryside, and by giving the mass of the peasantry a certain vested interest in the new order, as an indispensable step in creating a strong political base in the countryside for their

4/ Tien Liu, "The Development of a Collective Farm." Peking Jen Min Jih Pao (People's Daily), March 24, 25, 1952. (Text in Current Background No. 176. Hong Kong, May 2, 1952.)

5/ The Communists also claim that, due to increased emphasis on taxing expanding urban and state enterprises, as well as because of increased agricultural production, the tax burden borne by the peasantry was reduced during 1952. The agricultural tax in 1952 a semi-official editorial claimed, took only twelve percent of the peasants' annual gross income, as compared to seventeen percent in 1951. People's China (Peking), September 1, 1952. p. 4.

6/ "The mere carrying out of agrarian reform," Liu Shao-chi stated in a basic report on the agrarian reform law in 1950, "can only solve part, but not the whole, of the problem of the peasant's poverty." Liu Shao-chi, "On the Agrarian Reform Law." (Text in The Agrarian Reform Law of the People's Republic of China.) (together with other relevant documents.) op. cit., p. 83.

According to official figures, some 120 million acres of appropriated land was made available for redistribution to approximately 75 million peasant families during the past three years, an average of only slightly more than one and one-half acres per family.

regime. Consequently, it has been on the ideological and organizational aspects of agrarian reform that the Communists have placed greatest stress. Chou En-lai, in 1950, called the land reform "the most important task in consolidating the people's democratic dictatorship" 7/, while another Communist spokesman declared this campaign to be "the last and fiercest battle in the series of systematic class struggles for the wiping out of feudal influences." 7a/ Thus, "erroneous ideas" of "peaceful land reform" have been sharply criticized by Communist leaders, who reiterate that only "through endless struggles and grievance-airing campaigns", led by the party cadres and based on intensive propaganda and organizational work among the peasantry, can the latter be made to "draw a clear distinction between themselves and their feudal enemy." Only through such "struggles" can the landlords (who, according to Communist standards, constituted slightly over four percent of the rural population) be eliminated as a class and the "dictatorship of the peasants over the landlords established." 7b/ These "struggles" should be pushed, it is added, even though the accompanying "confusion" results in temporarily lowering agricultural production.

The land reform movement has therefore been characterized by so-called "struggle meetings", by the large-scale organization of peasants' associations, and by the creation of special "people's tribunals" and the execution or imprisonment of those landlords accused of being "despotic" or "lawbreaking." It has primarily aimed at developing a new Communist-inspired "class consciousness", chiefly among the poorer peasantry who, now organized and armed, can serve as the new Communist power base in the countryside. Thus landlords (who were allowed to retain an equal share of the redistributed land 7c/ and "rich peasants and their agents" are prohibited from joining the peasants' associations, two-thirds of whose leadership, it is stipulated, must be drawn from among those who had originally been classified as farm labourers or poor peasants. 8/ The "purity" of this leadership at all levels, Liu Shao-chi further adds, must be completely "safeguarded." 8a/ The importance attached by the Communists to the

7/ Chou En-lai, Report to the National Committee of the CPCPC. China Monthly Review (Shanghai), November 1950. p. 105.

7a/ Tang Tru-hui, "The Political Significance of Agrarian Reform." Hankow Chang Chiang Jih Pao (Yangtze Daily), December 27, 1950. (Text in Current Background No. 212, Hong Kong, September 25, 1952.)

7b/ Ibid.

7c/ A Peking official claimed in 1952 that, "With the exception of a very small number of landlords who were at the same time local despots and those who were ordinarily resident in the cities, the rest of the landlords who numbered 20 million have all been given plots of land just like the peasants." Hsueh Mu-chiao, "New China's Great Economic Victories." Hsueh Hsi (Study) (Peking), October 1, 1952. Reproduced in Current Background No. 219, Hong Kong, November 14, 1952. Hsueh Mu-chiao is Director of the State Statistical Bureau.

8/ Membership in the various class categories is determined according to officially-defined criteria issued by the Peking government. "Decisions Concerning the Differentiation of Class S Countryside" in The Agrarian Reform Law of the Pe China, (together with other relevant documents. o

8a/ Liu Shao-chi, "On the Agrarian Reform Law." Ibid

development of this new rural organizational structure was underscored when it was spoken of, during the height of the crisis following Chinese entrance into the Korean war, as a vital means of ensuring the Peking regime's internal security should all-out war develop. 8b/

Also, apparently with these latter objectives of consolidation and security in mind, the agrarian reform campaign was joined in 1951 by an even broader movement, aimed not only at "despotic landlords", but at all those among the "reactionary elements" in the country (broadly defined by the Communists as those not included among the "four friendly classes" of the "people's democratic dictatorship") accused of "counter-revolutionary activities." Basically coordinated with developments in the countryside 9/, the new "movement for the suppression of counter-revolutionaries" swung into high gear with the passage, under Mao's signature, of a drastic set of regulations in February 1951.

As far back as 1949 Mao had warned, in his essay, On People's Democratic Dictatorship, that as far as the "hostile classes" were concerned, the army, police and courts of the new state would be "instruments of oppression", and that there would consequently be "no benevolent policies toward the reactionaries or the counter-revolutionary activities of the reactionaries." The Common Program had underscored this point in declaring that "The People's Republic of China must suppress all counter-revolutionary activities, severely punish all Kuomintang counter-revolutionary war criminals and other obdurate...elements who collude with imperialism, commit treason to the fatherland, and oppose the cause of people's democracy." 10/ Both Mao and the Common Program, however, also held out the promise that "reactionary elements", though deprived of political rights, would be given the chance to "reform themselves" and become "new men", and would be punished only if they persisted in "counter-revolutionary activities."

In its first year of power, for reasons already discussed, the Peking government did in fact follow a "soft" policy toward those it viewed as "hostile elements". But by mid-1950, with preliminary Communist consolidation achieved, the new land reform about to get underway, and the continued existence with American support, of the Nationalist government on Formosa serving as a source of contact and encouragement to anti-Communist groups on the mainland, a reversal in policy began to take shape. Mao Tse-tung, in a June 1950 report to the Communist central committee, called for the party and "all the people throughout the country...(to) raise their vigilance against the subversive activities of the counter-revolutionary

8b/ "...if in the process of agrarian reform, we should fail to overthrow feudal influences thoroughly, to mobilize the masses fully, to establish genuinely the peasants' revolutionary dictatorship in every village and every corner of the countryside, then should war break out, the feudal influences will emerge everywhere and effects will be produced on our security..." Teng Tzu-hui, "The Political Significance of Agrarian Reform." op. cit.

9/ "(The) series of struggles of the peasant masses have gone hand in hand with the movement for the suppression of counter-revolutionaries." Chou En-lai, Report to third session of the First National Committee of the CPPCC, October 23, 1951. op. cit.

10/ Article 7, Common Program of the CPPCC.

P. 4.

elements"; and the following month preliminary regulations on "the suppression of counter-revolutionary activities" were issued jointly by the Government Administration Council and the Supreme People's Court. In his September 1950 political report to the National Committee of the CPCCC, Chou En-lai strongly criticized "local judicial workers" for having "only shown clemency to the counter-revolutionary elements without suppressing them", and declared that "the masses of people blame them for their 'boundless clemency'". 11/

Official criticism of any tendency toward "clemency" gained added momentum following the Chinese intervention in Korea, with its consequent threat of imminent all-out war. The official party newspaper in Peking editorialized in December 1950: "At the moment, the Chinese people are waging a sharp struggle against American imperialism.... Under the circumstances counter-revolutionary elements in hiding are intensifying their sabotaging activities....(and therefore) counter-revolutionaries must be deprived of their political freedom, must be deprived of all conditions for counter-revolutionary activities, and must be made to behave obediently. To this end, the deviation of boundless magnanimity must be cleared from each link in the work of public security and judicial organs." 12/

At the end of the year regulations were issued in the various cities calling for the voluntary registration with the authorities of "reactionary party elements and special agents" as a "last chance for repentance" and as "their only outlet to a bright future." 13/ Then came the drastic and all-inclusive "Regulations of the People's Republic of China for Punishment of Counter-Revolutionaries", promulgated by the Central People's Government Council on February 21, 1951. 14/

Basing itself on Article 7 of the Common Program, already referred to, these Regulations set forth a detailed list of "counter-revolutionary activities" which were to be punishable by death or life imprisonment in the case of principal offenders, and by lesser prison terms for minor offenders. Such activities range all the way from engaging in armed revolt "in collusion with imperialism, to "conducting counter-revolutionary propaganda and agitation", and include all acts of espionage, engaging in "underground activities", organizing or participating in anti-Communist "secret service or espionage organizations", acts of sabotage, secretly crossing the state frontier for "counter-revolutionary purposes", attacks on public officials, and "instigating the masses" (with "counter-revolution as the object") to resist implementation of government decrees. Those harboring or protecting any such persons were themselves to be punished with imprisonment, or with death in "serious cases". The Regulations were not only made retroactive, but specifically included "pre-liberation" activities in its purview. Thus among those to be punished were people who organized or led "counter-revolutionary secret service or espionage organizations and committ(ed) other

11/ Chou En-lai, Report to National Committee of the CPCCC, Sept. 30, 1950. op. cit., p. 104.

12/ Peking Jen Min Jih Pao (People's Daily), December 28, 1950.

13/ Shanghai Radio, January 5, 1951.

14/ Text issued by New China News Agency (Peking), February 21, 1951.

heinous crimes before liberation without doing meritorious service to atone for their crimes after liberation." 15/ In addition, the Regulations stated that, "Other criminals with counter-revolution as the object, but not stipulated in these regulations, are punishable in accordance with the suitable stipulations of these regulations."

Though the campaign of suppression had been underway since at least July 1950 (the December 1950 Peking People's Daily editorial quoted above had referred to the "heavy blows" already dealt "counter-revolutionaries"), it was evidently only after the passage of the February 1951 decree that it assumed the vast proportions of a nationwide "mass movement" during the spring and summer of that year. In accordance with the pattern developed by the Chinese Communists in the countryside, where anti-landlord campaigns are conducted through "speak bitterness" and "struggle" meetings of the peasants, so the new suppression movement was organized "with fanfare", marked by "accusation and denunciation meetings" held in some cases before huge popular throngs and broadcast by radio.

Lo Jui-ching, Communist Minister of Public Security, disclosed in May 1951, for example, that nearly 200,000 persons had recently attended such "accusation meetings" in Peking, and of over 500 cases "cleared up" in this fashion, 221 had been given the death sentence. 16/ In Mukden it was officially reported that over a million people, either personally or through radio, had held a "grand accusation rally for the denunciation of counter-revolutionaries" on May 13. Those listening in were asked to make their accusations by mail or phone. "After the meeting", the news agency report continued, "the municipal people's government, accepting the request of the people, executed a batch of counter-revolutionaries." 17/

The officially-described procedure, at least in the case of Peking, is as follows: the public security bureau investigates those who are "denounced" to it, as well as its own list of suspects, presumably, and a preliminary judicial disposal of these cases is made; then those cases "well-known to and bearing on the local citizens (are) referred to the masses for discussion and views on their disposal". On the basis "of the views expressed by the masses"; the cases are further reviewed by government and judicial authorities, with final judgment passed by the Judge Advocate's Office of the local military control committee. 18/ The process of final "review" after referral "to the masses" is apt to be completed rapidly -- in a matter of hours in the case of the Mukden meeting already referred to -- for it is apparent that these so-called "denunciation and accusation rallies" are used only for certain specially-chosen cases, "in all of which those involved have already been investigated, tried and sentenced. The mass rallies are primarily part of the "propaganda-education" function of the courts and are designed to arouse public sentiment against picked groups of "counter-revolutionaries", presumably those whose alleged past activities are most likely to stir up such feelings.

15/ Ibid., Article 7.

16/ Peking, New China News Agency, May 22, 1951.

17/ Mukden, New China News Agency, May 16, 1951.

18/ Peking, New China News Agency, August 23, 1951.

Through this procedure, Lo Jui-ching stated, the people are being "educated" and are undergoing a "revolutionary awakening". As a result, he adds, "instances of denunciation against counter-revolutionaries have been on an unprecedented increase, there being wives denouncing counter-revolutionary husbands, sons accusing heinous fathers who persecuted not only the people but also their sons. On several occasions, while secret service agents were in the act of chalking up counter-revolutionary slogans, students and children managed to have them arrested and delivered to the Public Security Bureau." 19/

Widespread misgivings among "friendly elements" as to these methods was indicated in a Peking People's Daily editorial addressed to the "well meant" scruples of "people who are afraid that mass denunciation, in particular accusation and secret exposure, may bring about 'false accusation through personal grievance' and 'the innocent may suffer'." The suppression movement is not "being allowed to run wild", the editorial assures such people, since "thorough-going investigations" are carried out so that persons are not arrested or disposed of "on the strength of a couple of secret letters of denunciation alone." It is therefore "wrong", the editorial concludes, "for people to doubt the wisdom of prompting the masses to denounce, accuse, and inform on the counter-revolutionaries." 20/

The "counter-revolutionaries" executed, according to the official reports, included those alleged to be "gangsters or racketeers"; "bandits", with anti-Communist armed forces also coming under this heading; "secret agents", presumably of the Kuomintang or of "American imperialism"; leaders of the various secret societies long active in Chinese urban and rural life; "despots", as "bad" landlords are referred to; and those formerly associated with the Nationalist government's police or military forces who are now being tried for "blood crimes against the people." 21/ All such people, it should be noted, are essentially from those categories considered "outside the pale" by the Communists when they set up the 'people's democratic dictatorship', and the "counter-revolutionary" label, during this suppression campaign, was not extended to any of the "friendly classes" involved in the Peking coalition or to their representatives in the government. 21a/

It is obviously impossible to determine accurately the number executed or imprisoned as part of this campaign. However, its highly public nature,

19/ Peking, New China News Agency, May 22, 1951.

20/ Peking Jen Min Jih Pao (People's Daily), May 21, 1951.

21/ A Peking report of 237 "counter-revolutionaries" executed in August 1951 categorized them as follows: "125 secret service agents, 9 collaborators with the Japanese, 28 despots, 9 confirmed robbers, 27 leaders of reactionary sects and societies, 16 members of the Home Returning Corps (the Nationalist-organized local militia), and 23 soldiers and policemen of bandit Chiang." Peking, New China News Agency, August 23, 1951.

Chou En-lai has listed as the "five categories of counter-revolutionary elements -- bandits, despots, secret agents, members of reactionary parties or organizations and members of reactionary superstitious secret societies." Chou En-lai, Report to third session of the First National Committee of the CPCCC, October 23, 1951. op. cit.

21a/ Many of these, however, were affected in varying degrees by the later san fan and wa fan movements.

reflected in extensive reports on the campaign in the Chinese press 22/, and various official pronouncements on judicial developments during this period, allow for some estimation of its extent.

Thus in October 1951, Shen Chun-ju, President of the Supreme People's Court, reported that for the first six months of that year, "according to incomplete statistics", people's courts at the various levels had dealt with over 800,000 criminal and civil cases which, he noted, "played an important part in fulfilling the aim of suppressing reactionaries and protecting the people." 23/ A September 1951 official report, dealing with the Northeast (Manchuria) and some five other northern and central provinces, and the seven leading cities in the country, stated that the people's courts had handled almost 200,000 "criminal cases" during this same six month period. 24/ Such cases, it can be assumed, dealt almost entirely with "counter-revolutionaries", for the Vice-Procurator-General of the government declared at that time that "prosecution of cases of counter-revolution is more important than prosecution of ordinary criminal cases today." 25/ (Meanwhile, a later report on Central-South China indicated that some thirty percent of all those arrested in that region as "counter-revolutionaries" received the death penalty; with execution deferred for two years in the case of a small percentage. 26/ To the activities of the people's courts themselves must be added that of the special people's tribunals operating in the rural areas in connection with the land reform. All in all, it is quite conceivable that the number either executed, given deferred death sentences, or lengthy prison terms in the eighteen month period ending in late 1951 totaled some hundreds of thousands.

By late 1951, Mao was reporting that "the remaining counter-revolutionaries on the mainland will shortly be in the main eliminated"; and by the end of that year the "movement" had apparently about-run its course, at least as far as "fanfare" was concerned, though a year later, the Minister of Public Security was still talking of "the remnant influence of counter-revolutionaries", and warning that "as long as counter-revolutionaries exist, we must wipe them out thoroughly." 27/ Such groups, accord-

22/ One observer, for example, reports that the Shanghai press reported some 1,742 executions for that city from April 30 to September 30, 1951. Robert Guillain, "Revolution in China: The Reign of Terror." Hong Kong dispatch to the Manchester Guardian Weekly, November 22, 1951.

23/ Shen Chun-ju, Report to third session of First National Committee of the CPPCC, October 28, 1951. (Text in Current Background No. 147. Hong Kong, December 28, 1951.)

24/ Hsu Te-heng, Explanatory Report on the provisional regulations on the people's courts. op. cit.

25/ Li Liu-ju, Explanatory Report on the provisional regulations on the people's procurator's offices. op. cit.

26/ Teng Tzu-hui, "The Initiation of the Policy of Reform Through Labor in the Central-South Region." (Text of this November 21, 1951 in Current Background No. 171. Hong Kong, April 10, 1952.

27/ Lo Jui-ching, "Great Success in the Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries During Past Three Years." Peking, New China News Agency, September 27, 1952.

ing to the Communist press, have been answering "terror with terror", and there have been reports of local risings, sabotage through arson and other means of destruction from various parts of the country, and also of continued armed clashes with "remnant bandits in some remote areas." 28/ But by and large, it seems evident that by eliminating actively or potentially hostile leadership elements within China, the Peking government has taken a major step in consolidating its "revolutionary order" throughout the country.

With the physical elimination of those the Communists consider the most dangerous "counter-revolutionaries" largely accomplished, stress is now on the compulsory labor -- known as "reform through labor" -- of the remainder. Chou En-lai, for example, reported that "we have adopted the policy of pronouncing on those criminals who have merited the death penalty, but ... whose crimes against the national interests, though serious, are not in the most serious category, a death sentence suspended for two years and putting them to compulsory labor for that period in order to see how they turn out." 29/ The same policy is also being followed for the great numbers sentenced to prison terms in the first place. An official report on developments in Central-South China (already cited), included the following information: 30/

Among the criminals arrested in the Central-South region, only 28 percent were executed, about 2 percent had their death sentences stayed for two years, 50 percent were made to undergo reform through labor while serving their sentences, and the remaining 20 percent were handed over to the masses for surveillance and reform. In addition, there were also a number, approximately half of those arrested, who had not been formally arrested, but were directly transferred to the surveillance of the masses for reform through labor.

This last category refers to a special group of "parolees", made up of those "counter-revolutionaries" whose crimes are not "flagrant" enough to warrant arrest. According to the "Provisional Measures for the Control of Counter-Revolutionaries", 31/ enacted by the Government Administration Council on June 27, 1952, such individuals are to be subjected to "control measures" in order "to reform them into new men". These people are to be deprived of all political rights, they must take up "proper professions and actively labor to produce", and they must report instantly "on counter-revolutionary activities of others on discovery". The period of control is to last for three years or less, depending on the behavior of the individual concerned, and may be extended for more than three years if the authorities so decide. The local "public security organs" are charged with enforcing these measures.

28/ Ibid.

29/ Chou En-lai, Report to third session of First National the CPCC, October 23, 1951. op. cit.

30/ Teng Tzu-hui, "The Initiation of the Policy of Reform in the Central-South Region." op. cit.

31/ Text issued by New China News Agency (Peking), July

Also in mid-1952, the Government Administration Council approved a set of provisional regulations for the organization of "security committees". 32/ These regulations, as proclaimed by the Ministry of Public Security on August 10, 1952, provided that all cities and rural districts (which have completed agrarian reform) set up security committees "for the purpose of mobilizing the masses to help the people's government in anti-treason, anti-espionage, anti-robbery and anti-fire activities and in stamping out counter-revolutionary activities, thereby to protect the state and public order." Such security committees were to be established with the village as the unit in the countryside, and with a factory, other enterprise, school or street as the basic unit in the cities, and were each to have from three to eleven elected members. All of these committees are to be under the supervision of the appropriate administrative level public security office. Among the listed functions and powers of these committees are the responsibility "of educating the masses to preserve revolutionary order and of supervising the persons subject to control in labor and production", and of investigating, supervising, prosecuting, and denouncing "counter-revolutionaries" (to the local public security organs); though unless such individuals are "caught in the act", the committees themselves have no power to arrest or detain them -- a function reserved to the public security organs. These security committees are apparently another striking example of the Chinese Communist penchant for "popularizing", in the stage of implementation, every administrative function of the state, including those pertaining to the police and the judiciary.

Finally, to conclude this brief summary of the drastic security measures instituted by the Peking government since the outbreak of the Korean war, the June 1951 enactment of "Provisional Regulations for the Preservation of State Secrets" is also worth noting. 33/ According to these regulations, such secrets were declared to include not only information dealing with national defense, security, and foreign affairs, but, also such things as state financial plans and budgets, state economic plans, and "secrets concerning scientific inventions and discoveries, culture, education, hygiene and medicine." Those guilty of selling or revealing "state secrets" to "enemy agents" were to be punished under the February 1951 regulations on "counter-revolutionaries."

It may be added here that, since late 1950, the all-embracing "Resist-America-Aid-Korea" movement has provided the framework within which most of the measures described above have been implemented. Both in this respect and through the use of "patriotic compacts" and appeals to spur national efforts in every field, particularly the economic, the Korean war has very probably served to accelerate the entire process by which the regime has been solidifying "the people's democratic dictatorship" within China.

32/ "Provisional Regulations Governing Organization of Security Committees." Text released by New China News Agency (Peking), August 10, 1952.

33/ Text of regulations issued by the New China News Agency (Peking), June 10, 1951.

B. Current Political and Economic Perspectives.

In March 1951, the Chinese Communist party had formally announced that following "the consolidation of the New Democratic system", it would "proceed to the struggle for the nationalization of industry, (and) the collectivization of agriculture, that is to say, the transition to the socialist system, and finally to the struggle for the realization of the Communist system." 34/ By 1952, the party was already turning its attention to preparing the groundwork for these "struggles" looming ahead, as already pointed out in the discussion of recent agrarian developments. In the cities too, such preparations moved forward rapidly. The *wu fan* or "five anti" movement, launched at the beginning of 1952 and waged intensively during the first half of that year, was of major importance in this respect. Specifically directed at such alleged economic malpractices of private businessmen as tax evasion, bribery of state employees, fraud, theft of state economic secrets, and pilfering of state property, the campaign reflected a hardening of the party's politico-economic outlook, and was officially looked upon by the Communist leaders as a vital, if only preliminary round in the impending "struggle" for full socialism.

Thus, while the campaign itself was directed at individual offenders, the economic sins under attack in the five-anti movement were declared to be typical of the business class as a whole, and it was referred to by a Communist theorist as "a determined counter-offensive against the ferocious attack of the bourgeois class, a fierce battle between the ideology of the working class and the ideology of the bourgeois class." 35/ Chen Po-ta, leading Communist propaganda chief, called the campaign "a struggle for the path China is going to follow." After formation of the Peking government, he added, "bourgeois elements did not discard their hopes of seizing power little by little", and dreamed of delaying the preparation for shifting... from the establishment of the new democracy to the path of socialist development. 36/ While Chen also stated that Communist policy remained one of "cooperation" and did not "envision the liquidation of the bourgeoisie in the economic sense", the shift in primary emphasis away from the current transitional "new democratic" stage towards a rapidly-unfolding full-blown socialist era was unmistakable, as was the warning to those private businessmen who might oppose or impede this development. As the campaign drew to a close in July 1952, for example, another government leader declared that it had "provided an effective guarantee that the Chinese revolution must proceed on the path of socialism and not on the

34/ These stated objectives were included in the "eight requirements" for party members adopted in March 1951. See p. 71 for complete text of these requirements.

35/ Ai Su-chi, "Recognize Clearly the Reactionary Nature of the Bourgeois Class." Hsueh-Hsi (Study) (Peking), March 16, 1952. (Text in Current Background No. 179. Hong Kong, May 6, 1952.) However, many of the sentiments expressed in this and other articles appearing in Hsueh-Hsi at this time were later criticized for their "dogmatic, one-sided" approach to the question of the "national capitalists." (See p. 167.)

36/ Chen Po-ta, "25th Anniversary of J.V. Stalin's 'Problems of the Chinese Revolution.'" (Complete text translated from Pravda (Moscow), April 23, 1952 in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, June 7, 1952. p. 5.)

path of capitalism." 37/

Aside from its more fundamental political and economic aspects, the five-anti drive (as well as the accompanying "three-anti" campaign of "purification" simultaneously carried out among state economic and governmental personnel at all administrative levels 38/) also apparently netted the Peking government a very substantial financial return through the enforced collection of "back taxes and graft refunds", the heavy fines levied against those businessmen considered "serious lawbreakers" 39/, presumably, by the savings resulting from the elimination of a certain amount of waste and corruption in state economic enterprises. An official account of Finance Minister Po Yi-po's presentation of the 1952 budget to the Central People's Government Council in August 1952, reported him as having declared that the government's financial position for the 1951 fiscal year had turned out to be stronger than expected. "In particular", this summary of his report stated, "as a result of the great three-anti- and five-anti campaigns this year, a situation far better than originally expected has been brought about with regard to the implementation of the 1951 state budget; the revenue and expenditure not only balance each other but the balance shows a surplus....." 40/

But with the "national capitalists" apparently thoroughly chastened, as well as somewhat demoralized, as a result of the intense drive against the "five evils", the Communist party in mid-1952 moved to call a halt to the broad "offensive" aimed at that group. In characteristic fashion, once the "struggle" had run its course and basic objectives had been achieved, party policy once again became predominantly conciliatory, and undertook to reassure the still-important, though now very much subdued private business community as to its future prospects. The intensity of the five-anti campaign had been extremely upsetting to business activity; Communist economic expert Chen Yun himself acknowledged, in June 1952, that during the campaign's height "there were instances of partial stagnancy in the industrial and commercial enterprises." 41/. Particularly with a program of industrialization about to get under way, "beneficial" private enterprise was still an essential element in the national economy, and the government consequently took steps to repair some of the economic and political damage created by the more "extreme" developments which occurred during the five anti movement.

Now that it had been amply demonstrated that private business was completely subject to state direction and control (thus the closing phases of the wu fan coincided with preparations for forming an All-China Federation of Industrial and Commercial Circles as an effective agency for implementing

37/ An Tzu-wen, "Strengthen the Work of Party Reform and Party Expansion on the Foundations of Victory in the Three-Anti and Five-Anti Movements" op. cit.

38/ See pp. 69-70 for discussion of the "three-anti" movement.

39/ Henry R. Lieberman, Hong Kong dispatch to the New York Times, June 1, 1952.

40/ Peking; New China News Agency, August 10, 1952.

41/ Chen Yun, Address to conference for preparation of the All-China Federation of Industrial and Commercial Circles, June 24, 1952. Peking, New China News Agency, June 24, 1952.

state political and economic objectives among the 'national bourgeoisie' 42/ the Government, with suitable warnings of dire punishment should there be further "retrogression" from state-imposed standards of business operation and conduct, again offered encouragement to private enterprise, including the promise of increased government contracts and the guarantee of a stipulated margin of profit. Also, the Communist party's theoretical journal, Hueh-Hai (Study), which had been in the forefront of the ideological battle against the 'national bourgeoisie', was suspended in April 1952, reappearing in August with a series of "self-critical" articles acknowledging that it had previously exhibited a "dogmatic" and "one-sided" attitude in dealing with this question. 43/

All this was in keeping with the so-called "unite with and struggle against" policy of the Chinese Communist party. Since private enterprise still has an important part to play in the economic life of China, one aspect of party policy is to "unite" with this class to further this currently "progressive" role of private business, but at the same time, with an eye to their eventual liquidation as a class, a constant "struggle" is also waged against what the Communists consider the "reactionary" characteristics and ideology of the businessmen. On the ideological level, for example, Communist publicists declare that while the existence of "bourgeois ideology" within the business community is to be tolerated for the present (though businessmen too are to be "educated" to 'subjugate the dark and decadent side of their ideology'), "the broad masses of the working class, the teachers and students in schools and the working personnel in various organs" must be 'educated with the ideological system of Marxism-Leninism for their elevation and remolding so that they may not be infected by bourgeois ideology and be cleared of any such influence.' 44/

The advancing preparations for full socialism have also been reflected in the steadily-growing predominance of the state-owned and operated sector of the national economy. In September 1952, it was officially reported, owned eighty percent of "heavy industry" and about forty percent of "light industry", with the share of the state-owned sector up to fifty percent for the important textile industry. In terms of industrial output, the percentage share of the private sector in the economy declined from 56.2 percent in 1949 to 32.7 percent in 1952. By the latter year also, the state-owned People's Bank of China controlled over ninety percent of loans and deposits, the share of the private banks rising to almost ninety-nine percent if the operations of these "banks" owned by public and private interests" are included. "The nationalization of banking" yet proclaimed the nationalization of banking", the Director of the People's Statistical Bureau reported, "the private sector has been completely liquidated."

42/ See pp. 59-60 for further discussion of this phenomenon.

43/ See, for example, Hu Sheng and Yu Fung-jung, "On Self-Liquidation," Hueh-hai (Study), August 1, 1952. (In Survey of Chinese Political Press No. 404, Hong Kong, August 28, 1952.)

44/ Ibid.

44a/ In absolute terms, however, private industrial output is reported to have increased over this three-year period.

to cope with the changed financial situation, have in the past three years gradually withdrawn from business." 45/ Some ninety percent of the country's foreign trade was then being handled through state companies; from forty to one hundred percent of the wholesale business, depending on the particular commodity involved, was also in the hands of state trading companies; and about thirty percent of the nation's retail trade, it was estimated, would be conducted by either state or cooperative trading companies during 1952. 46/ Through their collection and distribution of key commodities, both agricultural and industrial, and their controlling position in relation to private enterprise, the expanding, nationwide network of state trading companies play a key role in the state's growing ability to plan and control China's overall economic life.

It was also officially reported that returns from state economic enterprises constituted the largest single source of government revenue in 1952, showing a continuous advance from third place in 1950 and second place in 1951. This, a Communist editorial declared, was a further "sign of the rapid advance of the Socialist sector; whose strengthened leadership over all other sectors of our economy assures the gradual transition from the New Democratic system of today to a Socialist tomorrow." 47/ In preparing for this "socialist tomorrow" the government has already created not only the basic administrative framework for directing the national economy, but also the beginnings of a mammoth organizational apparatus for carrying on the state's economic activities throughout the country. Thus already by the close of 1950, there were reported to be over 4,200 branches of the specialized state trading companies in the country (exclusive of state retail stores), with a staff totaling over 120,000 persons. 48/

Working closely with the state trading companies, and representing a transitional "semi-socialist" form of economic activity, is the vast, state-sponsored cooperative movement. It was claimed, at the end of 1952, that over one hundred million persons belonged to over 36,000 cooperative societies throughout the country, with these societies organized into federations on every administrative level, up to an All-China Federation of Cooperatives on the national level. These cooperatives are divided into three main types: rural supply and marketing cooperatives, which, with a claimed membership of some ninety-five millions, plays a key part in rural-urban trade; urban consumers' cooperatives (eleven million members); and industrial producers' cooperatives (some 200,000 members) which, functioning in both urban and rural centers, are largely concerned with handicraft production. These cooperatives are an essential element in the system of economic con-

45/ Hsueh Mu-chiao, "New China's Great Economic Victories." op. cit.

46/ Ibid. The state companies dealing in wholesale and foreign trade have been established along specialized lines, each dealing with a different commodity. Thus, in the foreign trade field, there are the China Bristle Company, the China Tea Company, the China Silk Company, the China Leather and Fur Company, the China Egg Products Company, etc.; while in the domestic field there are the China Grain Company, the China Cotton-Yarn-Cloth Company, the China Salt Company, the China Coal Company, etc. (For a discussion of the operations of the state trading companies, see Ronald Hsia, Price Control in Communist China, op. cit., pp. 33-44.

47/ Editorial, People's China (Peking), September 1, 1952. p. 4.

trols being erected by Peking; as it has been semi-officially stated, "the state (socialist) operated sector of the national economy leads the co-operatives, and, through them, organizes the numerous scattered individual producers to work according to the needs of over-all national plans." 48a/ More than 420,000 cadres were reported working in the cooperative movement in 1952. 48b/

Another important aspect of the government's economic efforts has been its role in public works developments, where it has literally "mobilized" some hundreds of thousands of laborers for such undertakings as the apparently gigantic Huai River irrigation and flood control project and similar smaller-scale schemes along the Yellow and Yangtze Rivers, and for the construction of new rail lines, such as the recently-completed Chungking-Chengtu and Kweichow-Tientsui lines. 49/

All these developments, combined with the ever greater utilization of Soviet economic and administrative techniques, have laid the foundations for the newly-emerging campaign for "national construction", which is to be primarily concerned with the building of a fully-planned, industrialized economy by the state (and which is itself spoken of as a necessary preliminary to the complete nationalization of private enterprise.) This "forthcoming" construction plan represents a shift from the present stage of restoring China's prewar economic level, largely through rehabilitation of existing facilities (which the Communists claim to have largely accomplished), to a new, more complex and difficult stage of constructing new facilities. This program, Peking's new economic planning chief Kao Kang wrote in October 1952, will stress heavy industry, i.e., "the development of industries producing the means of production", which he continued, "is the Socialist path...of more difficulties but (of) speedy developments." 50/ Such an undertaking, particularly in view of its emphasis on heavy industry rather than on the light consumer industries, calls for the planned and controlled organization and utilization of the nation's human and material resources, and for the overall control of both national pro-

48/ Ibid., p. 34.

48a/ C. L. Chao, 'China's Co-operative Movement: Largest in the World.' People's China (Peking), January 1, 1953. p. 26.

48b/ Cheng Tzu-hua, 'Cooperative Movement in the Past Three Years.' Peking Jen Min Jih Pao (People's Daily), September 23, 1952.

49/ It is worth noting that such projects, particularly those concerned with irrigation and flood control, have traditionally been regarded as major functions of central government in China, and the magnitude and effectiveness of government operations in this area has tended to be a measure of the strength of the central government and of its consequent degree of control over the country. Thus the present public works program is a significant reflection, in Chinese terms, of Communist centralized power and organizational effectiveness.

50/ Kao Kang 'Usher in New Period of Economic Construction.' Peking Jen Min Jih Pao (People's Daily), October 1, 1952.

duction and consumption. Clearly, the creation of the present powerfully-organized, highly centralized, and unified state structure has been an essential prerequisite for the launching of such a program by the Communists. 51/ The latter's ability to both release and organize "mass energy" throughout the country to achieve government objectives will also undoubtedly be put to use in the new "struggle" for industrialization, and will be facilitated by the particularly strong appeal that the prospect of economic modernization has exerted on China.

The emphasis on the political and ideological level is thus now twofold. There is the continued concentration on eliminating "bourgeois" vestiges in party and government ranks, and from economic, educational and cultural life; on further proletarianizing the party; and on intensifying ideological indoctrination in all key areas of Chinese life. "In factories, mines, cooperatives, state organizations and schools, as well as in the villages", the Peking People's Daily editorialized in July 1952 in keynoting the Chinese Communist party's thirty-first anniversary "the party should not in the least relax its efforts in giving regular, systematic ideological and political leadership". 52/

At the same time increasingly greater attention is being given to the gigantic task of creating the complex technical-economic administrative bureaucracy essential to the ambitious Communist plans for economic development. "The work of consolidation and building up the party", the editorial cited above continued, "must go hand in hand with the construction work of the state, and in particular, with economic construction work centered on industrialization." The "permanent aim" of the party now is to transform China "from an agrarian into an industrialized country and to advance our state to the future of Socialism." Communists on every "economic front" must now become "masters of their trade, master technical skill and raise their managerial and administrative ability." 53/

The enormous economic and technical problems to be surmounted in achieving a substantial degree of industrialization and its agricultural counterpart of collectivization in China, are much greater in many respects than those faced by the Russians when they launched their first five year plan. The Chinese Communists themselves talk of the "long and arduous task of [economic] construction", which must proceed "on the destitute and back-

51/ The Chinese Communists have established, according to a dispatch paraphrasing the former Indian Ambassador to China (K.M. Panikkar), a "'powerful central government', whose writ (runs) throughout the length and breadth of the mainland of China --... ." New Delhi dispatch to the New York Times, October 29, 1951.

A more recent American report stated, "Chinese and foreigners who know China best agree that centralization is the most important change in China. Orders issued in Peiping now are executed in remote villages 1,500 miles away." "Inside Red China." Hong Kong dispatch to U.S. News and World Report, March 7, 1952. pp. 14-15.

52/ Peking Jen Min Jih Pao (People's Daily), July 1, 1952.

53/ Ibid.

ward foundation of Old China. 54/ However, even apart from these technical and economic difficulties, such a campaign will also involve the most sustained and fundamental assault the Communists have yet made on the traditional pattern of Chinese social and economic life, and will therefore inevitably bring with it, as already noted, further and perhaps even fiercer "struggles" than those already waged by the Communists as part of the continuous process designed to remold China into a Communist pattern.

It is in the realm of industrialization that Soviet experience and technical and economic aid will prove indispensable to the Chinese, given present world conditions, and the extent, quality and terms of such assistance will obviously have a direct bearing on China's ability to realize its goals, the rapidity with which it is able to proceed, and on the hardships the Chinese people will be called upon to endure in the process. (These will also be affected, naturally, by present and future Chinese military commitments.)

Since the proposed economic construction program is to be undertaken very largely by the state itself, the acute problem of personnel and organization for such "economic work" will undoubtedly be the major concern of the Chinese Communists in the sphere of government administration for some time to come, barring of course, some such development as the expansion of the presently truce-deadlocked Korean war into an all-out conflict involving the Chinese mainland. "Technique, cadres and skilled workers form a determining factor for the success or failure of industrial construction", Kao Kang declared in 1952, 55a/ a point that has been reiterated over and over in Communist discussions of industrialization plans. The difficulties in this respect were underscored by reports in the Communist press, as early as 1951, of serious shortages in technicians and skilled laborers for construction projects, and of the fact that the unified distribution of university graduates that year met only one-tenth of national requirements. It was also reported then that the Manchurian railways, which had set the educational qualifications for their apprentices as junior middle school students, were forced to lower this standard in order to fulfill their quota. 55/ The number of students enrolled in all institutions of higher learning in 1952 was estimated to number only some 220,000, with barely three million attending all middle schools throughout the country. Even these figures, it should be noted, were already almost double the number enrolled in the middle schools and the universities, respectively in 1946. 56/

It is also probable that the already-indicated frictions developing between the "new cadres", primarily city-bred with some previous education

54/ Shanghai Chieh Fang Jih Pao (Liberation Daily), July 1, 1952. (The Liberation Daily is the official Communist party organ for Shanghai.)

55a/ Kao Kang "Usher in New Period of Economic Construction." op. cit.

55/ Peking, New China News Agency, September 6, 1951.

56/ These figures taken from the official Chinese publication People's Education, October 1952, are quoted in Chinese Communist Propaganda Review, Issue No. 30. Hong Kong, December 1, 1952. The Communists also claimed, however, that some fifty million students were attending primary school by 1952.

and skills, and many of the veteran party cadres of peasant background who, since the Communist "return to the cities" have been finding themselves at a disadvantage in competing for responsible posts and advancement in the government, may grow more acute and become an important problem for the party. This may result, since, with increased emphasis on industrial development, a new technical-managerial administrative class drawn principally from the urban factories and universities will emerge and become increasingly prominent in party and government ranks. At the same time, however, it must also be pointed out that the majority of the millions of new workers and technicians required will themselves have to be recruited from the vast reservoir of China's peasant population. 57/

Towards the close of 1952, certain important administrative steps were taken in direct preparation for undertaking this immense, planned industrial development program. First of all, a seventeen-member State Planning Commission was established under Manchurian leader Kuo Kang. The appointment of Kuo Kang to this post would seem to reflect the overwhelming importance of Manchuria, with its industrial facilities and agricultural surpluses, to future Chinese economic development. Also Manchuria had already instituted a "large-scale basic construction" plan in 1952, 58/ and presumably the pattern set there will now be applied on a nationwide scale. In preparation for the enormous task of creating the pool of skilled workers and technicians needed for this program, a Commission to Eliminate Illiteracy was established in November 1952 which has been given the stupendous task of overcoming illiteracy in China within ten years. At the same time, a Ministry of Higher Education was formed, and a sweeping reorganization and expansion of higher educational facilities was carried out with the aim of redirecting higher education along predominantly scientific, technical-engineering lines. Many of the existing universities were transformed into technical institutes, and other new ones were established, including separate Geological, Steel and Iron Engineering, Aeronautical Engineering, Mining Engineering, Mechanized Agriculture, and other specialized institutes. Special centers for training in finance, economics and law have also been set up. 59/ As part of the plan for rapidly expanding the student bodies of such institutions to fill acute national needs, all higher education has now also been made tuition-free. Finally, the already-noted reorganization of the country's regional administrations is apparently largely designed to create the even greater centralization deemed necessary for a state-directed industrialization effort.

As the Communists themselves acknowledge, they will eventually stand or fall on the basis of their progress in solving China's profound economic problems. The conditions bred by extreme poverty and general economic

57/ It was officially reported, for example, that Northeast China (Manchuria) planned to train 200,000 people, "mostly workers and leading peasants," as skilled workers and technical and administrative personnel, in preparation for industrial development there. Mukden, New China News Agency, August 19, 1952.

58/ See Kuo Kang, "The 1952 Plan for Northeast China and the Production of Extra Wealth". People's China (Peking), June 16, 1952. pp. 6-8.

59/ Peking, New China News Agency, November 24, 1952.

backwardness and collapse in China were in large measure responsible for bringing the Chinese Communists to power; it will be essentially on their record in economic construction, and more particularly on whether an increase in national economic strength brings with it a greater measure of well-being for the Chinese people that the future ability of the Peking regime to maintain its stability and power will in all likelihood depend. In like manner, the extent and rapidity of economic, technical and educational progress in China will undoubtedly play a large part in determining how strong an attraction Chinese Communism will have for other Asian countries faced with similar economic problems and aspirations.

MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN 1953

The numerous pronouncements in China during the latter half of 1952 on "forthcoming" economic construction plans crystallized in late December into an official announcement by Premier Chou En-lai that China's first Five Year Plan would begin in 1953. Subsequently, in a report to the fourth session of the National Committee of the CPRC early in February 1953, Chou gave some indication, in percentage terms, of the plan's "preliminary" 1953 objectives. Taking 1952 production figures as the base of 100, he listed major production targets for the first year of the plan as follows: pig iron 114, steel ingots 123, coal 100, power 127, petroleum 142, copper 139, lead 149, zinc 154, machine tools 134, caustic soda 131, cement 117, timber 138, cotton yarn 109, cotton piece goods 116, paper 106, sugar 123, grain 109, raw cotton 116, and tea 116. 1/

While Chou gave no absolute totals, these can be determined for certain major items (at least approximately) without great difficulty. The announced 1952 production figures, also listed in percentages, in turn took as their base of 100 what were officially referred to as "highest prewar levels" of output of the various commodities. According to a semi-official article appearing in late 1949, the figures accepted by the Communists as representing such highest previous output totals for China were as follows: steel -- 1,200,000 metric tons; pig iron -- 1,915,000 metric tons; coal -- 52,647,000 metric tons, electric power capacity -- 2,500,000 kilowatts; and petroleum -- 330,000 metric tons. 2/ While these figures largely correspond to accepted estimates, the important point here is not their absolute accuracy, but the fact that they are apparently the figures used by the Peking government as the "take-off" point for the percentage totals it has issued in recent years.

Accordingly, based on the figures cited above, the government claimed that China had produced in 1952 some two million metric tons of pig iron, approximately the same quantity of steel, some fifty million metric tons of coal, and had achieved a capacity of 2,650,000 kilowatts of electric power. Production of food grains and of other agricultural products such as cotton and tea were all reported to have exceeded peak prewar levels, varying from an increase of nine percent in the case of food grains to fifty-five

1/ Text of report, as released by New China News Agency, Peking Radio, February 5, 1953.

2/ Chen Chen, "Some Characteristics of the Industry of Old China." Esin Hua Yueh Pao (New China Monthly) (Peking), November 1949. p. 105. (Cited in Source Materials from Communist China. 2. Aspects of Economic Planning. Compiled by Chao Kuo-chun. Cambridge: Russian Research Center, Harvard University, April 1952. p. 15. According to the author of this article, his figures are based on combined data for 1943 and 1936 (with 1943 taken as the year of highest production in Japanese-occupied Manchuria, and 1936 as the year of highest prewar levels for China proper.) Actually, in the case of coal production, 1936 levels were somewhat under the peak output of 1934 for China proper. (See China Handbook 1937-1943. New York: Macmillan, 1943. p. 479).

percent for cotton. 3/ Thus, translating Chou En-lai's percentage targets for 1953 into absolute figures, output goals for the first year of China's Five Year Plan have been set at the following levels: steel -- somewhat under 2,500,000 metric tons; pig iron -- almost 2,300,000 metric tons; coal -- 50,000,000 metric tons, a figure still slightly below highest "pre-liberation" levels; electric power capacity -- 3,620,000 kilowatts; oil -- over 600,000 metric tons (this figure is based on a reported "estimated" output of 450,000 metric tons for 1952 4/. Total food grains production, determined on the basis of previous Communist claims and on Chou's percentage estimate for 1953, will approximate somewhat over 170 million tons. (In his 1953 budget message, Finance Minister Po Yi-po claimed that grain production in 1953 is scheduled to reach some 175 million tons, and cotton production about 1,500,000 tons. 5/ All-important transport and communications facilities are to continue to receive special attention, and have been allotted a sixty-five percent increase in funds over 1952.

It is evident from these figures that China starts its industrialization program with a very low level of output for the major industrial raw materials, and that its immediate targets are relatively modest -- though impressive in terms of the narrow starting base. Once again, the overwhelming importance of Manchuria to the Chinese economy should be noted. It is probably based on pre-1949 figures and on announced achievements in Manchurian rehabilitation since that time 6/, that this area in 1952 accounted for some fifty percent of China's total coal production, almost eighty percent of its power capacity, and approximately ninety percent of its iron and steel output. The Northeast also possesses the most highly developed communications and transport network

3/ From official percentage figures cited in Peking Jen Min Jih Pao (People's Daily) editorial, January 1, 1953. Text, as released by New China News Agency, (Peking), January 1, 1953.

4/ Li Fu chun (Minister of Heavy Industry), "Restoration and Development of Industry in China During the Last Three Years." Text released by New China News Agency, (Peking), September 29, 1952.

2/ Report to the Central People's Government Council on the 1953 state budget, February 12, 1953, op. cit. However, official pronouncements later in the year indicated the economy was experiencing difficulties in meeting the targets set forth for the first year of the plan. This was particularly true of agriculture, where it was officially acknowledged that severe drought and other natural calamities in various districts had adversely affected the summer crops, so that "the task on the grain front will still be heavy." (A directive on "strengthening famine relief work" for such stricken areas was issued in June by the Government Administration Council under Chou En-lai's signature.) Similarly, for many types of industrial output and new capital construction, it was officially declared that "maximum efforts would be required during the second half of the year if 1953 targets were to be met." Peking Jen Min Jih Pao (People's Daily) editorial, September 6, 1953.

6/ It was officially claimed that the Northeast in 1952 had exceeded the peak 1943 level of production by ten percent in the case of industrial output and 48.2 percent for agriculture. Kao Kang, "Usher in New Period of Economic Construction." op. cit.

in the country, is rich in natural resources, and has large agricultural surpluses which are vital to Peking's capital investment program. The absolute, if not relative, importance of Manchuria in the national economy is certain to grow as a result of the present five year plan, since first priority under it is being given to expanding heavy industry. "We must first concentrate", the official Peking People's Daily stated in January 1953, "on the development of such heavy industries as the metallurgical industry and the fuel, power, machine building, and chemical industries." 7/

According to Kao Kang, the funds for this industrial development program are to come chiefly from internal "socialist accumulations", that is, by extracting as large a "wealth surplus" as possible from industry and agriculture, and to utilize the greater part of it for reinvestment in further expanding productive facilities. In the case of industry, Kao Kang added, such extra wealth would at first have to be created principally through higher labor productivity and generally lowered costs of production. To use the "greater part" of the surplus capital thus created for reinvestment, he maintained, and only "a part" of it for "raising the material level of workers... fully accord(s) with the long-range interests of the working class." 8/ In other words, China, following the Soviet pattern, intends to increase national production much more rapidly than national consumption, with the growing "surplus" of production over consumption providing the major source of capital funds for further economic expansion.

It is clear that economic planning in China is thus far comparatively limited in scope, being neither fully integrated nor all-inclusive in nature. Such indispensable concomitants of planning as advanced accounting and statistical procedures and techniques are, for example, still at a low level of development within the country. At present, therefore, planning consists essentially of setting annual production targets for the key industries and of allocating materials, capital, and key personnel within such industries in accordance with these targets. The state trading companies are also used to effect an added degree of control over economic life, while the still-important private sector of the economy has been brought within the scope of state planning primarily through the device of government contracts.

The magnitude, in Chinese terms, of Peking's current economic effort was reflected in the announced national budget for the 1953 fiscal year which provides for balanced revenues and expenditures, respectively, of almost ten billion U.S. dollars (calculated in terms of the officially-set exchange rate for the "people's dollar"). 9/ 20.4 percent of the expenditures are earmarked for industry, 22.38 percent for national defense, 14.9 percent for social, cultural and educational work, and 22 percent for agriculture, transport, communications, and other public works and construction projects. The overall budget, both in terms of revenue and expenditure, is over three times the size of the 1950 budget and also represents an increase over the 1952 budget of 23.36 percent in revenue and 43.06 percent in expenditures. Po Yi-po claimed in his report on the 1953 state budget. 10/ He further

7/ Editorial, Peking Jen Min Jih Pao (People's Daily), January 1, 1953. op.cit.

8/ Kao Kang, "Usher in New Period of Economic Construction." op. cit.

9/ Po Yi-po, Report on 1953 state budget, op. cit.; and Henry R. Lieberman, Hong Kong dispatch to the New York Times, February 18, 1953.

10/ Po Yi-po, op. cit.

added that funds to be allocated for "economic construction" in 1953 would be six times the 1950 expenditures in this area. The size of the 1953 budget (which is also many times larger than any of Nationalist China's had been) is also, of course, a reflection of the fact that the state has undertaken many of the economic and cultural activities left in private or local government hands in non-Communist countries. (Almost sixty percent of the total state revenue in 1953, for example, is scheduled to come from profits and taxes of state-owned enterprises and cooperatives.)

Aside from technical assistance China, under present circumstances, must also look to the Soviet Union for most of the capital goods it will have to import for its projected economic development program. Already, in 1952, according to Chou En-lai, 72 percent of China's total foreign trade was being conducted with the Soviet bloc, as compared with only 26 percent in 1950. 11/ In March 1953, after lengthy negotiations probably centered on Chinese requirements under its five year plan, a new trade agreement was signed in Moscow between China and Russia, under which the latter agreed to supply Peking with equipment for its metallurgical, mining, machine, chemical, electrical, transport, and other industries, as well as with agricultural machinery and specialized agricultural supplies. China in turn undertook to supply Moscow with textile goods, certain industrial raw materials, and various agricultural products. There were not details as to prices or quantities involved, or of what percentage, if any, of the trade was to be on a credit basis. At least some extension of the relatively small \$300,000,000 credit advanced to China in 1950 was indicated by the announcement that a new protocol to that credit agreement had also been signed. 12/

The great significance attached by the Soviet Union to the Chinese alliance became particularly evident in what were spoken of as the "difficult days" following Stalin's death early in March 1953. In line with the apparent pattern of the new Soviet regime of giving active administrative responsibility for key departments of the government to top party and government leaders (such as the appointment of Molotov as Foreign Minister, Beria as Internal Affairs Minister, and Bulganin as Defense Minister), Vassili V. Kuznetsov, a Deputy Foreign Minister, a former head of the Soviet trade union movement, and an important figure within the Russian Communist party, was dispatched to Peking to replace the career diplomat incumbent, Alexander S. Panyushkin, as Ambassador to China. This move not only reflected the importance assigned to Sino-Soviet relations by the Russian leaders, but also suggested, in view of Mr. Kuznetsov's background as an engineer and as a highly experienced industrial and labor executive, that questions concerning Chinese economic development now rank high in relations between the two countries.

Both Peking and Moscow also took pains, after Stalin's death, publicly to reaffirm the Sino-Soviet tie. Mao, for example, in an article distributed throughout China, wrote that the Soviet Communist party "has been and is our model and will remain so in the future." 13/ Similarly, the new Soviet government headed by Premier Malenkov, conspicuously singled out China for special mention in talking of Moscow's continuing "solidarity" with the various "people's democracies." Thus in his funeral oration for Stalin, Malenkov declared, "We must in every way consolidate the eternal, indestructible and fraternal friendship of the Soviet Union with the great Chinese

11/ Chou En-lai, Report to fourth session of the First National Committee of the CPPCC, February 4, 1953. op. cit.

12/ Harrison E. Salisbury, Moscow dispatch to the New York Times, March 26, 1953.

13/ Cited by Henry R. Lieberman, Hong Kong dispatch to the New York Times, March 10, 1953.

people and with the workers in all countries of the people's democracy."
14/

While the personal relationship between Mao and the Soviet leaders may present certain problems of redefinition, particularly in view of Mao's ideological stature in the Communist world, the overriding economic, military and political bonds of mutual interest presently binding the two countries together remain basically unchanged. As one analyst noted, both countries are presently "quite aware of how important they are to each other", 15/ and it is this awareness which will very likely continue to be the basic factor in determining relations between the two countries.

In a February 1953 report to the National Committee of the CPCC, Minister of Personnel An Tzu-wen gave additional details on the "three-anti" movement of 1952 carried out among state administrative personnel, and on the "overhauling" or "reorganization" of the Communist party begun in the fall of that year. In the course of the "three-anti" campaign, which was finally concluded in October 1952 after being conducted on all administrative levels down to the hsien, more than 105,000 persons, representing 2.7 percent of the total personnel "taking part" in the movement, were "uncovered" as being guilty of corruption involving substantial sums. This drive, An Tzu-wen claimed, "had basically eliminated the phenomenon of corruption, effectively checked the phenomenon of waste, and seriously hit the tendency toward bureaucraticism in government organs." 16/

He also revealed that the party "reorganization" launched in 1952 had been decided upon at the national party conference on organizational work held in March 1951, and involved "a planned, well prepared and well directed universal reorganization of all the basic organs of the party." As mapped out at the 1951 conference, the process was to begin with the training of key party cadres to conduct the "reorganization", and was then to proceed to "the carrying out of a universal campaign to educate members of the party on how to be a good Communist, (and to) the carrying out of model experiments on reorganization, followed by the universal check up of all members in the basic organs of the party, the elimination of bad elements who had infiltrated into the ranks of the party, and the persuasion of those members who did not possess requisite qualifications for membership and who could not be successfully educated, to withdraw from the party." 17/

By the winter of 1952, it was claimed that 100,000 cadres had been trained, and "experimental" reorganization completed in 12,000 rural party branches. For reasons already indicated 18/, the ideological "purification" of party members in the countryside has been of particular concern to the Communist leaders, and it is the rural party branches which are the primary

14/ From text of funeral oration by Premier Malenkov, in New York Times, March 10, 1953.

15/ Henry R. Lieberman, Hong Kong dispatch to the New York Times, March 8, 1953.

16/ An Tzu-wen, Report to the fourth session of the First National Committee CPCC, February 7, 1953. Peking, New China News Agency, February 9, 1953.

17/ Ibid.

18/ See Chapter IV, section C.

targets of the new "reorganization." With preliminary preparations for this undertaking ended, a "large scale movement" was launched towards the close of 1952 on a "first batch" of 40,000 rural branches. According to An Tzu-wen, in those branches where "reorganization" has been completed, an average of ten percent of the members "failed to qualify." Of this ten percent, some three to five percent were expelled as "bad elements", while from five to seven percent, who were found to be "unqualified" for various reasons, were "persuaded to leave the party." The "bad elements" expelled (and also "appropriately punished" in many cases) included those who "oppressed the masses and violated laws and discipline", "landlord and rich peasant elements", and those who had either sheltered or themselves become "counter-revolutionaries." 19/ With a total of 180,000 rural branches to be "reorganized", the entire process is not scheduled for completion until the spring of 1954 and, should the same reported percentage "fail to qualify" in the remainder of these branches, will result in the removal of some half million members from the party rolls.

The "most serious problem" uncovered in the rural areas, An Tzu-wen reported, was that of "bureaucratism, commandism, and violation of law and discipline" by many cadres, a "work style" which he characteristically blamed on "impurity of ranks and impurity of ideology." The cadres guilty of "commandism" use "harsh and brutal methods" to accomplish assigned tasks, he stated, in placing responsibility for the continued existence of this state of affairs on "bureaucratism" in both lower and higher level party and government organizations. This latter situation, he admits, was not "fully solved" by the three-anti movement.

Mao himself, in a brief speech to the National Committee of the CPCCC at this same time, also listed the drive against "bureaucracy among our leading organs and leading cadres at all levels" as one of the "imperative" tasks presently facing the country. Even on the central government level, he added, "many leading cadres in many departments are still satisfied just to sit in their offices and write decisions and directives. Attention is paid only to preparing and giving out the work, no attention is given to going down among the rank and file to learn the situation and check up on the work. So their leadership constantly results in isolation from the masses and from reality." 20/ Placing the responsibility for the various evils listed above on the "corrosive effects" among administrative personnel of the "old China", Communist leaders admit that the "struggle" against these evils will be a "long-drawn" one, involving incessantly repeated "cleansing" and "remolding", drives (through Communist methods of "criticism and self-criticism") within both party and government ranks.

Indicating that party leaders considered the initial stage of political and organizational consolidation to be largely completed 21/, the Peking regime moved, in 1953, to give itself formal constitutional standing based on a nationwide "popular mandate." At a meeting of the Central People's

19/ Ibid.

20/ Peking, New China News Agency, February 7, 1953.

21/ Thus Mao stated at this Council meeting, "Speaking from an over-all point of view, military operations on the mainland have already ceased, land reform has been basically completed, and the people of the various strata organized." (Peking, New China News Agency, January 14, 1953.)

Government Council in January, 1953, a resolution was adopted calling for "the convening, in 1953 of popularly elected people's congresses at hsien, provincial, and municipal levels, to be followed by the convening of an All-China People's Congress which will draft a Constitution, approve the construction program for the nation's Five Year Plan, and elect a new Central People's Government." 22/ This was declared to be in accordance with "the stipulations laid down in the Common Program." A "Committee to Draft the Constitution of the People's Republic of China" was created, under the chairmanship of Mao Tse-tung and including virtually all leading party and government figures in its membership; and also a "Committee to Draft the Election Laws of the People's Republic of China", headed by Chou En-lai.

It appeared unlikely that these developments would lead to any important substantive changes in government structure or composition. For example, it was announced that the "main contents [of the Common Program] concerning the State's social system, the system of State power and the people's rights and obligations will be incorporated into the Constitution", while the Common Program, "appropriately amended", will remain as the statement of principles of the CPCC. 23/ This latter organ, scheduled to meet in plenary session later this year to amend both the Common Program and its own organic law, will continue to operate in an 'advisory capacity' as an organ of the "people's united front."

The "people's congress" system now to be implemented on a national scale will be essentially a further extension of the 'people's representatives conferences' which have already been organized at all levels up to and including the provinces, and which, noted earlier, have been gradually 'exercising the functions and powers of the people's congresses.' For example, Chou En-lai, in his February 1953 political report, claimed that nineteen provinces, eighty-five cities, 436 counties, and "the greater part" of the country's 280,000 hsiang (the basic rural administrative unit) had "duly elected their people's governments" through such conferences, and that in "most areas, over eighty percent of the total number of delegates to these conferences have been "directly or indirectly elected by the people." 24/ (The procedures used by the Communists in holding such elections have already been discussed in an earlier chapter on local government developments.) The foundation had thus been created for taking the step foreshadowed by Liu Shao-chi in February 1951, when he declared that 'in the near future (the people's representatives conferences) shall be directly transformed into People's Congresses of all levels.' 25/ It can be assumed that the functions of and the relationships among the governments and representatives conferences (with the latter now to be replaced by 'people's

22/ Peking, New China News Agency, January 14, 1953.

23/ From report by Chen Shu-tung, (vice-chairman of the National Committee of the CPCC) to fourth session of the First National Committee of the CPCC, Peking Radio, February 5, 1953.

24/ Chou En-lai, Political report to the fourth session of the First National Committee of the CPCC, February 4, 1953. *op. cit.*

25/ See. p. 88.

congresses") at the various administrative levels will remain virtually unchanged.

On March 1, 1953 the new election law for the people's congresses was proclaimed by Mao Tse-tung. 26/ As in the case of the people's representatives conferences, and in accordance with the Communist principle of "democratic centralism", this law provides that only basic administrative level people's congresses are to be directly elected by the people, with delegates to higher level congresses to be indirectly elected by the appropriate congresses at the next lower administrative level. Thus hsiang level congresses in the countryside, and district level congresses within the municipalities (or entire municipalities in cases where there has been no subdivision into districts) are to be elected "directly by the electors", a category which includes all citizens eighteen and over, except for landlords "whose status has not yet been changed according to law", "counter-revolutionaries" and "others" who "have been deprived of political rights according to law", and mentally deficient persons. Provisions are made for the armed forces and overseas Chinese to hold separate elections under separate regulations.

Hsien (county) people's congresses are to be elected by the hsiang congresses within each hsien respectively, and by congresses of the municipalities under hsien jurisdiction. The armed forces (presumably those stationed in the respective counties) are entitled to elect from one to five delegates to each hsien congress. Delegates to the provincial congresses are, in turn, to be elected by the congresses of the counties within the province, and of the municipalities under provincial jurisdiction. The military forces are allotted three to fifteen delegates to each provincial congress. As for the All-China People's Congress, it is to be elected by the people's congresses of the provinces, of the municipalities directly under the central government (as well as of "industrial municipalities" of over 500,000 population under provincial jurisdiction), of the minority nationality areas administratively under the central government, and by the armed forces and the overseas Chinese.

Communist concern over the predominantly peasant character of the country is evident from the weighted representation given urban centers. In electing provincial congresses, for example, counties with a population under 200,000 are allotted one to three delegates, those of 200,000 to 600,000 population, two to four delegates, and those with over 600,000 population, three to five delegates. On the other hand, "cities and townlets" under a province, and "important industrial and mining districts" within a province are allotted one delegate for every 20,000 people. Similarly, for the All-China People's Congress the number of delegates to be elected from each province is to be on the basis of one delegate per 800,000 population; but the urban areas entitled to elect delegates to this congress are allowed one delegate for every 100,000 people. This eight to one ratio thus ensures the largest municipalities and the important industrial and mining centers of the country (where China's industrial workers are of course concentrated) of being able to hold their own in the All-China People's Congress with the vast countryside which contains perhaps eighty percent of China's population. The minority nationalities are allotted 150 delegates to this congress, the armed forces sixty, and the overseas Chinese thirty. In an official report on the election law, Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-ping estimated that hsien

26/ Text of law released by New China News Agency (Peking), March 2, 1953.

people's congresses would generally have from 100 to 350 delegates, provincial people's congresses from 100 to 500, municipal people's congresses from 50 to 800, and the All-China People's Congress approximately 1,200 delegates. 27/

Election committees at all levels are to be set up, appointed by the governments of their respective levels, which are to supervise all aspects of the elections, including registration of both electors and candidates, and the counting of ballots in cases where direct elections are held. (For the country as a whole, a Central Election Committee, headed by Liu Shao-chi, has been established). Candidates are to be nominated by their "electoral districts or election units", and the elections, at the basic administrative levels, are to be carried out through "election meetings" of the various electoral districts, and are to be conducted either "by a show of hands, or by secret ballot." (The indirect elections to congresses on the hsien level and above, however, are to be by secret ballot only.)

As to the right of nominating candidates, the law stipulates: 28/

The Communist Party of China, various democratic parties, various people's organizations, and electors or representatives who are not affiliated to the above-mentioned parties or organizations may all put forward lists of candidates for election as delegates either jointly or singly on the basis of electoral districts or election units.

However, it can be assumed that, as in the case of electoral procedure currently practiced in the people's representatives conferences, jointly agreed upon single lists of candidates will be presented, particularly in electing delegates to the higher level congresses. Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-ping declared, for example, in discussing this point, that "joint nomination by the Communist Party of China, the various democratic parties and the various people's organizations in fact should be and can be the main form for submitting lists of candidates for election as delegates to the people's congresses at all levels." 29/ Also, as in the past, and as indicated in Teng Hsiao-ping's statement, such candidates will come largely from the mass "people's organizations", with a smaller number directly nominated by the various political parties, including the Communist.

Thus in terms of general background and political composition, the projected All-China People's Congress will closely resemble the present CPCCC (though of course it will not necessarily be composed entirely of the same individuals), while lower level congresses will similarly resemble the people's representatives conferences now functioning throughout the country. This was underscored by Mao Tse-tung's January 1953 statement that, "the system of government by a People's Congress will continue through a United Front of the various nationalities of the entire nation, the various democratic strata, the various democratic parties and

27/ Teng Hsiao-ping, "An Explanation of the Election Law." (Report to 22nd session of the Central People's Government Council, February 11, 1953.) Peking, New China News Agency, February 12, 1953.

28/ Article 47, Election Law of the People's Republic of China. op. cit.

29/ Teng Hsiao-ping, "An Explanation of the Election Law." op. cit.

the various people's organizations." 30/ However, the Communist authorities also declare that direct elections at the basic administrative levels may help overcome the serious problem of "commandism and violation of laws and discipline" among local government personnel, by weeding out "bad elements", and by changing the "obnoxious tendency" of many local government organs and officials "of governing by issuing orders." 31/

It was officially announced, early in April, that elections on the basic administrative levels would be held from May to October, with congresses elected at that time, in turn to elect hsien and municipal people's congresses in November. 32/ Presumably, this will be followed immediately by election of provincial congresses, and then of the All-China People's Congress which, as already noted, is also scheduled to be convened in 1953. It appeared probable, with the reopening of preliminary prisoner-exchange talks at Panmunjom in April, coupled with Premier Chou En-lai's announcement that China was now prepared to compromise on the deadlocked prisoner repatriation issue, that problems of internal economic development and of further political consolidation would occupy major Chinese Communist attention in the period immediately ahead.

30/ Remarks at 20th session of the Central People's Government Council, January 13, 1953. Peking, New China News Agency, January 14, 1953.

31/ Teng Hsiao-ping; "An Explanation of the Election Law." op. cit.

32/ Hong Kong dispatch to the New York Times, April 6, 1953.

CHAPTER VIII

MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN 1954

It has already been noted that, by 1953, the Peking government was actively moving from its initial period of political consolidation and economic rehabilitation to a succeeding stage that was spoken of as a much more lengthy "transitional period" having as its direct objective the creation of an industrialized, socialist society.

The opening phase of the new stage was marked by the introduction of the first Five Year Plan in 1953, and by various measures in the direction of greater administrative centralization and of increased government control over the national economy. It was also marked by more intense efforts at ideological reform, at the expansion of cooperative practices in agriculture, and at the increasing integration of private business enterprise within the centrally planned and controlled national economic system. Together with these developments came the announced plans to hold popular elections for a nationwide hierarchy of people's congresses, and for the adoption of a formal constitution which would define more sharply than hitherto the socialist objectives of the Peking regime and which would also serve to demonstrate the high degree of stability and internal consolidation achieved by the Communist-led government in the course of its first five years of power.

The shift in emphasis from "new democratic" to socialist objectives became formal government policy with the propagation of the so-called "general line of the state" in the latter part of 1953. The new "line" was first officially publicized by the Peking People's Daily in an October 1, 1953 editorial marking the fourth anniversary of the establishment of the People's Republic of China. In an article appearing later in that year, Mao was quoted as defining the basic tasks of this "general line" as the "gradual realization, over a considerably long period of time, of the socialist industrialization of the state, and the gradual realization of the socialist transformation by the state of agriculture, handicrafts, and private industry and commerce." 1/

The official tenet now was that the "basic victory" of the "new democratic revolution" had been won, and that China had now entered a period of transition which would be marked by the growing strength of the socialist sector of the economy, and by the "steady transformation" of the non-socialist sectors, with the eventual merging of the two tendencies and the achievement of full socialism. This period of transition would be "considerably long", it was explained, because of China's industrial backwardness and the continued dominance of the "small producer" economy in agriculture; also, "the bourgeois class was still a part of the people's democratic dictatorship, and a policy of utilization, restriction and reform must be applied against them to enable them to be gradually transformed through the road of state capitalism in transition to socialism." 2/

The administrative and constitutional developments of 1953 and 1954 were thus designed to bring government policy and structure into close correlation

1/ Yu Kan-chih, "Explaining the General Line of the State During the Period of Transition." Peking Shih Shih Shou Ts'e (Current Events), December 10 1953. (English text in Current Background. Hongkong: American Consulate General, May 5, 1954.

2/ Ibid.

with the new "general line." From the moment of its establishment, of course, the Peking government had clearly proclaimed the objectives of this line as among its ultimate goals. These goals had been spelled out most fortuitously in Mao's 1949 essay, On People's Democratic Dictatorship; and the quasi-constitutional Common Program of the CPCCC, adopted in 1949, spoke of the state-owned sector of the national economy as being "of a socialist nature", and as the basic foundation for developing the Chinese economy. The basic principles of the Common Program, it was emphasized in discussions preceding the adoption of the new constitution, would be incorporated into the latter document. The constitution, however, would be more specific and clearcut in its policy declarations, and would reflect the fact that what had been long-range objectives in 1949 were now the goals of current state policy.

As previously noted, a "Committee for Drafting the Constitution of the People's Republic of China", headed by Mao Tse-tung, had been set up early in 1953, at which time preparations had also begun for implementing the people's congress system throughout the country. 3/ These congresses were to culminate in an All-China (now usually referred to as a National) People's Congress, to be convened before the end of 1953, at which time the draft constitution would be submitted to this Congress for adoption.

However, in September 1953 the Central People's Government Council postponed the date for completion of "basic-level" elections 4/ generally until January 1954, and to March for those provinces and municipalities "experiencing difficulties" in carrying them out. Such elections were subsequently completed in the early months of 1954, and congresses on these levels held. The hsiang (the lowest level rural administrative unit) and township congresses in turn elected delegates to the hsien (county) congresses, which were convened in June. Vice-premier Teng Hsiao-ping reported at that time that "basic-level" elections had been completed in 214,798 electoral units whose registered voters totaled 323,809,684. He stated that 85.88 percent of the male voters and 84.01 percent of the female voters had participated in these elections. 5/

This election campaign and the process of registering voters was utilized to carry out the first nationwide census in recent Chinese history. Teng Hsiao-ping announced, in the course of his June election report, that "preliminary statistical data" showed the population of mainland China to be 582,584,000 -- a total far above all previous estimates. 6/

The hsien congresses and the congresses of municipalities under provincial jurisdiction elected delegates to the provincial people's congresses, while the fourteen large cities directly under the central government's jurisdiction,

3/ These were carried out in accordance with the Election Law of the People's Republic of China", adopted in March 1953. See pp. 131-133.

4/ "Basic-level" refers to the fundamental administrative divisions of the country, the only levels on which the congresses are elected directly by the people: the hsiang; the towns under hsien jurisdiction; the smaller municipalities not subdivided into districts; and the municipal districts of the larger cities. For a fuller description of the hierarchy of people's congresses, see pp. 131-133.

5/ Peking, New China News Agency, June 19, 1954.

6/ Ibid.

held municipal district (ch'u) congresses which in turn elected delegates to city-wide municipal people's congresses. Congresses on these various levels were held during July and August. According to an August report of the Central Election Committee, a total of 16,807 deputies to provincial and municipal congresses were elected. Many of them, this report continued, "are Communist party members, (and) model workers and peasants, while the various nationalities and democratic parties are well represented." 7/ These provincial and municipal congresses were now in turn ready to elect delegates to the first National People's Congress.

Delegates at all levels were generally elected from jointly-sponsored lists of candidates, drawn up by the Communist party, the various "democratic parties", and the mass organizations, in accordance with procedures already discussed. These congresses, it should be recalled, were largely based on the "people's representatives conferences" already in existence on all levels from the provinces on down to the hsiang. These had been gradually transformed from appointed to elected bodies and had been assuming the functions and powers of people's congresses. The electoral developments of the first half of 1954 brought this process to completion and led the way for the final step, the replacement of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, organized in 1949, by the National (or All-China) People's Congress.

In August, the Central People's Government Council decided to convene the first National People's Congress on September 15, 1954, apparently planning to have the latter body complete its work by the fifth anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China on October 1.

Before discussing the National People's Congress, certain further changes in administrative structure carried out in 1954 are important to note. It will be recalled that the Peking government had initially divided the country into six administrative regions, each with its own governmental apparatus patterned after the central government. In late 1952, however, in line with the trend towards increased centralization called for by national planning, these regional structures had been transformed into administrative committees which were to be little more than regional agents of the central government. 8/ The process of centralization was carried a step further in June 1954 with the abolition of these administrative committees entirely, so that no intervening governmental body remained between the central government and the provinces. In announcing this decision, the Central People's Government Council gave the following explanation: 2/

Today the country has entered the stage of planned economic construction. The planned economic construction of the state demands the further strengthening of the concentrated and unified leadership of the central government. In order that the central government may directly assume leadership of the provinces and municipalities so that there may be a more concrete understanding of conditions in the lower ranks, a reduction in the different levels of the administrative structure, an increase of work efficiency, and the overcoming of bureaucracy; in order that the employment of cadres may be economized to increase their supply to the factories, mines and other enterprises, and appropriately to strengthen the leadership of the provinces and

7/ Ibid., August 5, 1954.

8/ See pp. 84-85.

2/ From English text of the decision, as given by New China News Agency (Peking), June 19, 1954.

municipalities, the abolition of the first grade administrative machineries in the administrative regions is fully necessary and timely.

The liquidation of the regional organizations of the Communist party and the mass organizations, throughout the country was also apparently begun in line with this measure.

At the same time, the trend already noted 10/ towards eliminating the provinces which the Kuomintang regime had created out of sections of Inner Mongolia was carried further. Chahar province had been abolished in 1952, and now Ninghsia became part of Kansu province, while the absorption of Suiyuan into the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region (which had been carried out early in 1944) was formally ratified by the Central People's Government Council. Concurrently, the number of provinces into which the Northeast (Manchuria) had been divided was reduced from six to four. Thus there were in mid-1954 only twenty-five provinces in mainland China (the Communists count Taiwan as a twenty-sixth), as compared with thirty-five under the Kuomintang.

The same June decree also took eleven of the now fourteen special municipalities directly under the Central People's Government and returned them to the jurisdiction of the provinces in which they are located, leaving only the three largest municipalities of Peking, Tientsin and Shanghai under the direct control of the central government. These measures reducing the number of provinces and returning most of the municipalities to provincial rule were adopted, it was officially explained, to reduce somewhat the number of administrative units under the central government (particularly since all the provinces were now directly under its jurisdiction), thus "facilitating (the government's) leadership of the provinces and municipalities." 11/

On September 3, 1954 the Central Election Committee issued an official summary of results of elections to the National People's Congress, as well as a ramelist of the deputies elected. 12/ Of the total of 1,226 deputies, 1,136 represented the twenty-five provinces, Inner Mongolia, Tibet, the Changtu Territory (an autonomous Inner Tibetan region now a part of Sikang province), and the fourteen municipalities under the central government (the decree shifting most of these cities to provincial jurisdiction did not take effect until after the elections.) Sixty delegates were elected by servicemen's congresses within the armed forces, thirty represented the overseas Chinese, and 150 the minority nationalities organized in autonomous groupings throughout the country. Deputies for the overseas Chinese were named at an "enlarged conference" on overseas Chinese affairs, called by the Commission on Overseas Chinese Affairs (an official organ of the Peking government), and participated in by "representatives of the overseas Chinese." 13/ No deputies were selected to represent Taiwan (Formosa) which, the election report

10/ See pp. 96-97.

11/ Peking, New China News Agency, June 19, 1954.

12/ Peking, New China News Agency, September 3, 1954.

13/ Ibid.

added, "is yet to be liberated." - 14/

It will be recalled that the election law had been weighted in favor of urban areas, stipulating that, aside from the quota of 240 deputies set apart for the armed forces, the national minorities and the overseas Chinese, representation at the national congress was to be in the ratio of one deputy for 800,000 people, with the exception of the fourteen special municipalities and ten additional "industrial centers" of over 500,000 population, where the ratio was to be one deputy for only 100,000 people.

Thus the approximately thirty million people in these twenty-four cities were represented by some three hundred deputies, while the 550 millions in the remainder of the country were represented by 830 deputies (including the 150 national minorities' delegates). In the case of the ten "industrial centers", however, their quota of delegates was elected through their respective provincial congresses -- only the special municipalities elected deputies to the national congress directly through their municipal people's congresses. It should be recalled that representation to provincial congresses is themselves weighted in favor of urban centers and industrial and mining districts within the provinces: 15/

While deputies to the National People's Congress were elected on a regional basis, while the CPPCC of 1949 was selected on the basis of organizational representation, the results have been essentially the same in both cases. Among the deputies to the new congress are virtually all the leaders of the Communist party, the other parties and groups making up Peking's "united front", a great number of leading personages from the various mass organizations, plus "model workers and peasants", eminent scientists, writers, educators, and some religious leaders. The practice followed in the case of leading personalities was to have them "stand" for election from either their current "place of work", or their place of origin. Thus Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi and Chou En-lai were elected from Peking, while Chu Teh was elected from Szechuan province, his place of origin. The other Communist military leaders, such as Generals Peng Teh-huai, Lin Biao, and Liu Po-cheng, were elected as representatives of the armed forces.

Communist party members seem to make up about one-third of the total of the first National People's Congress, a traditional proportion to which the Communist leadership has usually restricted itself in such popular bodies. The new congress is approximately double the size of the old CPPCC, and about ninety percent of the members of the latter body reappear as delegates to the congress. The Peking government therefore continues to stress its "united front" aspects and the appearance of broad representation in its popular organs.

It has been pointed out earlier that elections on the lower levels were generally for jointly-sponsored, single lists of candidates drawn up as a result of "consultations" among the various parties and organizations at those levels. Similarly, such lists of candidates for the national congress were drawn up by the Standing Committee of the CPPCC -- (itself considered the organized expression of the "united front"), also on the basis of prior consultation and

14/ Ibid.

15/ See p. 132.

ment between the Communist party and the other parties and mass organizations represented in the Peking government. These jointly-sponsored lists of nominees for the National People's Congress were then presented to the provincial and municipal congresses for formal election.

The first session of the National People's Congress opened in Peking on September 15, 1954, with Mao Tse-tung presiding. The Congress closed on September 28, after unanimously adopting the new constitution, as well as organic laws of the National People's Congress, the State Council, the People's Courts, the People's Procuratorate and the local people's congresses and people's councils of all levels. The Congress also approved Chou En-lai's lengthy report on the work of the government, and elected the leading persons of the government (including its own Standing Committee), in accordance with the provisions of the constitution.

Liu Shao-chi, in his report to the Congress on the draft constitution, gave some of the background leading up to the presentation of the document to the Congress for approval. The original draft, he reported, had been submitted to the Committee for the Drafting of the Constitution by the Central Committee of the Communist party in March 1954. "Serious discussions" of this draft, had then been undertaken by some eight thousand representatives of the various parties and mass organizations in the principal cities of the nation. Finally, in June, the Central People's Government Council published the official draft version of the constitution, containing such revisions of the original text as had emerged from these discussions. This published version was then made the basis for public discussions throughout China in which, Liu claimed, more than 150 million people took part! This led to further suggestions for revisions some of which were adopted by the Committee for the Drafting of the Constitution, and in turn approved by the Central People's Government Council in September. This was the document submitted to the National People's Congress for adoption.

Here is the classic pattern characterizing the Peking government's method. While the key policy decision is made by the Communist leadership, "united front" approval and backing is obtained for the policy, and every effort is made to develop the feeling of popular participation in the decision on the broadest possible mass basis. In the case of the constitution, such revisions in the text as resulted from these discussions were apparently largely minor matters of detail. 17/

The Communist leaders have always portrayed their revolutionary movement as the logical culmination of the process of change taking place in China over the past hundred years. In similar vein, the new constitution is declared to be the outgrowth of China's struggle for constitutionalism during the past fifty years, from the belated efforts in the last years of the Ch'ing (Manchu) dynasty, down through the various constitutional projects of the warlord and Kuomintang periods. Liu Shao-chi, summarizing the history of these earlier attempts, which he labelled "bourgeois" and "bogus" in nature, spoke of the

16/ Liu Shao-chi, "Report on the Draft Constitution of the People's Republic of China." Delivered on September 15, 1954. English text issued by New China News Agency (Peking), September 15, 1954.

17/ These revisions are discussed by Liu Shao-chi in his report to the National People's Congress, ibid.

present document as the "epitome of the historical experience of Chinese constitutionalism in modern times." 18/

The constitution 19/ is composed of a preamble and four chapters: general principles, the state structure, fundamental rights and duties of citizens, and the national flag, state emblem, and capital. The preamble is basically an affirmation of the current "general line of the state", i.e., that China is now in a period of transition during which the "central task" of the state is the "step by step" achievement of socialism. The preamble also declares for the continuation of the "democratic united front", led by the Communist party, and calls for the development of diplomatic relations with all countries on the basis of certain stated principles, while specifically reaffirming the "indestructible friendship" of China with the Soviet Union and the "people's democracies."

In the chapter on general principles, the People's Republic of China is defined as "a people's democratic state led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants." Supreme power is officially vested in the people's congresses at all levels, with all state organs to practise "democratic centralism." 20/ All nationalities are guaranteed equality, and political autonomy in areas where a national minority lives 'in numbers.' All such areas of regional autonomy, however, are declared to be "inseparable parts of the People's Republic of China", which is a "unified, multi-national state."

The state "shall ensure the step-by-step abolition of systems of exploitation and the building of the Socialist society"; the key element in achieving this transformation is to the state-owned socialist sector of the economy which is ensured priority in its development. At present, however, three other categories of economic ownership also exist: cooperative ownership, ownership by individual working people, and capitalist ownership.

While the state protects the right of the peasants to own land and other means of production, the latter are to be "guided and helped" to establish cooperatives "on a voluntary basis". An important shift from earlier policy is the declaration that "State policy towards the rich peasant economy is one of restriction and gradual elimination."

As for the capitalists, "the State protects the ownership of means of production and other capital by capitalists according to law." This particular article goes into some detail on current policy trends of capitalist economy and on its future transformation:

18/ Ibid.

19/ This analysis of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China is based on the English text of the Draft Constitution, issued by the New China News Agency (Peking), June 15, 1954, supplemented by the amendments and changes contained in the final text, as given by the Peking Radio (Chinese Home Service), September 20, 1954.

20/ For a discussion of the principles of democratic centralism, see p. 28.

The policy of the State towards capitalist industry and commerce is: use, restrict and transform. Through control by state administrative organs, leadership by the state-owned economy and supervision by the workers, the State uses the positive qualities of capitalist industry and commerce which are beneficial to the national welfare and the people's livelihood; restricts the negative qualities of capitalist industry and commerce which are not beneficial to the national welfare and the people's livelihood; encourages and guides the transformation of capitalist industry and commerce into various forms of state capitalist economy, step by step replacing ownership by capitalists with ownership by the whole people. 21/

Meanwhile, the state also forbids capitalists "to endanger public interests, disturb the social economy or undermine the national economic plan by any kind of illegal activity."

In discussing this matter of the elimination of the private capitalist, Liu Shao-chi declared it to be "inconceivable that there should be no complicated struggle as we pass from the process of restricting capitalist exploitation to that of eliminating it." However, he continued, this could be "peaceful struggle" (in contrast to the 1950-52 elimination of the "feudal landlord class" during the land reform), and the capitalist, "provided he realizes the march of events, provided he is willing to accept socialist reform, and provided he does not act against the law or wreck the property of the people, can enjoy the concern of the State and will have proper arrangements made for his life and work in the future; nor will he be deprived of political rights." 22/

The right of citizens to inherit private property is affirmed, as well as their ownership of lawful incomes, sayings, homes, and "means of life." The state, however, may "in the public interest, buy, requisition or nationalize land and other means of production in both cities and countryside according to the provisions of the law."

The National People's Congress is defined as the highest organ of state power, and the sole organ exercising the legislative power of the state. It is elected for a term of four years and is normally scheduled to meet once a year, convened by its Standing Committee. Among the specific functions and powers assigned to the National People's Congress are amending the constitution (by a two-thirds vote), enacting laws (by a simple majority vote), and electing (and removing from office) of leading state personnel. It also decides on the question of war and peace, and on the national economic plan, and it approves the state budget. It may exercise "all other functions and powers" which the Congress itself deems necessary. Deputies to the National People's Congress may be recalled by the electoral units which elected them.

The Standing Committee is the permanent body of the National People's Congress. It conducts elections to and convenes the National People's Congress; it interprets laws, enacts decrees, supervises the work of the State Council,

21/ Chapter I, Article 10, Constitution of the People's Republic of China.

22/ Liu Shao-chi, "Report on the Draft Constitution of the People's Republic of China." op. cit.

the Supreme People's Court, and the Procurator-General's Office. It may annul decisions and orders of the State Council and of State organs on lower levels where these contravene the constitution, laws or decrees; it has important powers of appointment and dismissal of government personnel when the National People's Congress is not in session; it decides on appointment and recall of envoys to foreign states; it decides on ratification or abrogation of treaties, martial law, mobilization, and the proclamation of a state of war in the event of attack or in fulfillment of treaty obligations if the National People's Congress is not in session. The Standing Committee remains in being until a new one is elected by the succeeding Congress.

The Chairman of the People's Republic of China is elected by the National People's Congress for a term of four years. In accordance with decisions of the National People's Congress or its Standing Committee, he promulgates laws, and decrees, appoints or removes members of the State Council and the National Defense Council, proclaims amnesties, pardons, and martial law, appoints and recalls envoys to foreign states, orders mobilization, and proclaims a state of war. He represents the state in foreign relations, commands the armed forces, and presides over the National Defense Council. He may convene a "Supreme State Conference" consisting of the Vice-Chairman of the People's Republic of China, the chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, the Premier of the State Council and others concerned. He then presents the views of this conference on important state matters to the appropriate government organ for discussion and decision. A Vice-Chairman assists the Chairman, and succeeds to the latter post should the Chairman become incapacitated or die.

The State Council is defined as an executive body which is "the highest administrative organ of the State." It is composed of a Premier, who directs its work, vice-premiers, ministers, chairmen of commissions, and a secretary-general. It coordinates and supervises the work of the various ministries and commissions, and of local people's councils on all levels throughout the country. It formulates administrative measures, and proclaims decisions and orders, and verifies their execution, in accordance with the constitution, laws, and decrees. It submits proposals to the National People's Congress or its Standing Committee, and is in general responsible for implementing the various plans and policies of the state.

The constitution also defines the functions, areas of responsibility, and electoral procedures for the people's congresses and people's councils of all levels. The people's congresses are the "local organs of state power", while the people's councils, elected by the corresponding level congress, are defined as both the executive organ of the people's congresses and the local administrative organ of the state. As elsewhere, "democratic centralism" is the basic administrative principle governing the hierarchy of congresses and councils: higher level congresses and councils may revise or annul "unsuitable decisions" of next lower congresses and councils respectively, while the "local people's councils at every level throughout the country are state administrative organs under the unified leadership of, and subordinate to, the State Council." Members of local governments (i.e., the people's councils) may be recalled by the people's congress which elected them.

Autonomous area governments are part of the local government structure and are organized in accordance with the principles discussed above. Such autonomous governments may be set up on three administrative levels; the region directly under the central government (such as Inner Mongol

mous chou (an administrative subdivision between the province and the county), and autonomous counties (hsien). The county is thus the lowest level on which an autonomous nationality area may be set up, though of course such counties are themselves subdivided into hsiang and towns in the same manner as other counties. 23/ These constitutional provisions on autonomy appear to be somewhat less sweeping than the 1952 "General Program for the Enforcement of Regional Autonomy." 24/

The people's courts and people's procurator's offices are set up in a hierarchy corresponding to the administrative structure, culminating in the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate. Centralism prevails here, too, with the lower level bodies subordinate to those of the next higher level, and the Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's Procuratorate supervising the work of all lower courts and procuratorates respectively. While the courts are declared to be "independent in the exercise of their judicial authority and subject only to the law", they are responsible at each level to the corresponding level people's congress (with the Supreme People's Court responsible to the National People's Congress or its Standing Committee), with the presidents of the people's courts elected by their respective level people's congresses for terms of four years.

The situation is somewhat different for the procurator's office. While local organs of the procuratorate at every level are subordinate to those of higher levels and all are subordinate to the Supreme People's Procuratorate, the constitution also declares that "local organs of the People's Procuratorate are independent and are not subject to interference by local organs of state." The Supreme People's Procuratorate, however, is responsible to the National People's Congress or its Standing Committee, and it exercises "supervisory power" over all departments of the State Council and all local state organs, government personnel and citizens, "to ensure observance of the law." The office corresponds in some degree, to the long-standing Chinese concept of a censorate.

The constitution includes a section guaranteeing all the personal freedoms usually associated with a "bill of rights", plus such economic rights as the right to work, rest, and social security. There will be "special attention" given to the physical and mental development of the youth; women are guaranteed full equality, while "the state protects marriage, the family, the mother and child." The country will protect "the proper rights and interests of Chinese resident abroad", and will grant the right of asylum to "persecuted foreign nationals."

While the "bill of rights" provisions are themselves free of any qualifying phrases, the previous section on general principles declares that: 25/

23/ Liu Shao-chi stated that a "nationality hsiang" could be set up where national minorities exist in an area the size of a hsiang (the lowest rural administrative subdivision). However, such a unit could not exercise the right of political autonomy. Liu Shao-chi, "Report on the Draft Constitution of the People's Republic of China." op. cit.

24/ See pp. 95-96.

25/ Chapter I, Article 19, Constitution of the People's Republic of China:

The People's Republic of China safeguards the people's democratic system, protects the security and rights of its citizens, suppresses all kinds of treasonable and counter-revolutionary activities and punishes all traitors and counter-revolutionaries.

The State, in accordance with the law, deprives feudal landlords and bureaucratic capitalists of political rights for a specified period, at the same time it provides them with a way to live, in order to enable them to reform themselves by work into citizens who earn their livelihood by their own labor.

Political rights could thus also be denied to those accused of engaging in 'treasonable and counter-revolutionary activities'. Liu Shao-chi bluntly declared on this point that "anyone who expects our constitution to ensure freedom for the activities of traitors and counter-revolutionaries is bound to be disappointed." 26/

The constitution also lists the duties of citizens, such as abiding by the law, preserving "labor discipline and public order, safeguarding public property, paying taxes, and performing military duty, as required by law."

Comparatively few significant changes in the structure of the Peking government result from the new constitution, which in many cases formally registers the structural changes and developments of the past five years. This is particularly true of local government, the autonomous areas, and the judicial structure. As for the organs of central government, the new State Council is similar in functions and powers to the Government Administration Council it replaces. Its organization and composition are somewhat different, however. Whereas not all heads of ministries and commissions were members of the Government Administration Council, they are members of the State Council. There are now thirty-five such ministries and commissions. The system of committees under which ministries operating in related fields had been grouped (such as the Financial and Economic Affairs Committee) has apparently been eliminated, though one of these committees, that on People's Control, or Supervision, has been replaced by a Ministry of Supervision. Other newly-created ministries are those of Defense, and Local Industry. A National Construction Commission has also been organized, and it and the State Planning Commission are now among the ministries and commissions directly under the State Council. On the other hand, the Ministry of Personnel, the People's Bank, the Publications Administration, and the Academy of Sciences, all of which had ministerial rank under the Government Administration Council, appear to have lost their cabinet rank.

Noteworthy changes in military administration seem to have taken place. Formerly, control of all military affairs had resided in the People's Revolutionary Military Council, which had been equal in status to the Government Administration Council and subordinate only to the Central People's Government Council. Now, for the first time, a Ministry of Defense has been added to the 'cabinet' (the State Council) with the same status as all other ministries of the government. At the same time, however, the People's Revolutionary Military Council has not been abolished, but has been instead transformed into a National Defense Council. While the constitution has very little to say about the organization and powers of this body, it stipulates that the chairman of the People's Republic of China is to be its chairman, while the vice-chairmen

26/ Liu Shao-chi, "Report on the Draft Constitution of the People's of China." op. cit.

and members of the Council are to be decided upon by the National People's Congress on the nomination of the chairman of the People's Republic of China

The National Defense Council may actually be more of a military policy planning board, while direct administrative responsibility over the armed forces rests with the Ministry of Defense. The National Defense Council, however, has a curiously large membership (ninety-seven) for a body of such nature, and it is not possible as yet accurately to assess its powers or functions. It appears likely that the general staff organization of the "People's Liberation Army" will come under this Council.

It is probably safe to say that the military elements in the Peking government are less prominent today than they were in earlier years. The establishment of elected organs of government on all levels and the abolition of the regional administrations, which were virtually all under military leadership, has de-emphasized their influence in civil government. The creation of the Ministry of Defense must be viewed as another step in this direction. The integrated nature of Communist political-military leadership developed during the many years of civil war means that Communist military leaders continue to play key roles in government. Thus, General Peng Teh-huai is the Minister of Defense and one of the vice-premiers of the Peking government, while three other leading generals, Lin Piao, Ho Lung, and Chen Yi, are also vice-premiers of the government. 27/ Also, Chu Teh is the Vice-chairman of the People's Republic of China, second only in formal status to Mao Tse-tung

An important change is the abolition of the Central People's Government Council, which has been replaced by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, and also by the "Supreme State Conference", which is to meet on the initiative of and under the direction of the chairman of the People's Republic of China. This latter figure is clearly the most important individual in the government. He is not only the official head of state, but has broad and significant powers of his own, not unlike those of so powerful an executive as the President of the United States. In the last analysis, however, it will be the national prestige and position within Communist party councils of the person filling the post that will determine its importance. With Mao as chairman, it is the key position in the government; but should the present vice-chairman, Chu Teh, succeed Mao in the course of the next four years, the office would very likely decline in power.

Actually, the main responsibilities of government leadership seem to rest not only on the chairman of the central government, but also on the chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and, to a lesser extent, on the Premier of the State Council. It is perhaps significant that Liu Shao-chi declared, in the course of his constitutional report to the National People's Congress in September, that "ours is a collective head of state" whose functions and powers are jointly exercised by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, ...and the chairman of the People's Republic of China." 28/ It may be added that this concept of "the collective

27/ The composition of the new State Council was given by the New China News Agency (Peking), September 28, 1954.

28/ Liu Shao-chi, "Report on the Draft Constitution of the People's Republic of China." op. cit.

leadership of the state" is now being widely propagated in China.

Finally, it is again worth noting that a major difference between the new constitution and the Common Program of 1949 is the shift in political emphasis. The Common Program had declared China to be a "New Democracy" whose goals were "anti-imperialism, anti-feudalism, and anti-bureaucratic capitalism"; the constitution, while based on the 1949 document, declares itself to be "an advance on it", reflecting the fact that the fundamental goals outlined above have been basically achieved and that the country is now headed for socialism. The new document, the Peking People's Daily editorialized, "signals the beginning of a new stage in the Chinese people's revolution and work of national construction, and defines the historic path of the transition of this country from new democracy to socialism." 29/

The new structure of the Peking government, with its now fully-implemented people's congress system, resembles in broad outline the Soviet state structure more closely than ever. The National People's Congress is similar to the Supreme Soviet, the Standing Committee of the former body corresponds to the Presidium of the latter; and the State Council is equivalent to the Council of Ministers in the Soviet government. In China, however, formal and actual leadership of the state is primarily in the hands of the chairman of the People's Republic of China, a position that has no real equivalent in the Soviet system. In the Soviet Union, governmental leadership apparently rests with the chairman, or Premier, of the Council of Ministers (Malenkov), while the chairman of the Soviet Presidium (Voroshilov) is the formal, though largely honorary, head of state. The Chinese premier (Chou En-lai), though wielding great executive power, does not have the leadership position of the Soviet premier.

The chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (Liu Shao-chi), on the other hand, has much more actual power than his Soviet counterpart, even though the latter is formally the head of the Soviet state.

The Chinese system may reflect the characteristic Chinese pattern of a government leader somewhat aloof from and superior to those directly responsible for state administration. The informally-constituted Supreme State Council which has no counterpart in the Soviet system, also seems to have a background in traditional governmental practices, such as the select inner council (the Grand Council, or Council of State) created under the Ch'ing dynasty to decide on key state matters.

The leading government personnel elected by the National People's Congress before its adjournment on September 28, brought comparatively little change in the upper ranks of government. As noted, Mao Tse-tung was elected the chairman of the People's Republic of China, and Chu Teh, the veteran military leader, vice-chairman. Liu Shao-chi was elected to the important post of chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. Thirteen vice-chairmen, only five of them Communists, and sixty-five members were also named to this body which resembles the former Central People's Government Council in the character of its membership. Like the latter body, the new Standing Committee has a coalition composition, and among its vice-chairmen are the three non-Communists who had been among the six vice-chairmen of the Central People's Government Council: Soong Ching-ling (Madame Sun Yat Sen), Li Chi-shen, and Chang Lan. Also among the vice-chairmen are the Sinkiang representative

29/ Peking Jen Min Jih Pao (People's Daily), September 29, 1

Saifudin, and the Dalaï Lama of Tibet. Peng Chen, the Communist mayor of Peking, is secretary-general, as well as one of the vice-chairmen, of the Standing Committee. Of the Committee's seventy-nine member total, forty are Communists, a majority of exactly one.

Tung Pi-wu, the Communist "elder statesman", was elected President of the Supreme People's Court, replacing the non-Communist Shen Chun-ju, who is now one of the vice-chairmen of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. Chang Ting-cheng, a Communist central committee member replaced his fellow central committee member, Lo Jung-huan, as Chief Procurator. The latter is now also a vice-chairman of the Standing Committee.

Chou En-lai was named premier of the State Council (as well as foreign minister), the same posts he held in the Government Administration Council. Ten vice-premiers were named (double the former number), all members of the Communist party's central committee. While in the majority of cases the heads of ministries and commissions remained as before, there were a few important changes. Most noteworthy were the replacement of Kao Kang as head of the State Planning Commission by Li Fu-chun, who had also been one of the Communist party's active leaders in planning work; and the replacement of Li Li-san as Minister of Labor by Ma Wen-jui. The case of Kao Kang will be discussed below. Li Li-san, a former leader of the Chinese Communist party who had made a "comeback" in 1945, apparently now has no important government post and was not elected a member of the National People's Congress. So far as is known, however, he is still a member of the Communist party central committee.

Peng Teh-huai became the new Minister of Defense, while Po Yi-po, who had lost his post as Minister of Finance in 1953, has been given the leadership of the new National Construction Commission. Of the thirty-five ministries and commissions, twenty-one are headed by Communists.

As for the new National Defense Council, of its ninety-six members under chairman Mao, sixty-five are Communist military leaders, with the remainder made up principally of former Kuomintang generals. Of the fifteen vice-chairmen, eleven are Communists, the others being Fu Tso-yi, Cheng Chien, Lung Yun, and Chang Chih-chung, all of whom held high rank under the Kuomintang. A sign that the National Defense Council is meant to be somewhat more technically military in organization than was the People's Revolutionary Military Council is the fact that such non-military leaders of the Communist party as Liu Shao-chi and Chou En-lai, both of whom were vice-chairmen of the latter council, are not included among the membership of the new body.

In all three leading state organs, the State Council, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, and the National Defense Council, the Communist Party holds a majority. However, the striking stability of central government personnel over the past five years must be noted, particularly since these years can be considered to have been the government's "shakedown period", and have also been characterized by dramatic developments and important shifts of policy.

The one former party and government leader whose name is now completely missing from the list of party and government heads is Kao Kang, the Manchurian regional leader who had been head of the State Planning Commission, a vice-chairman of the central government, and a member of the political bureau of the Chinese Communist party. He has not been mentioned since the beginning

of 1954, and has apparently been out of favor since that time. There has, however, been no public mention of his being in disgrace, nor of reasons for his being dropped from his official posts.

A possible key to this puzzle is to be found in the report of the fourth plenary session of the central committee of the Chinese Communist party, held in February 1954. This was the first such meeting held since the third plenary session in June 1950. A lengthy communique, published on February 18, disclosed that the major report to the session had been delivered by Liu Shao-chi, "on behalf of the Political Bureau (of the Communist party) and Comrade Mao Tse-tung." 30/ Mao himself, according to this communique, was "on holiday" and did not attend.

The main concern of the session was party unity; 'imperialist encirclement' and the continuing "class struggle" within China, Liu warned, created dangers to this unity. Thus, "imperialists and counter-revolutionaries" will search for agents within the party and, ominously citing the recent example of Beria in Russia, as well as the earlier cases of Chen Tu-hsiu (1927) and Chang-Kuo-tao (1938) within the Chinese party, he declared that "the enemy not only will always seek agents within our Party but in the past has found them, and it may be in the future, too, he will find vacillating and disloyal elements and those who join the party with ulterior motives for acting as his agents." Liu further warned that any "sectarian activities" or divisions within the party could only be looked upon as serving such "enemy purposes."

In summarizing the resolution adopted at the session, the communique comes closest to getting down to cases: 31/

...among some of our cadres, even certain high-ranking cadres within our party, there is still a lack of understanding of the importance of party unity, of the importance of collective leadership, of the importance of consolidating and enhancing the prestige of the Central Committee. (some cadres) lose their heads over certain achievements they have made in their work, forgetting the modest attitude and spirit of self-criticism which should animate a Communist Party member. They listen only to other's flattery and praise but cannot accept other's criticism and supervision; they suppress and revenge themselves against those who criticize them. They even regard the region or the department under their leadership as their individual inheritance or independent kingdom.

This passage would seem to be aimed particularly at Kao Kang. That concern existed over divisive developments at such high levels within the party was further evident by the communique's declaration that the injunction to work to strengthen party unity was directed most of all at "responsible comrades" of the central committee and regional committees of the party, and at the "high-ranking, responsible comrades of the armed forces," all of whom were urged "to set an example" for the rest of the party to follow.

The tone of the communique, however, was largely "preventive" in nature. While it spoke of the necessity of waging an "unrelenting struggle" against those "who deliberately undermine party unity" and of taking drastic action

30/ Text of communique, as published in the Peking Jen Min Jih Pao (Daily), February 18, 1950, given by New China News Agency (February 18, 1954).

31/ Ibid.

against those "refusing to correct their errors", it stressed that those "willing to mend their ways" should be helped to do so. The guiding principle, the communique declared, must be, "starting from unity, to attain unity through criticism and struggle," citing a Maoist injunction to "cure the sickness and save the patient."

The plenary session also called for the convening of a party conference sometime during 1954, with perhaps sharper and more dramatic action to be taken then if difficulties persist. It is probable that the Chinese Communist leadership is anxious to avoid any public split within its ranks, and has been deliberately vague in its pronouncements thus far to allow those now under attack still to redeem themselves. Thus even Kao Kang, though he has lost all his important positions, has not yet been publicly denounced, and may even return in some less important capacity, as was true of many of those criticized in the cheng feng movement of the early 1940's.

A striking illustration of this aspect of Chinese Communist policy is that in order to cite "horrible examples" of "enemies" in high party ranks in the past, Liu Shao-chi had to go all the way back to Chang Kuo-tao, who broke with the party in 1938, and Chen Tu-hsiu, a founder and first head of the Chinese Communist party who fell into disgrace following the breakup of the original Communist-Kuomintang entente in 1927.

An official election report, in September 1954, disclosed what is apparently a complete list of the present political bureau of the Chinese Communist party. They were listed in the following order, seemingly corresponding to their position within the party: Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Chen Yun, Lin Po-chu, Tung Pi-wu, Peng Teh-huai, Peng Chen, and Chang Wen-tien. 32/ The first four of these under Mao were further singled out in another election summary as "Comrade Mao's close comrades-in-arms", 33/ and they, together with Mao, probably make up the secretariat of the political bureau. The key positions within the government of Mao, Liu, Chou and Chu Teh have already been noted. Chen Yun is the first vice-premier of the State Council and, as a leading economic expert, is probably in overall charge of the nation's economic development program. The remaining members of the political bureau also hold important government posts in Peking, except for Chang Wen-tien, who serves as Chinese Ambassador to the Soviet Union. The latter is also a member of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.

Detailed information on the progress of Peking's economic construction plans were contained in an official report issued in September by the State Statistical Bureau, and in the course of Premier Chou En-lai's lengthy report to the National People's Congress in that same month. The former represented the official government statement on the results achieved in 1953, the initial year of China's first five year plan. 34/ In terms of total value of production, it reported, China's state-owned, cooperative, and joint state and privately-owned industrial enterprises had fulfilled their 1953 plans by 107 percent. It claimed fulfillment or overfulfillment of plans in virtually

32/ Peking, New China News Agency, September 14, 1954.

33/ Ibid., August 24, 1954.

34/ Communique of the State Statistical Bureau on Results of 1953 State Plans
New China News Agency (Peking), Sept. 13, 1954.

every area of production, including steel, pig iron, oil, electric power, and coal. It should be noted, however, that the original 1953 targets in many areas had undergone downward revision in the course of that year.

In percentages of 1952 output, the Statistical Bureau reported 1953 output in key areas to have been: electric power, 126; crude oil, 144; pig iron, 119; steel, 131; coal, 109; cement, 135; and cotton cloth, 114. In railway construction, 589 km. were laid down in the course of the year, most of it on the Lanchow-Sinkiang line, and in Szechuan. Thirty million square meters of floor space were built, twelve million of the total in residential housing.

In agriculture, drought and flood in many regions were blamed for failure to reach projected targets, though the gross output of grain declared to be "still somewhat higher" than in 1952. Total output of food crops, the report claimed, reached over 165 million tons (the original target had called for 170-175 million tons), with cotton falling to 1.17 million tons, ninety-one percent of 1952 production, and about 300,000 tons below the target for 1953.

The total output in value of China's industry in 1953 (excluding handicrafts), was 33 percent higher than 1952. Of the total output value, state-owned enterprises accounted for 53 percent, cooperative enterprises and joint state-and-privately-owned enterprises for nine percent, and private enterprise for 38 percent. As for total agricultural and industrial output value, "modern industry" accounted for 31 percent; handicraft workshops for some eight percent; individual handicrafts and handicrafts cooperatives, about seven percent; agriculture and related occupations, about 54 percent.

In domestic trade (wholesale and retail), the state and cooperative trading concerns accounted for 70 percent of the total sales volume, though their proportion of retail trade was still under fifty percent. In foreign trade, the state trading concerns accounted for 92 percent of the total, and private concerns for the remaining eight percent.

In education, 212,000 undergraduate and 4200 postgraduate students were reported in higher educational institutes in 1953, an eleven percent increase over 1952. Of these, 37.7 percent were in engineering, 13.7 percent in medicine, 5.9 percent in science, 18.8 percent in teaching preparation, with the remainder in arts, agriculture, etc. 3,628,000 were reported enrolled in middle schools, and 51,500,000 in primary schools (excluding peasants attending spare-time schools).

Chou En-lai, in his report to the National People's Congress, gave some specific figures on China's production targets for 1954, listing the following estimates for leading fields: electric power, 10,800 million kw. hours; coal, 81,990,000 tons; pig iron, 3,030,000 tons; steel, 2,170,000 tons; metal-working machines, 13,513; cement, 4,730,000 tons; cotton yarn, 4,600,000 bales; and machine-made paper, 480,000 tons. 35/

While in comparison with the production figures for the large industrialized countries of the world, these figures are still extremely low, they

35/ Chou En-lai Report on Government Work. (Delivered at first First National People's Congress, September 23, 1954), Peking, News Agency, September 24, 1954.

indicate impressive progress, particularly in coal and pig iron production, while it will be higher than the pre-Communist peak outputs for Manchuria and China proper. Steel production appears somewhat lower than had been estimated on the basis of earlier Communist percentage claims.

Chou reported that in the course of the first five year plan, some 600 important industrial units were to be built or improved, including 141 projects for which Soviet help had been promised. These 141 projects, he noted, include modern iron and steel complexes, non-ferrous metallurgical plants, coal mines, oil industries, plants for making heavy machinery, including automobiles, tractors, and aircraft, as well as power stations and chemical works. Most of these projects, he stated, would be completed by 1958, though a small number would take almost ten years to finish. When these projects were completed, Chou declared, "we will produce by ourselves metallurgical, power generating, oil extracting, as well as forging and pressing equipment. We will produce motor vehicles, locomotives, tractors, and airplanes." 36/

These 141 projects refer to a September 1953 agreement between China and the Soviet Union calling for Soviet economic and technical assistance in constructing 91 new enterprises and reconstructing 50 existing ones. The actual total of economic credits extended by the Soviet Union at that time was not mentioned. Further negotiations on Sino-Soviet economic affairs took place during the visit of high Soviet functionaries, including N. S. Krushchev, to celebrations of the fifth anniversary of the establishment of the Peking government on October 1, 1954. According to a joint communique issued on October 12, 1954, the Soviet Union agreed to increase, by 400 million rubles (\$100 million), the supply of equipment for the 141 enterprises included in the 1953 agreement. In addition, the Russians agreed to grant China a long-term credit of 520 million rubles (\$130 million) and to grant assistance for building an additional fifteen industrial enterprises. 37/

It was announced at the same time that the four joint-stock companies formed by Russia and China in 1950 and 1951 (petroleum and non-ferrous metals companies in Sinkiang, a shipbuilding and repair company in Dairen, and a civil airlines company) were to be dissolved, with a transfer of the Soviet share in their operations to begin in January 1955. The value of the Soviet share, it was stipulated, was to be "repaid to the Soviet Union over the course of several years by supplies of goods which are usual export commodities from the People's Republic of China." 38/ Thus, it was announced, "all the enterprises now belonging to the joint Sino-Soviet companies will become wholly state-owned enterprises of the People's Republic of China." 39/

36/ Ibid.

37/ Communique on Negotiations Between China and the Soviet Union. Peking, New China News Agency, October 12, 1954.

38/ Sino-Soviet Joint Communique on the Transfer of the Soviet Shares in the Joint Stock Companies to the People's Republic of China. Peking, New China News Agency, October 12, 1954.

39/ Ibid.

An agreement on scientific and technical cooperation was also signed at this time, providing for the two countries to supply each other with technical data, to exchange information and specialists, and to "acquaint each other with their achievements in the fields of science and technology." 40/ The agreement was to run for five years and for an additional five years unless annulled at that time by either side. Obviously, it is China that stands to gain by this sort of arrangement in the years immediately ahead.

Announcement was also made of Soviet and Chinese plans to construct a railroad linking Lanchow, a rail terminus in northwest China, with Alma Ata in the Soviet Union, through Sinkiang. Sections on Soviet territory would be built by the Russians, and the China sections by the Chinese, with technical assistance from the Russians. 41/ Another announced railway link between the two countries is that through the Mongolian People's Republic, to be completed in 1955. These two lines, added to the existing Manchurian rail link with Russia, will mean that three widely separated rail arteries will link China with the Soviet Union.

In another agreement, the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw its armed forces from the joint naval base of Port Arthur and to transfer installations there to the Peking government without compensation. 42/

Chou En-lai, in his report to the National People's Congress, acknowledged that primary consideration would have to be given to the development of heavy industry for some time to come, and that it would be necessary for the Chinese people "to bear certain temporary hardships and inconveniences in order that in the long run we shall live in prosperity and happiness." He also noted certain shortcomings in economic achievements thus far. For example, though virtually all areas announced fulfillment or overfulfillment of 1953 targets, "if we examine the fulfillment of targets from the four aspects of total production value, production costs, profit, and labor productivity, then only thirty percent of the enterprises completed their plans in all of these aspects."

Chou also pointed to defects in planning. Many plans, he declared, were inaccurate, inadequately integrated, ill-coordinated, and underwent too frequent revision. Insufficient technical manpower and poor technical administration, he added, present another serious problem. It is clear that Chinese economic planning is still in an initial, somewhat sketchy stage, and that fully-integrated, all-embracing planning does not yet exist.

40/ Sino Soviet Joint Communiqué on the Signing of the Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperatives, Peking, N.C.N.A., Oct. 12, 1954.

41/ Joint Communiqué of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the U.S.S.R. on the Construction of the Lanchow and the organization of through traffic, 1954.

42/ Sino-Soviet Joint Communiqué on the Withdrawal of Soviet Armed Forces from the Jointly-used Naval Base of Port Arthur and Placing this Base Completely at the Disposal of the People's Republic of China. New China News Agency, October 12, 1954.

Nevertheless, given China's inadequate industrial base and dearth of skilled manpower, important results in the complex and difficult task of economic construction industrialization have already been attained, and it is quite likely that a foundation for future accelerated industrialization may be achieved by the end of the present decade.

In agriculture, Chou gave a detailed picture of the extent of flood damage during 1954. The Yangtze and Huai River floods, he declared, were "without parallel in the last hundred years", and about one-tenth of the nation's farmland was flooded. About half this total, some 13 million acres was still flooded in September. As a result, he stated, as in 1953, the agricultural plan for 1954 would not be fulfilled, though he claimed that the output of grain and cotton for the year would exceed that for 1953.

Despite overall progress in agriculture over the past five years, Chou continued, "the growth of agriculture obviously falls behind the needs of the people and the state for agricultural produce. In order that agriculture may develop more quickly and in a more planned manner, we must gradually carry out the Socialist transformation of agriculture. That is, to change backward individual farming step by step to collective farming by organizing the peasants into mutual-aid teams and cooperatives on a voluntary basis." Sixty percent of all peasant households have already joined such teams and cooperatives, he claimed, and the number of agricultural producer cooperatives (a "lower form" of collective farm) reached 100,000 in August 1954, and is expected to increase to 500,000, embracing ten million people, by the spring of 1955. Chou expressed the "hope" that by the end of the first five year plan, half of the peasant households would be grouped into these producer cooperatives.


Vice-premier Teng Tzu-hui further elaborated on this latter point in a subsequent report to the National People's Congress on the "socialist transformation of agriculture". 43/ Declaring that agricultural production lags behind the needs of industrialization, and of rising standards of living, he declared this situation to be due to technical backwardness and to the individual nature of agricultural production. Noting that the country cannot yet produce tractors, nor adequate supplies of gasoline to run them, and that peasant "social consciousness" was still low, he stated that the transformation of agriculture would have to be carried out gradually and in distinct stages. Collectivization itself would be achieved in two stages: the first, the agricultural producer cooperatives mentioned by Chou En-lai, and which Teng Tzu-hui described as "partial collective ownership" in which the peasant "invests" his land as a "share", and where there is unified management of production. This first stage will eventually be followed by cooperatives of a "higher form", in which there would be complete collective ownership.

The essential differences between the two forms of collective organization seem to be that in the producer cooperatives the peasant is remunerated partially in terms of the ratio of land he has "invested", and he also retains legal title to his land; in the collective farm, on the other hand, remuneration is determined on other bases, and the legal title of the land reverts to the collective as a whole. The first stage is a necessary prerequisite, Teng Tzu-hui stated, for through them "the peasants can become more amenable to the cooperatives while their concept of private ownership of land can be

43/ Text of his report given by New China News Agency (Peking), September 23, 1954.

gradually reformed after they have joined the cooperative." Thus cooperatives of this transitional form "represent a course through which our country must pass in effecting socialist transformation of agriculture." No timetable for the achievement of full collectivization has been indicated, but with at most only half the country scheduled to be in producer cooperatives by 1958, this final stage is still some years away.

It is clear that Communist political and economic consolidation continues to grow in China, and that the political organizational techniques and economic control measures characteristic of Communist governments have already brought an appreciable growth in China's national strength. This growth in strength has also had its impact abroad, in the Korean truce negotiations, and most notable in the Geneva Conference in 1954, as well as in the visits to Peking during 1954 of such prominent foreign personages as Nehru of India, U Nu of Burma, and the former Prime Minister of Great Britain, Clement Attlee.



STRUGGLE FOR ERADICATION OF THE PASSIVE ATTITUDE AND UNHEALTHY CONDITIONS IN PARTY ORGANIZATIONS

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(Report made at the Study Meeting for Cadres of the Directly Subordinate Organs of the CCP Central Committee, January 7, 1953)

Source: Jen Min Jih Pao, Peking, February 12, 1953

Comrades: At the First National Organization Work Conference of the Party, Comrade Liu Shao-ch'i, in evaluating the general conditions of our party, thus stated: "Our party is great, glorious and correct; it is a political party unprecedented in the history of China." This evaluation is entirely correct. For the past 31 years, our party under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung has led the whole nation in carrying out the great revolution, overthrowing the reactionary rule of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism, achieving a great victory, gaining rich experiences in struggle, training a large batch of elite cadres, and winning the real support of the entire people. This explains that in our party the active and healthy elements have occupied the fundamental, essential, and dominant position.

However, problems still exist in our party. There still exists in our party life a fairly serious passive attitude and unhealthy phenomenon. Although this does not constitute the important feature of the conditions of the party organization, the problems arising therefrom should merit our serious attention. In the past, we have not sufficiently exposed this, but the 3-anti movement and the ideological remoulding movement of the past year have in a large measure uncovered the passive and unhealthy phenomenon existing in our party, and made us better understand the problems in this respect. In his report at the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Comrade Malenkov made a severe and penetrating criticism of the passive and unhealthy conditions that exist in the CPSU. This report is highly educational to us, because in our party there exist similar but much more serious conditions. Therefore, I believe we should make Comrade Malenkov's report our weapon, cause a careful analysis to be made of these serious problems of our party, mobilize the entire party, and wage, with a Bolshevik spirit, a resolute struggle against these phenomena.

What are the passive and unhealthy phenomena found in our party life?

First, criticism and self-criticism, especially bottom-to-top criticism, have not yet been fully developed, and suppression of criticism is still fairly common and serious.

Generally speaking, our party has been attaching importance to criticism and self-criticism. In many of his instructions, Comrade Mao T has repeatedly stressed the importance of this problem. In the pr our party life, we have truly directed our attention to this ideological remoulding and party overhauling movements and the movement were all large-scale criticism and self-criticism

of the movements has produced important effects on the party and helped every party member in elevating himself. We must consider this a definite success. However, the shortcoming in our party life is that our practice of criticism and self-criticism is not regular enough, especially the bottom-to-top criticism. The result is that after the movement is over, many of the shortcomings and errors severely criticized during the movement revive or even assume much more serious proportions than previously. Knowing this tendency of ours, some people secretly congratulate themselves. When a movement comes they get prepared for it and pretend to be so active and sincere that they appear to be determined to wage a bitter struggle against all errors and even cry bitterly in admitting their errors. But as soon as the movement is over, they show their true selves and act the way they always do, completely ignoring all criticism. It becomes evident that without the regular practice of criticism, especially bottom-to-top criticism, and without mass supervision, we have no way to struggle against such people and even a good Communist party member can turn bad.

Many of our party members are rather unaccustomed to criticism coming from the lower level or from the masses. They have this erroneous thought: that is, they can tolerate criticism from the upper level, but not from the lower level; they can tolerate criticism by the party but not by the lower level or by the masses. They consider their work to be not subject to the supervision of the masses, so they ignore mass opinion.

It must be pointed out that the bureaucratic attitude of ignoring mass criticism and public opinion is not casual but rather common and serious. This point would be clear to all if we instance just a few leadership organs and the way they treat the letters from the masses. The Shantung Province People's Government has pigeon-holed over 70,000 letters from the masses while all the counties in the province have each pigeon-holed over 300 letters. In Shensi province, the Changan hsien alone pigeon-holed more than 1,100 letters from the masses. According to the result of investigation of 17 different organs of Foochow Municipality, 3,285 letters from the masses have been left unattended to, and the Hsintien ch'u alone (of this municipality) have pigeon-holed 111 letters, put aside by the three chiefs the ch'u has had. Incomplete figures of 31 organizations of Shanghai Municipality showed that over 22,000 letters have been given no attention. Many letter boxes there, fully packed with letters from the masses, have been left in the sun and rain for months and months without being touched. The letter boxes being weather beaten, many of the letters became illegible. Such a serious state of affairs is definitely not to be tolerated.

To ignore criticism from the lower level and the masses is an expression of suppression of criticism. Another but much more serious expression of suppression of criticism is to direct oppression and retaliation at those who criticize. Such acts are generally committed by ch'u and ts'ui cadres not infrequently under the support of their superiors. An example of this can be found in the local CCP committee of T'enghsien, Shantung, which in dealing with the serious criminal act of ts'un cadres of Chaowangt'ang Village of Tsining hsien, tried to shield the criminal. Such an attitude is intolerable. The cadres and people's militia of the Chaowangt'ang Village have, with Wang Shu-k'un and Wang Shu-sen as their chiefs, committed numerous crimes and been bitterly hated by the masses. However, the local CCP committee of T'eng hsien considered that Wang Shu-k'un, having been "previously meritorious", was not to blame but the landlords who plotted against the cadres. Sun Huai-t'ang and his sons who denounced Wang Shu-k'

were put under arrest and not released even when the Shantung Sub-bureau gave a telephonic order to set them free. The error was not corrected until after repeated criticisms by the Sub-bureau. From this it is only natural that such serious problems as the case of Chaowangtang Village remained unsettled for a long time, since the local CCP committee of T'enghsien took such an attitude toward the mass opinions. What deserves more serious attention is that such acts of oppression and retaliation toward the denouncers have been committed by certain middle or even higher-level cadres. The "Chi hai-fu case" (also known as the Sung Ying case) of Wuhan Municipality we disposed of during the initial stage of the 3-anti movement was a typical instance. Numerous other instances can be cited, among which is the Huang Yi-feng case where the accused, as director of the Communications Department of the East China MAC sought to retaliate upon the accuser.

The above-described represent only part of the cases where the retaliation and attack are comparatively open and brutal. Some cadres (including certain higher-level cadres), however, resort to retaliation and even oppression, not in an open and brutal manner, but covertly. When a cadre criticizes them, they would try under all pretexts to "hit" him; they could find many reasons and "principles" to cover their acts of retaliation and give the attacked no chance to speak. The result is that some just and unselfish cadres are often hit and finally ousted. I believe we should no longer tolerate any such acts utterly detrimental to the interests of the party. It should be pointed out that these are tantamount to acts of crimes and all those who are for the cause of the party should wage a relentless struggle against them.

Comrade Malenkov said, "It would be erroneous if we think that the bottom-to-top criticism can be developed in a spontaneous manner. It can be developed and enlarged only when the denouncer truly knows that he receives the support of the party and that the shortcomings he points out can really be removed." These words are extremely dear to us. It is only apparent that when a person exposing and criticizing certain undesirable situations knows that what he will receive is not support but retaliation and persecution, he will lose his confidence and courage. If we cannot prove by action our determined support of those who make criticism, then it will bring no effect, no matter how many calls we issue.

Therefore, it behooves us to "wage a relentless struggle against the deadly enemies of the party, those who obstruct the criticism of our shortcomings, suppress criticism, and oppress and retaliate upon those who criticize" (Malenkov). Let it be clearly pointed out that any suppression of criticism and any acts of persecution and retaliation against criticism should be construed as an act against party discipline and any party member making such errors must be subject to disciplinary action and expelled from the party, no matter how high his level is. The whole case and the penalty given by the party should then be published in the newspapers for the education of the broad party members and the masses.

Giving regular protection for mass criticisms and bringing into full play the mass spirit of criticism is a necessary condition to the progress of the party and the prosperity of the nation. Comrade Stalin told us that while criticism cannot be one hundred percent correct, we should not believe it if it is made by the lower level and is only 5-10 percent correct. In fact, if we demand all criticism to be one hundred percent.

nothing different from a strangling mass criticism. Comrade Stalin said, "...If this demand is made, you will shut up the mouth of thousands upon thousands of workers and worker correspondents who would otherwise be willing to correct our shortcomings but are not good at correctly expressing their opinions." He again said, "If you demand their criticism to be one hundred percent correct, then you would eliminate any possibility of criticisms coming from bottom-to-top and of self-criticism." But it must be remembered that criticism by the masses is often correct and that even if it is not correct or entirely correct, it should still merit our attention. This is the principle Comrade Mao Tse-tung often related to us, "One who speaks is not to blame but one who listens learns a lesson." It would be a crime against the party if we do not treat the criticism by the masses according to this principle.

Second, the state of anarchy and lack of discipline is still very serious, especially when it comes to reflecting the shortcomings in work and reporting only what is good.

Ever since the CCP Central Committee issued in 1948, the directive to strengthen the system of reporting and requesting for instructions and to oppose anarchism and the lack of discipline, much success has been achieved as party organization, party discipline, unity and centralization within the scope of the party are greatly raised. As a result, the nation-wide victory of the liberation war and the success of social reforms and economic rehabilitation have been gained. However, it must be pointed out that up to the present the state of anarchy and lack of discipline has not yet been completely overcome but has continued to occur.

What is especially serious and most harmful to the party is the fact that when reporting on work to the upper level, only the achievements but not the shortcomings, only the good news but not the bad news, and only the merit but not the failure, are told. Problems or even serious problems exist in many of the organs at all localities, but they are seldom reported to the upper level. As no sufficient systematic check-up is made by certain leadership organs, some, taking advantage of this weakness, magnify their success and touch only slightly at or completely cover up their shortcomings. The result is that the situation reported often varies greatly from the actual situation. Even when certain problems have been discovered by the upper level which calls for an investigation, they still feel unwilling to expose the whole situation but report the part that cannot be covered any longer. Especially dangerous is the fact that certain CCP committees and the leadership comrades of certain organs get used to such serious violation of party discipline without realizing the error being committed.

Two factors are responsible for such practice of reporting only achievements but not shortcomings: (1) Due to the bureaucratic style of work, what is reported by the lower level is transmitted to the upper without making any investigation, study or understanding of the true situation. (2) For fear of possible harms to themselves when the upper level finds the poor job done, the leadership cadres wilfully hide up the shortcomings and problems even when they know that such exist. When these shortcomings and problems are reflected to the upper level, they try all they can to evade responsibility.

These two phenomena are utterly erroneous and intolerable, especially the latter. Those who cover up their shortcomings take no interest in the benefit of the masses but their own "fame", "prestige", and the 'impression' the upper level gains of them. For this reason, when serious shortcomings or errors occur they make no attempt to examine them, much less to rectify them, but when such are reflected by others, they would immediately ask, "Who told this?". They would spend much time to find out who the person is who speaks ill of them and then hit him as an enemy just because he reflects the true situation.

A sign of further development of these errors is to prepare false reports which are not based on facts but are designed to gain the trust of the upper level. Therefore, their pockets are stuffed with all kinds of materials to cater to the taste of their upper level.

Of course, some of the "false reports" are not entirely without ground. Knowing the great danger involved in having a totally groundless report prepared, some try to find some 'basis' or even create several "examples" and magnify them. They fully understand that such "examples" and "basis" do not represent the true conditions, but they do this just to provide some basis for argument when such "false reports" are uncovered.

Such a serious violation of party discipline, corroding and deteriorating the fighting strength and undermining the unity of the party, must not be tolerated and allowed to grow. "The party requires the entire members, especially the leadership cadres, to be loyal and honest and to seriously fulfill their responsibility toward the party and the nation. The party cannot trust those who act against the interest of the nation and try to deceive the party and the nation. Any attempt at deception, whether by concealing the true conditions or by twisting facts, shall be considered as a serious crime of violating party discipline (Malenkov). Some leadership cadres verbally pledge to be loyal and honest to the party but prove to be otherwise in action. In dealing with such people, the party must adopt a drastic measure. If they do not sincerely admit their own errors and seriously correct them, the party will remove them from the leadership posts, mete out penalties to them and expel them from the party.

In the past we have been rather lenient to and "looked after" too much the interest of those cadres who have committed errors. We used to pardon them, thinking that 'they had in the past worked for the cause of the revolution'. This of course harms the rigidity of party discipline, and the defect must be resolutely overcome. It should be stressed that there is only one party discipline which all party members, ordinary or leadership members, must observe. Any member, irrespective of his position and qualifications, shall be subject to the same standards and given the same penalties he deserves when he commits an error. In no case should there be any exception under the pretext of "past merits".

Besides that we must henceforth strictly uphold party discipline, augment the party life and education toward the party members, and strengthen the top-to-bottom examination of the conditions in which the party policy and decision are implemented, it is necessary to develop the bottom-to-top criticism, fully promote democracy, and place the party organization and party work under the supervision of the broad party members and the masses. To achieve this, numerous difficulties will be encountered but must resolutely be overcome by mass efforts. The above-described phenomena of anarchy,

lack of discipline and violation of law can be effectively corrected only when the various obstacles are removed in a tenacious struggle by the broad party members and masses.

Third, in selecting cadres and in understanding their work, there exists a serious weakness, the deviation of attaching importance to "Qualifications", "ability rather than virtue", and "using only personal friends and relatives". It is quite common that only superficial observation, instead of penetrating investigation, of cadres is made through methods of bureaucratism and formalism.

There should be only one standard for the selection of cadres, namely the one proposed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, "virtue and ability". The "virtue" represents the political quality of a cadre while "ability" represents the administrative ability of a cadre. The two must be given equal importance.

This standard is quite definite but, in selecting their cadres many organs of the various places do not follow it. The work and responsibility of a cadre is determined by his qualification and history. Thus the following phenomenon arises: A cadre whose political quality and business ability are good and suitable for certain work, is not assigned to it just because his qualification is insufficient. On the other hand, a cadre gets the assignment because of his qualification, although he is poor in political quality and business ability, with the result that the work ends in failure. It is only apparent that to push the party work ahead we must break down this erroneous concept of "qualifications", promote without the least hesitation those newly emerged elite cadres with "both ability and virtue" and give them support and help so as to enable them to shoulder their responsibility. Those cadres with veteran standing but slow in progress should be spurred forward. Those who have had a long history of struggle and contributed to the cause of revolution but become arrogant and complacent, seeking no progress and remaining slack, thus lost their political sensitivity, should be removed from their leadership posts, as they are no longer fit for such, and assigned other work for which they may be qualified.

Another erroneous trend seen in the selection of cadres is the thought of laying stress on ability but not virtue. Such a thought is prevailing among the leadership cadres of many of the economic departments. Some declare that "cadres with both ability and virtue are, indeed, non-existent". Others state that "when one cadre with virtue is placed together with another with ability, things will work out nicely". Still others state that one has to be brave in employing cadres, since personal history and political problems have become a thing of the past and since there are no longer any counter-revolutionaries. Some say that "those with virtue but no ability should run party affairs and those with ability but no virtue do administrative work". Some alter at will the party principles for the selection of cadres while others propose the erroneous principle of "30 percent political quality and 70 percent business ability."

Due to these erroneous concepts, many have taken "technique" and "the cultural level" as the only condition for the selection of cadres, without making any investigation as to their political quality. Some leadership cadres trust the retained KMT personnel who have not undergone any serious ideological reform and political test, considering that their technical and

cultural levels are high and they should be relied upon to perform the work. The result is that the work ~~is not done satisfactorily~~, erroneous thought and style of work develop, and the leadership post of some departments is seized by some depraved elements, causing serious damages to the work. A serious phenomenon of impurity on the part of cadres was exposed in the various government, provincial and municipal organs during the 3-anti movement but one of the most important factors was the stress that has been arbitrarily laid on business ability to the neglect of political quality.

This of course does not mean that the business ability of a cadre is not important to the cause of the party. Just on the contrary, we attach extreme importance to the business ability of our cadres. As the stage of economic rehabilitation is concluded ahead of time and large-scale economic construction has begun, the cadres will gradually be assigned to definite work in the various specialized fields. It is of prime importance there that the party must seriously guide our cadres to study their business and lead them to learn what they do not understand and what they are not acquainted with. If this is not done, all plans for construction will remain empty talk. Experiences of recent years have proved that the acquiring of specialized ability is no easy job and can be accomplished only by hard work, with a determination to overcome all difficulties. The results of study obtained by our cadres in recent years can be classified into the following three categories. (1) those who have worked hard and succeeded, (2) those who have tried but not sufficiently hard and gained only slight success, and (3) those who have not tried at all and therefore learned nothing. We should encourage and help the cadres of the first group to continue their efforts. For the second group we should admit their progress but, at the same time, point out their shortcomings and encourage them to catch up. To the third group, we should criticize severely and if they remain unchanged, they should be replaced by those willing to work hard, so that our work may not be delayed.

However, after a cadre has already succeeded in entering into a special field, we should see that he does not neglect politics. The previously described tendency of stressing ability rather than virtue in selecting cadres is a sign of estrangement from politics. When a cadre concentrates his efforts on a definite task, it is likely that he pays less and less attention to the general direction and political principles. If his attention is not called to this point in due time, he will get gradually narrowed in his viewpoint and lose sight of the overall picture and policy except the part of work which he has been doing. In this way, his work can easily be alienated from the party policy and aim and political errors can occur. Comrade Stalin taught us that in the government and party organs, the higher the working personnel's political level and Marxist-Leninist consciousness, the more effective will be their work, and vice versa, and that political shortsightedness often causes them to see only the temporary interest, take to routinism and deteriorate easily. (Problems of Leninism, Chinese Text, p.782, Foreign Language Press, Moscow) The party's responsibility of leadership lies in constantly keeping the comrades on the alert to seriously oppose any estrangement from politics and raise unceasingly their Marxist-Leninist level and political consciousness, as this is the only way to enable them to perform their work well.

Another tendency which is more dangerous is that in selecting cadres the leadership, deviating from party principles, employ personal friends, relatives and fellow provincials. Such instances are numerous. One of whom is T'ang Yun-chao, former chief of the Labor Department of the then Northeast People's Government, who took in as many as 42 persons who were landlords, capitalists, former KMT police, rebels, and suspected secret agents. While this makes it possible for a very "congenial" atmosphere to prevail in many of our party and government organs, the political atmosphere becomes thin, the party life unhealthy, the spirit of criticism and self-criticism lacking, and mutual shielding is seen among the working personnel. Under the circumstances, cadres with a sense of justice and who do some thinking are often hit and ousted.

Next, we have not done enough to examine our cadres. The state of bureaucratism and formalism is only too common in many organizations where a cadre is examined by a mere glance at his application form or personal history, which of course is not enough. The principal defect, however, is that some leadership organs judge cadres by the reports they submit to the upper level and by the superficial record of their work showing the figures they have fulfilled, and not by direct contacts with them and through examination of the way they do their work and the quality of the work they have done. For this reason, some poor cadres have been considered as good just because they are good at preparing reports to show their work record which, however, is often exaggerated or achieved by compulsory measures or violation of policy, while those working hard and serious implementing the party policy are considered by the upper level as poor and inept cadres. Evidently this is a very dangerous sign.

To overcome this, apart from taking steps, gradually but definitely, to know the cadres by direct contacts and examination of their actual work, the party's leadership organs at all levels should try to know the cadres from the bottom and from among the masses. We have in the past seldom tried to know the cadres by paying attention to mass opinions, without which our understanding of the cadres is not complete. The viewpoint of the leadership and that of the masses both are limited, and only when we view from both angles, study and analyze the viewpoints, and combine them together, will it be possible for us to acquire a true understanding of our cadres.

Fourth, the work style of bureaucratism and formalism still exists in many of our party and government leadership organs. In the basic level organizations of the party and the government, the phenomena of commandism and alienation from the masses prevail and have not yet been overcome.

The 3-anti movement last year has been highly successful. It has basically liquidated the state of corruption and waste on the part of many of the working personnel at the administrative district, provincial (municipal, regional) and Central People's Government levels. It has also basically ended the bureaucratism of the different organs, where the leadership is alienated from the masses. It would be incorrect, however, if in the face of these successes we consider that bureaucratism no longer poses a serious problem in the party and government leadership organs.

Facts prove that the state of bureaucratism and formalism is still quite serious in many of our party and government leadership organs. It is especially seen in that, no attempt is made to understand the true condition of the lower level, to hear the grievances of the masses and to assign work as the actual objective conditions demand. Work is often determined, not by the degree of urgency and importance, but by subjective requirements of the leadership organs. As a result, the assignments are too many, too heavy and too urgently demanded, which makes the lower level too busy and too tired to accomplish anything well. The situation is made worse when assignment of work is made with the arbitrary emphasis laid on "the completion of task" without having the scope of the policy clearly defined and the working method and style pointed out to the lower level; when little inspection is made after the work is assigned, as the upper level remain satisfied with the report on the superficial record achieved by the lower level and makes no attempt to determine the actual result of the work; when only the good aspect of the work is taken into consideration; and when quantity, not quality, is aimed at. This has fostered the growth of "the simple business viewpoint" and the "commend" style of work, spoiled the result of work which should otherwise be well performed, caused the interest of the masses to suffer loss, and undermined the relations between the party and the masses.

Some leadership cadres, while verbally opposing the work style of bureaucratism and formalism, actually commit such errors themselves. They do not penetrate into the lower level, understand the situation, and check up the work, but like to listen to reports of success but not failure, become easily satisfied by superficial success, and blinded by facile optimism. They believe that so long as the work is good and success made, it does not matter if there are shortcomings, thus resulting in slackness, lethargy, and carelessness, without realizing the serious situation that obtains at the lower level. It is not infrequent that certain problems have already assumed a serious proportion at the lower level without the slightest knowledge of the upper, or that the upper level knows a little about them but do not consider it important to take any action, with a result that many serious phenomena detrimental to the interest of the masses exist for long periods or even continue to develop.

Some leadership cadres, being highly enthusiastic, ambitious and desirous of serving the masses as much as possible, nevertheless find themselves imbued with the bureaucratic style of work, do not know how to pursue the mass line, and do not consult with and rely upon the masses. The result thus obtained is just the reverse and contrary to what is expected, in that distress, instead of benefits, is caused the masses. The party cannot pardon such leadership cadres just because of their aspiration to do well for the masses, since the party judges, not by their aspiration but the actual results, the successful completion of a mission given to its cadres in their respective areas or departments. No matter how high their enthusiasm and how good their intention is, the party has the responsibility to educate them and seriously criticize them, so long as they have not rid themselves of the bureaucratic style of work. If they are not determined to rectify their errors and continue to cause loss to the masses, the party will have to mete out to them the necessary penalty or even remove them from the leadership posts.

Closely related to the work style of bureaucracy and formalism is the state of commandism and estrangement from the masses on the part of the ch'u, hsiang, and part of the hsien organs of the party and the Government. This state of affairs is rather common and serious. In the agricultural production and patriotic health movements directly serving the interests of the masses, the commandist style of work is quite serious. Under such bad style of work, the masses suffer tremendously in the anti-drought work, the promotion of improved seeds, the issuing of agricultural loans and the anti-epidemic work. In some places, the situation is even more serious where the chu, hsiang and part of the hsien cadres violate law and discipline, suppress criticism, shield the counter-revolutionaries, and harm good people.

The existence of these phenomena has seriously menaced the interest of the people, twisted the party policy, and undermined the relations between the party and the masses. Evidently this is an utterly evil anti-people style of work, absolutely incompatible with the party interest, as, if its social source is determined, it is one which the reactionary ruling class (the Kuomintang style of work) left in our party and government. To struggle against such a bad style of work will not only be an important issue for the present but also for a very long period to come.

The existence of such style of work is directly related to the impure status, the impure thought and the impure style of work on the part of the basic-level organs and cadres.

This shows that we have not carried out any examination of our cadres of all levels, especially the hsien, chu and hsiang levels, or that the examination has not been thorough, if any. It also shows that the party overhaul work at the hsien, chu and hsiang levels has not as yet achieved the result desired and that the struggle has not yet been developed, in the course of the overhaul, against commandism and for the eradication of law-breakers. Bureaucratism, as stated before, on the part of many party and government leadership organs has been largely responsible for the continued existence and development of this serious situation at the hsien, chu and hsiang levels. The state of commandism and alienation from the masses is given further chance to grow, at the same time, as the upper level organs only demand the lower levels to get the work done and do not check the work done by them, nor make the policy clear to them, point out to them what should be done and what should not, tell them the working method, and mobilize the party members and masses to develop bottom-to-top criticism.

Therefore, we must not treat the deviations of the basic-level organs of the party and the Government as a problem of the organs themselves but also a problem of the leadership organs. Only when the leadership organs make a serious attempt to correct their bureaucracy and formalism will it be possible for the lower-level organs of the party and the Government to further rectify these errors.

Comrades, we consider the four problems mentioned above as the principal unhealthy and passive phenomena in our present party life. The important factor responsible for the long existence of these phenomena in our party organization is, just as Comrade Malenkov stated, "the underestimation of the importance of our ideological work." That is to say, "The party organs have weakened the party's organizational and ideological work, as a result of which nobody has paid any attention to this work in many of the party

organs." The phenomenon of "the party pays no attention to the party" as Comrade Mao Tse-tung stated in 1948 has remained unchanged or not much changed.

In order to further consolidate our party, to strengthen the relationship between the party and the people, to eradicate the phenomenon of neglecting the party's organizational and ideological work, to raise the work level of the party, and to wipe out the passive and unhealthy conditions of the party organizations, we must take some active and effective action. The five tasks for the consolidation of the party, as named by Comrade Malenkov, are also applicable to our party. The following measures should be adopted to fit the concrete conditions of our party:

- (1) In the party, in all basic-level organizations, in the party schools and party training classes, in all party organs and publications, and in all the meetings of the party, a systematic education should be given to the entire party members so that they can see the menace brought about by these phenomena to the cause of our party and people and realize that toleration of them will be incompatible with the party cause and the duty of party members, and that they must work actively and resolutely to end them.
- (2) The party committees, party organs, and party disciplinary committees should take all steps to ensure that democracy is given full play and self-criticism and bottom-to-top criticism developed, as one of the important standards of checking up the work of party committees and party organs; that cases of suppression of criticism and retaliation for criticism are severely punished and announced to the public; and that democratic election is practiced seriously in the party to coordinate with the national elections.
- (3) A determined struggle should be waged against anarchism and lack of discipline and no efforts spared to carry out a disciplinary education, to tighten the various systems of the party, and to step up the work of the party disciplinary committees.
- (4) To improve the methods of cadres personnel work, to systematically publicize and observe the party's correct policy for the selection of cadres, and to integrate as much as possible the selection of cadres with the check-up on the conditions of the implementation of this policy, making it truly the principle of our cadres work.
- (5) To launch this year an ideological remoulding movement mainly against bureaucratism, commandism, and violation of law; to augment the work of supervisory organs; and to see that the cadres of all levels give instructions as to work methods and discipline when they assign work.
- (6) The ideological work of the party should be strengthened. All party organizations must give this work priority. The results of party overhaul education should be consolidated by initiating regular education in the party branches. The result from the study of the documents of the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union should be consolidated and constant education given the cadres. Precaution should be taken against overlooking the political work in the upsurge of construction and against weakening the party's propaganda machine. Party members and party organizations should take up the re-publicizing and explaining the party policy to the masses.

(Translation by American Consulate-General, Ho

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For this reason, in our policy of construction, we should take into consideration not only the present needs of our people but their permanent interest. Of course, simultaneous with concentrating our strength on the building of the nation's heavy industry, it is necessary for us to train a personnel for national construction, to develop our communications, transportation, light industries and agriculture, and develop our commerce. At the same time, we should, step by step, promote cooperatives for agricultural producers and handicraftsmen, carry out a reform of the private industries and commerce, and correctly bring into play the function of individual farming, the handicraft and the private industries and commerce. All this is to ensure the steady rise of our economy, the steady increase in proportion of Socialism in the national economy, and the gradual raise in the material and cultural life of the people as the production is stepped up. The fulfillment of these tasks will greatly advance the cause of New China in making herself an independent, democratic, united, prosperous and peaceful nation.

The 5-year plan of national construction is glorious but stupendous. To achieve this task we must mobilize the people of all strata, unite together and make a concerted effort. Besides, we need the help of all nations, especially the Soviet Union. In repudiating the erroneous concept of those who consider that the nation's revolutionary work "can be achieved without any international help", Chairman Mao Tse-tung pointed out: "In the age of imperialism, it will be impossible for any nation to achieve victory for its genuine cause of people's revolution, without the help of other nations in one way or another, and even if a victory is achieved, it will not be consolidated" (On the People's Democratic Dictatorship). That is to say we need help not only in the past but at present and in future.

To make a beginning is difficult. We must thank the Soviet Government people for the generous, selfless, great support they gave us in the most difficult stage we began with our economic construction. According to the result of the negotiation concluded by the Chinese delegation with the Soviet Government, the Soviet Union will help us to build or rebuild, up to the end of 1959 and including the enterprises it helped us to build in the past three years, a total of 141 enterprises of a tremendous scale, including the iron and steel joint enterprise, the non-ferrous metal enterprise, the coal and petroleum enterprise, the machine-building factories, the automobile and tractor works, the hydraulic and thermal power stations. When these enterprises are built, the industrial productivity of the nation will be greatly increased, China will be a country with an independent industry of her own, and our national industrialization will be placed on a solid foundation. It is only evident that without the Soviet help, it would not be possible for us to begin with our 5-year plan on such a large scale, in such a wide scope and at such a great rate.

In their remarks of August 4 this year on our Industrial and Agricultural Exhibition, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and 9 government leaders, including Comrade Malenkov, stated: "We firmly believe that the great people of China, under the guidance of their own glorious Communist Party led by Comrade Mao Tse-tung and their own revolutionary Government, will achieve new great victories and, in a short period, will make New China a great powerful people's democracy with a developed industry and an advanced agriculture. Our dear comrades, you may rest assured that in the great cause of socialist reform of the people's China, you will always receive the friendly and active support of the Soviet people, the Communist Party of the

Soviet Union and the Soviet Government." The warmth and friendship of the Soviet leaders toward the Chinese people are fully manifested in their large-scale assistance in our economic construction.

The assistance given us by the Soviet Union has always been sincere and selfless. In the recent negotiation between our delegation and the Soviet Government, the latter has fully satisfied all the demand of help, where necessary, possible, and indispensable. All that should be done but we did not think of, the Soviet Union made enthusiastic suggestions and the items for assistance were increased. In helping us build or rebuild our enterprises, the Soviet Government has given us a generous support, from the selection of factory site, the collection of data for planning purposes, the drawing up of planning schemes, the actual planning, the supply of equipment, the direction of construction, installation and operation, to the manufacturing of products and the supply, without compensation, of technical assistance for the manufacturing of products. In order to help us train personnel for economic construction, the Soviet Government will accept students we send to the various Soviet factories for the purpose of practice and will also continue to dispatch special experts to work in China. It is, indeed, a new event in the history that so many problems concerning industrial construction have been solved and so overall and permanent a program of assistance has been drawn up during a single negotiation between two nations.

It must be pointed out that while international assistance is necessary and essential to our economic construction, the key to our success still lies in the unity of our people and their own good efforts at salvation. To make industrialization possible in such an economically backward large country as China, it requires the great perseverance of the entire people to overcome the numerous difficulties unavoidable. The concept to rely entirely upon foreign assistance without making any endeavor ourselves is utterly wrong. Inasmuch as we have under the guidance of the Communist Party of China and Chairman Mao Tse-tung, held together and gone through a hard struggle, achieved salvation on our own, overcome all kinds of difficulties, and, with the international assistance, won our victory of the revolution and succeeded in the rehabilitation of our national economy, then with the overall and tremendous support of the Soviet Government to our economic construction today, we should all the more strive for the completion of the newly built or rebuilt enterprises, fully exploit the potentialities of our enterprises, endeavor to increase production and practice economy to accumulate sufficient wealth for the state, and work untiringly for national industrialization.

With the great support of the Soviet Union, what will be the goal toward which we should direct our efforts?

First, with the enterprise which the Soviet Union helps to build or rebuild, as the backbone, we should follow the principle of proportionate development of national economy and plan our economic development accordingly. Here we should see that a discrimination is self-existent construction of minor importance and, with center of importance laid on heavy industry, the method of equal development resulting in division of strength is avoided. We should take a natural course in a natural way and oppose the subjectivism of blind haste. We should learn and keep the most fundamental method of planning and special attention to the mutual relationship and balance between the new and old as well as the large and small factories, fully tap the production potentialities of the present

enterprises, and oppose the conservative trend in production.

Second, we should strengthen the work of capital construction, especially the geological prospecting work, so as to ensure a sufficient supply of mineral resources. The planning work should also be strengthened, the planning power increased and the planning concept rectified. The technical level of construction and installation should be raised and new strength for such cultivated. To strengthen the leadership of capital construction, a great number of capable cadres should be sent to the departments of capital construction.

Third, to meet the work resulted from the Soviet assistance, good preparations should be made for all work of construction, such as drawing up the planning schemes and the selection of factory sites at an early date, the furnishing of accurate data for planning (including the geological data), the immediate examination and approval of the planning submitted by the Soviet side, the active completion of the equipment as we undertake to manufacture, the quick distribution of cadres for building and rebuilding the enterprises, and the mapping out of plans for the important industrial districts and industrial cities.

Finally, to make a greater endeavor to learn from the Soviets and to train the construction personnel, we should study the "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik)", the political and economic science, and the Soviet experiences in building Socialism. We should also study the Soviet advanced technique and science, the entire planning documents with which the Soviets assist us in building and rebuilding our enterprises, and the work of construction, installation and operation. We should send students to the Soviet Union for practice and study, and intensify the technical education of our universities, colleges and middle technical schools.

The first year of our first 5-year plan has begun since this year, and we thank the Soviet Government and the Soviet people for the great support rendered us in our 5-year plan of construction. We must mobilize the people and, first of all, the working class of the whole nation to participate in this great cause of construction and, on their respective posts, to exert their utmost to overcome difficulties, fulfill and over-fulfill the national plans, and march steadily toward the industrialization of the nation.

(Translation by American Consulate General, Hong Kong).

APPENDIX III

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

New China News Agency, Peking, Oct. 12, 1954.

COMMUNIQUE ON NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION

The Government Delegation of the Soviet Union, comprising N.S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.; N.A. Bulganin, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.; A.I. Mikoyan, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.; M.M. Shvernik, Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions; G.Y. Alexandrov, Minister of Culture; D.T. Shepilov, Editor-in-Chief of *Pravda*; E.A. Furtseva, Secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Y.S. Nasriddinova, Minister of the Building Materials Industry of the Uzbek S.S.R.; V.P. Stepanov, responsible member of staff of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; and P.F. Yudin, Ambassador of the Soviet Union to the People's Republic of China, visited China from September 29th to October 12th, at the invitation of the Chinese Government to take part in the celebrations of the 5th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China.

During the stay of the Soviet Government Delegation in the People's Republic of China, Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China and Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Vice-Premiers Chen Yun, Peng Teh-huai, Teng Hsiao-ping, Teng Tse-hui and Li Fu-chun as one party and the members of the Soviet Delegation as the other party conducted negotiations on questions of Sino-Soviet relations and the international situation. Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the People's Republic of China, Chu Teh, Vice-Chairman of the People's Republic of China, and Liu Shao-chi, member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, also took part in the negotiations. The negotiations were conducted in an atmosphere of sincere friendship and mutual understanding.

The joint declarations of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Soviet Union on Sino-Soviet relations and the international situation, and on relations with Japan, and the joint communiques on the question of the naval base at Port Arthur, on the question of existing Sino-Soviet Joint Stock Companies, on the Agreement regarding Scientific and Technical Cooperation and on the construction of the Lanchow-Urumchi-Alma Ata Railway, are published below.

In addition, an agreement on the granting of a long-term credit of 520 million rubles by the Government of the U.S.S.R. to the Government of the People's Republic of China and a protocol on the granting of assistance from the Government of the U.S.S.R. to the Government of the People's Republic of China for building an additional 15 industrial enterprises and on increasing by an amount valued at more than 400 million rubles the supply of equipment for the 141 enterprises covered in the previously signed agreement.

JOINT DECLARATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics affirm that they are in full agreement both in respect to the constantly growing all-round cooperation between the two states and in respect to all questions concerning the international situation.

In the five years since the Chinese people gained their historic victory and founded the People's Republic of China, relations of close cooperation between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union have been established in full accord with the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance of February 14, 1950.

That Treaty is based on the sincere desire of the peoples of China and the Soviet Union to give each other mutual assistance to promote the economic and cultural progress of the two countries and further strengthen and enhance the fraternal friendship existing between them and thus facilitate the consolidation of peace and security in the Far East and throughout the world in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Experience has demonstrated the great vitality of the cooperation established between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, a cooperation which is a reliable guarantee for peace and security in the Far East and an important factor in the safeguarding of world peace.

The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Soviet Union declare that the friendly relations which have been built up between China and the U.S.S.R. are the basis for the further development of close cooperation between the two states in accordance with the principles of equality, mutual benefit, mutual respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The two Governments have the same desire to continue to take part in all international activities designed to consolidate peace, and will consult with each other on questions touching the common interests of the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, with a view to achieving unity in action directed to safeguarding the security of the two states and maintaining peace in the Far East and throughout the world.

The Geneva Conference which brought about the cessation of military operations in Indo-China and created the possibility of regulating the situation in Indo-China in accordance with the legitimate national rights of the peoples of that area showed the significance for the cause of peace of the participation in the discussion of pressing international issues of the Great Powers who, under the United Nations Charter, bear the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace. It also showed that the policy of the United States ruling circles of preventing the People's Republic of China from taking its rightful place in the United Nations is utterly untenable.

Such a policy of the United States and its direct acts of aggression against the people's Republic of China, particularly its continued occupation of China's territory of Taiwan, and its military and financial support to the Chiang Kai-shek clique, the enemy of the Chinese people, are incompatible

with the task of maintaining peace in the Far East and easing international tension.

The two Governments consider it an abnormal situation that Korea continues to be divided into two parts contrary to the natural aspirations of the Korean people for a united, peace-loving, democratic Korean state. In view of the fact that the unification of Korea is one of the important tasks the fulfillment of which would have great significance for the consolidation of peace in the Far East, the two Governments consider it necessary to convene in the nearest future a conference on the Korean question, with the wide participation of the countries concerned.

The People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union strongly condemn the formation of the Southeast Asia aggressive military bloc, because this bloc is based on the imperialist designs of its sponsors, which are directed in the first instance against the security and national independence of the Asian countries as well as against the interests of peace in Asia and the Pacific Region.

The two Governments consider it necessary to declare that the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union will continue to base their relations with states in Asia and the Pacific Region and with other states on the strict observance of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence, thereby opening up wide possibilities for the development of fruitful international cooperation.

The two Governments are deeply of the conviction that such a policy conforms to the basic interests of all peoples, including the peoples of Asia. The security and welfare of all peoples can be ensured provided that all the states make joint efforts in the cause of defending peace.

On their part, the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Soviet Union will exert their utmost efforts to facilitate the settlement of outstanding international questions, including those concerning Asia.

JOINT DECLARATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON RELATIONS
WITH JAPAN.

As provided for in the Potsdam Declaration, after the conclusion of the Second World War, Japan should have received complete national independence, established its own democratic institutions, and developed its own independent and peaceful economy and national culture.

However, the United States of America, as the chief occupying power in Japan which had been charged with the main responsibility for implementing the Potsdam decisions, crudely violated these decisions, trampled on the interests of the Japanese people and imposed upon Japan the San Francisco "peace treaty" and other agreements which run counter to the above-agreement between the Major Powers.

Nine years after the end of the war, Japan has still not independence and remains in the position of a semi-colonial country

tory is covered with numerous American military bases, which have been set up for purposes having nothing in common with the task of maintaining peace and securing the peaceful and independent development of Japan. The industry and finances of Japan are made dependent on American war contracts; Japan suffers restrictions in its foreign trade. All this has ruinous effects on its economy, and particularly on the peaceful branches of its industry.

All this cannot but injure the national self-respect of the Japanese people, create an atmosphere of uncertainty among the Japanese, and fetter the varied abilities of the Japanese people.

The present situation of Japan has evoked a legitimate apprehension among the peoples of countries in Asia and the Far East that Japan may be used to carry out schemes of aggression which run counter both to the interests of the Japanese people and to the task of maintaining peace in the Far East.

The peoples of the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union express their deep sympathy for Japan and the Japanese people, who have been placed in a difficult position as a result of the conclusion of the above-mentioned "treaty" and agreements which are dictated by foreign interests. They believe that the Japanese people will find adequate strength in themselves to take the course of freeing themselves from dependence on foreign power, the course of achieving the rebirth of their motherland and establishing normal relations and economic cooperation and cultural ties on a broad scale with other countries, first and foremost with their neighbors.

The policy of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Soviet Union in their relations with Japan is based on the principle of the peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems, and on the conviction that this conforms with the vital interests of all peoples. They stand for the development, on mutually beneficial terms, of broad trade relations and the establishment of close cultural ties with Japan.

They also express their readiness to take steps to normalise their relations with Japan, and declare that Japan will meet with the full support of the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union in its efforts to establish political and economic relations with the People's Republic of China and the U.S.S.R. as well as in all measures Japan undertakes to secure the conditions for its peaceful and independent development.

SINO-SOVIET JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES FROM THE JOINTLY-USED CHINESE NAVAL BASE OF PORT ARTHUR AND PLACING THIS BASE COMPLETELY AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Soviet Union, in view of the changes in the international situation in the Far East following the termination of the war in Korea and the restoration of peace in Indo-China, also taking into consideration the strengthened national defences of the People's Republic of China and, in the light of the relations of friendship and cooperation between the two countries which are being daily strengthened, have agreed that Soviet armed forces will withdraw from the jointly-used naval base of Port Arthur and its installations in this area be transferred without compensation to the People's Republic of China.

Both sides agree that the Joint Sino-Soviet Commission at Port Arthur set up in accordance with the agreement of February 14th, 1950 be responsible for carrying out measures connected with the withdrawal of Soviet armed forces and the transfer of the installations in the area of the Port Arthur naval base to the Government of the People's Republic of China.

The withdrawal of Soviet armed forces and the transfer of the installations in the area of the Port Arthur naval base to the Government of the People's Republic of China shall be completed by May 31st, 1955.

SINO-SOVIET JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON THE TRANSFER OF THE SOVIET SHARES IN THE JOINT STOCK COMPANIES TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

In 1950 and 1951, in accordance with the agreement reached between the Governments of China and the Soviet Union, four joint Sino-Soviet companies were established on the principle of equality:

A company to extract non-ferrous and rare metals in the Province of Sinkiang of the People's Republic of China,

A company to extract and refine petroleum in the Province of Sinkiang of the People's Republic of China,

A company to build and repair ships in Dairen, and

A company to organize and operate civil airlines.

This was the period when the young People's Republic of China faced the tasks of rehabilitating her national economy. The establishment of these Sino-Soviet companies have made it possible in a short period of time to put into order the work of the enterprises included in these companies, to considerably expand their productive capacities and raise their general technical level, by adopting the foremost Soviet experiences in economic construction. These joint companies have thus played a positive role in and made a definite contribution to the work of rehabilitating and developing China's economy.

Now, when the People's Republic of China, having rehabilitated her economy, is successfully fulfilling her first five-year plan, and the Chinese economic organizations have accumulated the necessary experiences and can themselves direct the operations of the enterprises included in these joint companies, the Governments of the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union have reached an agreement on the transfer, starting from January 1st, 1955, of the Soviet share in the operations of these joint Sino-Soviet companies to the People's Republic of China. The value of the Soviet share shall be repaid to the Soviet Union over the course of several years by supplies of goods which are usual export commodities from the People's Republic of China.

In this way, all the enterprises now belonging to the joint Sino-Soviet companies will become wholly state-owned enterprises of the People's Republic of China.

Both Governments hold the unanimous opinion that their decision is in conformity with the friendly relationship already established between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union and will facilitate the

further consolidation of economic cooperation on the basis of equality, mutual assistance and mutual respect for each other's interests.

SINO-SOVIET JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT ON SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION.

The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have held discussions in Moscow and Peking on Sino-Soviet cooperation in the fields of science and technology. The discussions proceeded in a friendly and cordial atmosphere and were concluded with the signing in Peking on October 12th of the Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. This Agreement was signed by Comrade Li Fu-chun, Vice-Premier of the State Council on behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China, and Comrade A.I. Mikoyan, Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. on behalf of the Government of the U.S.S.R.

In accordance with the provisions of the Agreement, the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agree that scientific and technical cooperation between the two countries should be realized through the interchange of experience in every branch of the national economy.

The two sides will provide each other with technical data, exchange related information and send specialists to give technical assistance and acquaint each other with their achievements in the fields of science and technology.

The exchange of technical data between the two sides shall be free of charge except for the payment of the actual costs connected with the preparation of copies of documents.

In order to work out measures to effect this cooperation and make appropriate proposals to the two Governments, a Sino-Soviet commission, composed of seven members appointed by the U.S.S.R. and seven by the People's Republic of China will be established. The commission will meet at least twice a year, meeting alternately in Peking and Moscow.

The Agreement is valid for five years. If neither signatory states one year prior to the expiration of the above-mentioned period that it wishes to annul the Agreement, the Agreement will remain in force for another five years.

The signing of the Sino-Soviet Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation is a new important contribution to the further strengthening of cooperation between the People's Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics conforming to the interests of the two countries as well as the interests of the consolidation of peace.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE LANCHOW-URUMCHI-ALMA ATA RAILWAY AND THE ORGANIZATION OF THROUGH TRAFFIC.

The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with a view to strengthening their

mutual economic and cultural ties, have agreed that both sides will, in the near future, build a railway from Lanchow through Urumchi (on Chinese territory) to Alma Ata (on Soviet territory). The construction of the aforementioned railway on Chinese territory will be undertaken by the Chinese Government. Construction of the Railway on Soviet territory will be undertaken by the Soviet Government. The Soviet Government will render all-round technical assistance to the Chinese Government in building the said railway on Chinese territory. Construction of the Lanchow-Yumen section of the aforementioned railway on Chinese territory was started in 1953.

**JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF A RAILWAY FROM CHINING TO ULAN BATOR
AND THE ORGANIZATION OF THROUGH TRAFFIC.**

The Government of the People's Republic of China, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic, with a view to strengthening their mutual economic and cultural ties, concluded on September 15th, 1952 an agreement on the construction of a railway from Chining in the People's Republic of China to Ulan Bator in the Mongolian People's Republic. This railway will be linked with the railway from Ulan Bator to the Soviet Union. The Government of the People's Republic of China will undertake the construction of the section from Chining through Ehrlien to the Chinese frontier. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic will jointly undertake the construction of the section from Ulan Bator through Chamut to the frontier of the Mongolian People's Republic. The three Governments will complete in 1955 the construction of the aforementioned railway and organize through traffic.

APPENDIX IV

CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

New China News Agency, Peking, Oct. 5, 1954

Following is the full text of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China adopted on September 20th, 1954, by the first National People's Congress at its first session:

C O N T E N T S

Preamble

Chapter I. General Principles

Chapter II. The State Structure

Section 1. The National People's Congress

Section 2. The chairman of the People's Republic of China

Section 3. The State Council

Section 4. The Local People's Congresses and Local People's Councils

Section 5. The Organs of Self-Government of National Autonomous Areas

Section 6. The People's Courts and the People's Procuratorate

Chapter III. Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens

Chapter IV. National Flag, State Emblem, Capital

PREAMBLE

In the year 1949, after more than a century of heroic struggle, the Chinese people, led by the Communist Party of China, finally achieved their great victory in the people's revolution against imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism, and so brought to an end a long history of oppression and enslavement and founded the People's Republic of China, a people's democratic dictatorship. The system of people's democracy - new democracy - of the People's Republic of China guarantees that China can in a peaceful way banish exploitation and poverty and build a prosperous and happy Socialist society.

From the founding of the People's Republic of China to the attainment of a Socialist society is a period of transition. During the transition the fundamental task of the State is, step by step, to bring about the Socialist industrialization of the country and, step by step, to accomplish the Socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce. In a few short years our people have successfully carried out a series of large-scale struggles: the reform of the agrarian system, resistance to American aggression and aid to Korea, the suppression of counter-

revolutionaries and the rehabilitation of the national economy. As a result, the necessary conditions have been created for planned economic construction and gradual transition to Socialism.

The first National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, at its first session held in Peking, the Capital, solemnly adopted the Constitution of the People's Republic of China on September 20, 1954. This Constitution is based on the Common Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference of 1949, and is an advance on it. It consolidates the gains of the Chinese people's revolution and the victories won in the political and economic fields since the founding of the People's Republic of China; and, moreover, it reflects the basic needs of the State in the period of transition, as well as the general desire of the people as a whole to build a Socialist society.

In the course of the great struggle to establish the People's Republic of China, the people of our country forged a broad people's democratic united front, composed of all democratic classes; democratic parties and groups, and popular organizations, and led by the Communist Party of China. This people's democratic united front will continue to play its part in mobilizing and rallying the whole people in common struggle to fulfill the fundamental task of the State during the transition and to oppose enemies within and without.

All nationalities of our country are united in one great family of free and equal nations. This unity of China's nationalities will continue to gain in strength, founded as it is on ever-growing friendship and mutual aid among themselves, and on the struggle against imperialism, against public enemies of the people within the nationalities and against both dominant-nation chauvinism and local nationalism. In the course of economic and cultural development, the State will concern itself with the needs of the different nationalities, and, in the matter of Socialist transformation, pay full attention to the special characteristics in the development of each.

China has already built an indestructible friendship with the great Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Democracies; and the friendship between our peoples and peace-loving people in all other countries is growing day by day. Such friendship will be constantly strengthened and broadened. China's policy of establishing and extending diplomatic relations with all countries on the principle of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, which has already yielded success, will continue to be carried out. In international affairs our firm and consistent policy is to strive for the noble cause of world peace and the progress of humanity.

CHAPTER I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Articles

1. The People's Republic of China is a people's democratic State led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants.
2. All power in the People's Republic of China belongs to the people. The organs through which the people exercise power are the National People's Congress and the local people's congresses.

The National People's Congress, the local people's congresses and other organs of state without exception practise democratic centralism.

3. The People's Republic of China is a unified, multi-national State.

All the nationalities are equal. Discrimination against, or oppression of, any nationality, and acts which undermine the unity of the nationalities are prohibited.

All the nationalities have freedom to use and foster the growth of their spoken and written languages, and to preserve or reform their own customs of ways.

Regional autonomy applies in areas entirely or largely inhabited by national minorities. National autonomous areas are inalienable parts of the People's Republic of China.

4. The People's Republic of China, by relying on the organs of state and the social forces, and by means of Socialist industrialization and Socialist transformation, ensures the gradual abolition of systems of exploitation and the building of a Socialist society.

5. In the People's Republic of China the ownership of the means of production today mainly takes the following forms: state ownership, that is, ownership by the whole people; cooperative ownership, that is, collective ownership by the working masses; ownership by individual working people, and capitalist ownership.

6. State-owned economy is Socialist economy owned by the whole people, it is the leading force in the national economy and the material basis on which the State carried out Socialist transformation. The State ensures priority for the development of state-owned economy.

All mineral resources and waters, as well as forest, undeveloped land and other resources which the State owns by law, are the property of the whole people.

7. Cooperative economy is either Socialist economy collectively owned by the working masses, or semi-Socialist economy in part collectively owned by the working masses. Such partial collective ownership by the working masses is a transitional form by means of which individual peasants, individual handicraftsmen and other individual working people organize themselves in their advance towards collective ownership by the working masses.

The State protects the property of the cooperatives, encourages, guides and helps the development of cooperative economy. It regards the promotion of producers' cooperatives as the chief means for the transformation of individual farming and individual handicrafts.

8. The State protects peasant ownership of land and other means of production according to law.

The State guides and helps individual peasants to increase production and encourages them to organize producers', supply and marketing, and credit cooperatives voluntarily.

The policy of the State towards rich-peasant economy is to restrict and gradually eliminate it.

9. The State protects the ownership of the means of production by handicraftsmen and other non-agricultural individual working people according to law.

The State guides and helps individual handicraftsmen and other non-agricultural individual working people to improve the management of their affairs and encourages them to organize producers', and supply and marketing cooperatives voluntarily.

10. The State protects the ownership by capitalists of the means of production and other capital according to law.

The policy of the State towards capitalist industry and commerce is to use, restrict and transform them. The State makes use of the positive qualities of capitalist industry and commerce which are beneficial to national welfare and the people's livelihood, restricts their negative qualities which are not beneficial to national welfare and the people's livelihood, encourages and guides their transformation into various forms of state-capitalist economy, gradually replacing capitalist ownership with ownership by the people; and this it does by means of control exercised by administrative organs of state, the leadership given by state-owned economy, and supervision by the workers.

The State forbids any kind of illegal activity by capitalists which endangers the public interest, disturbs the social economic order, or undermines the economic plan of the State.

11. The State protects the right of citizens to ownership of lawful income, of savings, houses and the means of life.

12. The State protects the right of citizens to inherit private property according to law.

13. The State may, in the public interest, buy, requisition or nationalize land and other means of production both in cities and countryside according to provisions of law.

14. The State forbids any person to use his private property to the detriment of the public interest.

15. By economic planning, the State directs the growth and transformation of the national economy to bring about the constant increase of productive forces, in this way enriching the material and cultural life of the people and consolidating the independence and security of the country.

16. Work is a matter of honor for every citizen of the People's Republic of China who is able to work. The State encourages initiative and creative activity of citizens in their work.

17. All organs of state must rely on the masses of the people, constantly maintain close contact with them, heed their opinions and accept their supervision.

18. All persons working in organs of state must be loyal to the people's democratic system, observe the Constitution and the law and strive to serve the people.

19. The People's Republic of China safeguards the people's democratic system, suppresses all treasonable and counter-revolutionary activities and punishes all traitors and counter-revolutionaries.

The State deprives feudal landlords and bureaucrat-capitalists of political rights for a specific period of time according to law; at the same time it provides them with a way to live, in order to enable them to reform through work and become citizens who earn their livelihood by their own labor.

20. The armed forces of the People's Republic of China belong to the people; their duty is to safeguard the gains of the people's revolution and of national construction, and to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of the country.

CHAPTER II. THE STATE STRUCTURE

SECTION 1. THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS

21. The National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China is the highest organ of state power.

22. The National People's Congress is the only organ exercising the legislative power of the State.

23. The National People's Congress is composed of deputies elected by provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the central authority, the armed forces and Chinese resident abroad.

The number of deputies to the National People's Congress, including those representing national minorities, and the manner of their election, are prescribed by Electoral Law.

24. The National People's Congress is elected for a term of four years.

Two months before the term of office of the National People's Congress expires, its Standing Committee must carry to completion the election of deputies to the next National People's Congress. Should exceptional circumstances arise preventing such an election, the term of office of the sitting National People's Congress may be prolonged until the first session of the next National People's Congress.

25. The National People's Congress meets once a year, convened by its Standing Committee. It may also be convened whenever its Standing Committee deems this necessary or one-fifth of the deputies so propose.

26. When the National People's Congress meets, it elects a presidium to conduct its session.

27. The National People's Congress exercises the following functions and powers:

1. To attend the General Assembly;
2. To accept laws;
3. To supervise the enforcement of the Constitution;
4. To elect the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman of the People's Republic of China;
5. To decide on the election of the President of the State Council upon recommendation by the Chairman of the People's Republic of China, and of the members of the State Council upon recommendation by the President;
6. To decide on the election of the Vice-Chairman and members of the Council of National Defense upon recommendation by the Chairman of the People's Republic of China;
7. To elect the President of the Supreme People's Court;
8. To elect the Chief Procurator of the Supreme People's Procuratorate;
9. To decide on the national economic plan;
10. To examine and approve the state budget and the financial report;
11. To study the status and conditions of agriculture, industry, transport, and communication, especially under the national authority;
12. To decide on general mobilization;
13. To decide on questions of war and peace; and
14. To exercise such other functions and powers as the National People's Congress considers necessary.

18. The National People's Congress has power to elect and dismiss:

1. The Chairman and the Vice-Chairman of the People's Republic of China;
2. The President and Vice-President, Ministers, Heads of Commissions and the Secretary-General of the State Council;
3. The Vice-Chairman and members of the Council of National Defense;
4. The President of the Supreme People's Court;
5. The Chief Procurator of the Supreme People's Procuratorate;

19. Members of the Commission require a two-thirds majority vote of all the deputies to the National People's Congress.

Deputy and other bills require a majority vote of all the deputies to the National People's Congress.

20. The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress is the permanent body of the National People's Congress.

The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress is composed of the following persons, elected by the National People's Congress:

The Chairman;
The Vice-Chairman;
The Secretary-General;
Members.

21. The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress exercises the following functions and powers:

- (1) To conduct the election of deputies to the National People's Congress;
- (2) To convene the National People's Congress;
- (3) To interpret the laws;
- (4) To adopt decrees;
- (5) To supervise the work of the State Council, the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate;
- (6) To annul decisions and orders of the State Council where these contravene the Constitution, laws or decrees;
- (7) To revise or annul inappropriate decisions of organs of state power of provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the central authority;
- (8) To decide on the appointment or removal of any Vice-Premier, Minister, Head of Commission or the Secretary-General of the State Council when the National People's Congress is not in session;
- (9) To appoint or remove the Vice-Presidents, judges, and members of the Judicial Committee of the Supreme People's Court;
- (10) To appoint or remove the Deputy Chief Procurators, Procurators, and members of the Procuratorial Committee of the Supreme People's Procuratorate;
- (11) To decide on the appointment or recall of plenipotentiary envoys to foreign states;
- (12) To decide on the ratification or abrogation of treaties concluded with foreign states;
- (13) To institute military, diplomatic and other special title and ranks;
- (14) To institute and decide on the award of state orders, medals and titles of honor;
- (15) To decide on the granting of pardons;
- (16) To decide, when the National People's Congress is not in session, on the proclamation of a state of war in the event of armed attack against the State or in fulfillment of international treaty obligations concerning common defence against aggression;
- (17) To decide on general or partial mobilization;
- (18) To decide on the enforcement of martial law throughout the country or in certain areas, and
- (19) To exercise such other functions and powers as are vested in it by the National People's Congress.

32. The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress exercises its functions and powers until the next National People's Congress elects a new Standing Committee.

33. The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress is responsible to the National People's Congress and reports to it.

The National People's Congress has power to recall members of its standing Committee.

34. The National People's Congress establishes a Nationalities Committee, a Bills Committee, a Budget Committee, a Credentials Committee and other necessary committees.

The Nationalities Committee and the Bills Committee are under the direction of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress when the National People's Congress is not in session.

35. Investigation committees may be constituted to enquire into specific questions when the National People's Congress, or its Standing Committee if the National People's Congress is not in session, deems it necessary.

All organs of state, people's organizations and citizens concerned are obliged to supply necessary information to these committees when they conduct investigations.

36. Deputies to the National People's Congress have the right to address questions to the State Council, or to the Ministries and Commissions of the State Council, which are under obligation to answer.

37. No deputy to the National People's Congress may be arrested or placed on trial without permission of the National People's Congress or, when the National People's Congress is not in session, of its Standing Committee.

38. Deputies to the National People's Congress are subject to the supervision of the units which elect them. These electoral units have power to replace at any time the deputies they elect, according to the procedure prescribed by law.

SECTION 2. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

39. The Chairman of the People's Republic of China is elected by the National People's Congress. Any citizen of the People's Republic of China who has the right to vote and stand for election and has reached the age of thirty-five is eligible for election as Chairman of the People's Republic of China.

The term of office of the Chairman of the People's Republic of China is four years.

40. The Chairman of the People's Republic of China, in accordance with decisions of the National People's Congress or the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, promulgates laws and decrees; appoints or removes the Premier, Vice-Premiers, Ministers, Heads of Commissions and the Secretary-General of the State Council; appoints or removes the Vice-Chairmen and members of the Council of National Defence; confers state orders, medals and titles of honor; proclaims general amnesties and grants pardons; proclaims martial law; proclaims a state of war; and orders mobilization.

41. The Chairman of the People's Republic of China represents the People's Republic of China in its relations with foreign states, receives foreign envoys and, in accordance with decisions of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, appoints or recalls plenipotentiary envoys to foreign states and ratifies treaties concluded with foreign states.

42. The Chairman of the People's Republic of China commands the armed forces of the country, and is Chairman of the Council of National Defence.

43. The Chairman of the People's Republic of China convenes a Supreme State Conference whenever necessary and acts as its Chairman.

The Vice-Chairman of the People's Republic of China, the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, the Premier of the State Council and other persons concerned take part in the Supreme State Conference.

The Chairman of the People's Republic of China submits the views of the Supreme State Conference on important affairs of state to the National People's Congress, its Standing Committee, the State Council, or other bodies concerned for their consideration and decision.

44. The Vice-Chairman of the People's Republic of China assists the Chairman in his work. The Vice-Chairman may exercise such part of the functions and powers of the Chairman as the Chairman may entrust to him.

The provisions of Article Thirty-nine of the Constitution governing the election and term of office of the Chairman of the People's Republic of China apply also to the election and term of office of the Vice-Chairman of the People's Republic of China.

45. The Chairman and the Vice-Chairman of the People's Republic of China exercise their functions and powers until the new Chairman and Vice-Chairman elected by the next National People's Congress take office.

46. Should the Chairman of the People's Republic of China for reasons of health be unable to perform his duties over a long period, the Vice-Chairman exercises the functions and powers of Chairman on his behalf.

Should the office of Chairman of the People's Republic of China fall vacant, the Vice-Chairman succeeds to the office of Chairman.

SECTION 3. STATE COUNCIL

47. The State Council of the People's Republic of China, that is, the Central People's Government, is the executive of the highest organ of state power; it is the highest administrative organ of state.

48. The State Council is composed of the following persons: The Premier; The Vice-Premiers; The Ministers; The Heads of Commissions; The Secretary-General.

The organization of the State Council is determined by law.

49. The State Council exercises the following functions and powers:

- (1) To formulate administrative measures, issue decisions and orders and verify their execution, in accordance with the Constitution, laws and decrees;
- (2) To submit bills to the National People's Congress or its Standing Committee,
- (3) To coordinate and lead the work of Ministries and Commissions;
- (4) To coordinate and lead the work of local administrative organs of state throughout the country;

- (5) To revise or annul inappropriate orders and directives of Ministers or of Heads of Commissions;
- (6) To revise or annul inappropriate decisions and orders of local administrative organs of state;
- (7) To put into effect the national economic plan and provisions of the state budget;
- (8) To control foreign and domestic trade;
- (9) To direct cultural, educational and public health work;
- (10) To administer affairs concerning the nationalities;
- (11) To administer affairs concerning Chinese resident abroad;
- (12) To protect the interests of the State, to maintain public order and to safeguard the rights of citizens;
- (13) To direct the conduct of external affairs;
- (14) To guide the building up of the defence forces;
- (15) To ratify the status and boundaries of autonomous Chou, counties, autonomous counties, and municipalities;
- (16) To appoint or remove administrative personnel according to provisions of law; and
- (17) To exercise such other functions and powers as are vested in it by the National People's Congress or its Standing Committee.

50. The Premier directs the work of the State Council and presides over its meetings.

The Vice-Premiers assist the Premier in his work.

51. The Ministers and Heads of Commissions direct the work of their respective departments. Ministers and Heads of Commissions may issue orders and directives within the jurisdiction of their respective departments and in accordance with laws and decrees, and decisions and orders of the State Council.

52. The State Council is responsible to the National People's Congress, reports to it, or, when the National People's Congress is not in session, to its Standing Committee.

SECTION 4. THE LOCAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESSES AND LOCAL PEOPLE'S COUNCILS

53. The Administrative division of the People's Republic of China is as follows:

- (1) The country is divided into provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the central authority;
- (2) Provinces and autonomous regions are divided into autonomous Chou, counties, autonomous counties, and municipalities;
- (3) Counties and autonomous counties are divided into Hsiang, nationality Hsiang, and towns.

Municipalities directly under the central authority and other large municipalities are divided into districts. Autonomous Chou are divided into counties, autonomous counties, and municipalities.

Autonomous regions, autonomous Chou and Autonomous counties are all national autonomous areas.

54. People's congresses and people's councils are established in provinces, municipalities directly under the central authority, counties, municipalities, municipal districts, Hsiang, nationality Hsiang, and towns. Organs of self-government are established in autonomous regions, autonomous Chou and Autonomous counties. The organization and work of organs of self-government are specified in Section Five of Chapter Two of the Constitution.

55. Local people's congresses at all levels are the local organs of state power.

56. Deputies to the people's congresses of provinces, municipalities directly under the central authority, counties, and municipalities divided into districts are elected by the people's congresses of the next lower level; deputies to the people's congresses of municipalities not divided into districts, municipal districts, Hsiang, nationality Hsiang and towns are directly elected by the voters.

The number of deputies to local people's congresses and the manner of their election are prescribed by Electoral Law.

57. The term of office of the provincial people's congresses is four years. The term of office of the people's congresses of municipalities directly under the central authority, counties, municipalities, municipal districts, Hsiang, nationality Hsiang, and towns is two years.

58. The local people's congresses at every level ensure the observance and execution of laws and decrees in their respective administrative areas; draw up plans for local economic and cultural development and for public works; examine and approve local budgets and financial reports; protect public property; maintain public order; safeguard the rights of citizens and the equal rights of national minorities.

59. The local people's congresses elect, and have power to recall, members of the people's councils at corresponding levels.

The people's congresses at county level and above elect, and have power to recall, the presidents of people's courts at corresponding levels.

60. The local people's congresses adopt and issue decisions within the limits of the authority prescribed by law.

The people's congresses of nationality Hsiang may, within the limits of the authority prescribed by law, take specific measures appropriate to the characteristics of the nationalities concerned.

The local people's congresses have power to revise or annul inappropriate decisions and orders of people's councils at corresponding levels.

The people's congresses at county level and above have power to revise or annul inappropriate decisions of people's congresses at the next lower level as well as inappropriate decisions and orders of people's councils at the next lower level.

61. Deputies to the people's congresses of provinces, municipalities under the central authority, counties, and municipalities divided into districts are subject to supervision by the units which elect them.

the people's congresses of municipalities not divided into districts, municipal districts, Hsiang, nationality Hsiang, and towns are subject to supervision by their electorates. The electoral units and electorates which elect the deputies to the local people's congresses have power at any time to recall their deputies according to the procedure prescribed by law.

62. Local people's councils, that is, local people's governments, are executive organs of local people's congresses at corresponding levels, and are the local administrative organs of state.

63. A local people's council is composed according to its level, of the Provincial Governor and Deputy Provincial Governors; or the Mayor and Deputy Mayors; or the County Head and Deputy County Heads; or the District Head and Deputy District Heads; or the Hsiang Head and the Deputy Hsiang Heads; or the Town Head and Deputy Town Heads, as the case may be; together with other members.

The term of office of a local people's council is the same as that of the people's congress at corresponding level.

The organization of local people's councils is determined by law.

64. The local people's councils administer their respective areas within the limits of the authority prescribed by law.

The local people's councils carry out the decisions of people's congresses at corresponding levels and decisions and orders of administrative organs of state at higher levels.

The local people's councils issue decisions and orders within the limits of the authority prescribed by law.

65. The people's councils at county level and above direct the work of their subordinate departments and of people's councils at lower levels, as well as appoint or remove personnel of organs of state according to law.

The people's councils at county level and above have power to suspend the execution of inappropriate decisions by people's congresses at the lower level; and to revise or annul inappropriate orders and directives by their subordinate departments, and inappropriate decisions and orders by people's councils at lower levels.

66. The local people's councils are responsible to the people's congress at corresponding levels and to the administrative organs of state at the higher level, and report to them.

The local people's councils throughout the country are administrative organs of state which are under the unified leadership of, and subordinate to, the State Council.

SECTION 5. THE ORGANS OF SELF-GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL AUTONOMOUS AREAS

67. The organs of self-government of all autonomous regions, autonomous prefectures and autonomous counties are formed in accordance with the basic principle

governing the organization of local organs of state as specified in Section Four of Chapter Two of the Constitution. The form of each organ or self-government may be determined in accordance with the wishes of the majority of the people of the nationality or nationalities enjoying regional autonomy in a given area.

68. In all autonomous regions, autonomous Chou and Autonomous counties where a number of nationalities live together, each nationality is entitled to appropriate representation on the organs of self-government.

69. The organs of self-government of all autonomous regions, autonomous Chou and autonomous counties exercise the functions and powers of local organs of state as specified in Section 4 of Chapter Two of the Constitution.

70. The organs of self-government of all autonomous regions, autonomous Chou and autonomous counties exercise autonomy within the limits of the authority prescribed by the Constitution and the law.

The organs of self-government of all autonomous regions, autonomous Chou and autonomous counties administer their own local finances within the limits of the authority prescribed by law.

The organs of self government of all autonomous regions, autonomous Chou and autonomous counties organize their local public security forces in accordance with the military system of the State.

The organs of self-government of all autonomous regions, autonomous Chou and autonomous counties may draw up regulations governing the exercise of autonomy and other special regulations suited to the political, economic and cultural characteristics of the nationality or nationalities in a given area and submit any such regulations to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for approval.

71. In performing their duties, organs of self government of all autonomous regions, autonomous Chou and autonomous counties employ the spoken and written language or languages commonly used by the nationality or nationalities in a given area.

72. The higher organs of state should fully safeguard the right of organs of self-government of all autonomous regions, autonomous Chou and autonomous counties to exercise autonomy, and should assist the various national minorities in their political, economic and cultural development.

SECTION 6. THE PEOPLE'S COURTS AND THE PEOPLE'S PROCURATORATE

73. In the People's Republic of China judicial authority is exercised by the Supreme People's Court, local people's courts and special people's courts.

74. The term of office of the President of the Supreme People's Court and Presidents of local people's courts is four years.

The organization of people's courts is determined by law.

75. The system of people's assessors applies, in accordance with judicial proceedings in the people's courts.

76. Cases in the people's courts are heard in public unless otherwise provided for by law. The accused has the right to defence.

77. Citizens of all nationalities have the right to use their own spoken and written languages in court proceedings. The people's courts are to provide interpretation for any party unacquainted with the spoken or written language commonly used in the locality.

In an area entirely or largely inhabited by a national minority or where a number of nationalities live together, hearings in people's courts are conducted in the language commonly used in the locality, and judgments, notices and all other documents of the people's courts are made public in such language.

78. In administering justice the people's courts are independent, subject only to the law.

79. The Supreme People's Court is the highest judicial organ.

The Supreme People's Court supervises the judicial work of local people's courts and special people's courts; people's courts at higher levels supervise the judicial work of people's courts at lower levels.

80. The Supreme People's Court is responsible to the National People's Congress and reports to it; or, when the National People's Congress is not in session, to its Standing Committee. Local people's courts are responsible to the local people's congresses at corresponding levels and report to them.

81. The Supreme People's Procuratorate of the People's Republic of China exercises procuratorial authority over all departments of the State Council, all local organs of state, persons working in organs of state, and citizens to ensure observance of the law. Local organs of the People's Procuratorate and special people's procuratorates exercise procuratorial authority within the limits prescribed by law.

Local organs of the People's Procuratorate and the special people's procuratorates work under the leadership of the people's procuratorates at higher levels, and all work under the unified leadership of the Supreme People's Procuratorate.

82. The term of office of the Chief Procurator of the Supreme People's Procuratorate is four years.

The organization of people's procuratorates is determined by law.

83. In the exercise of their authority local organs of the People's Procuratorate are independent and are not subject to interference by local organs of state.

84. The Supreme People's Procuratorate is responsible to the National People's Congress and reports to it; or, when the National People's Congress is not in session, to its Standing Committee.

85. Citizens of the People's Republic of China are equal before the law.

86. Citizens of the People's Republic of China who have reached the age of eighteen have the right to vote and stand for election whatever their nationality, race, sex, occupation, social origin, religious belief, education, property status, or length of residence, except insane persons and persons deprived by law of the right to vote and stand for election.

Women have equal rights with men to vote and stand for election.

87. Citizens of the People's Republic of China have freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, freedom of procession and freedom of demonstration. By providing the necessary material facilities, the State guarantees to citizens enjoyment of these freedoms.

88. Citizens of the People's Republic of China have freedom of religious belief.

89. Freedom of the person of citizens of the People's Republic of China is inviolable. No citizen may be arrested except by decision of a people's court or with the sanction of a people's procuratorate.

90. The homes of citizens of the People's Republic of China are inviolable and privacy of correspondence is protected by law.

Citizens of the People's Republic of China have freedom of residence and freedom to change their residence.

91. Citizens of the People's Republic of China have the right to work. To guarantee enjoyment of this right, the State, by planned development of the national economy, gradually creates more employment, and better working conditions and wages.

92. Working people in the People's Republic of China have the right to rest and leisure. To guarantee enjoyment of this right, the State prescribes working hours and holidays for workers and office employees; at the same time it gradually expands material facilities to enable working people to rest and build up their health.

93. Working people in the People's Republic of China have the right to material assistance in old age, illness or disability. To guarantee enjoyment of this right, the State provides social insurance, social assistance and public health services and gradually expands these facilities.

94. Citizens of the People's Republic of China have the right to education. To guarantee enjoyment of this right, the State establishes and gradually extends the various types of schools and other cultural and educational institutions.

The State pays special attention to the physical and mental of young peoples.

95. The People's Republic of China safeguards the freedom of citizens to engage in scientific research, literary and artistic creation and other cultural activity. The State encourages and assists citizens engaged in science, education, literature, art and other fields of culture to pursue their creative work.
96. In the People's Republic of China women enjoy equal rights with men in all spheres - political, economic, cultural, social and domestic.
- The State protects marriage, the family, and the mother and child.
97. Citizens of the People's Republic of China have the right to bring complaints against any person working in organs of state for transgression of law or neglect of duty by making a written or verbal statement to any organ of state at any level. People suffering loss as a result of infringement by persons working in organs of state of their rights as citizens have the right to compensation.
98. The People's Republic of China protects the proper rights and interest of Chinese resident abroad.
99. The People's Republic of China grants the right of asylum to any foreign national persecuted for supporting a just cause, taking part in the peace movement or engaging in scientific activity.
100. Citizens of the People's Republic of China must abide by the Constitution and the law, uphold discipline at work, keep public order and respect social ethics.
101. The public property of the People's Republic of China is sacred and inviolable. It is the duty of every citizen to respect and protect public property.
102. It is the duty of citizens of the People's Republic of China to pay taxes according to law.
103. It is the sacred duty of every citizen of the People's Republic of China to defend the homeland.
- It is the honorable duty of citizens of the People's Republic of China to perform military service according to law.

CHAPTER IV. NATIONAL FLAG, STATE EMBLEM, CAPITAL

104. The national flag of the People's Republic of China is a red flag with five stars.
105. The state emblem of the People's Republic of China is: in the center, Tien An Men under the light of five stars, framed with ears of grain, and with a cogwheel at the base.
106. The capital of the People's Republic of China is Peking.

